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Abstract 
 
This study examines the macro and micro level determinants of the quality of reported 
earnings.  The prior literature suggests that both micro and macro variables impact on 
discretionary accruals choice in managing earnings.  However, most of the studies on 
earnings management have been single country studies that have focussed only on micro 
variables as all firms within the samples examined have been subject to the same interplay of 
macro economic, legal, cultural and institutional frameworks.  This study addresses this gap 
in the literature by using a sample of 156,906 firm year observations from 63 countries over 
the period 1998-2007 to examine the role of thirteen micro and macro variables in 
determining earnings quality.  
The macro variables studied include legal enforcement, political system, and control 
of corruption, culture and adoption of IFRS. Earnings management is estimated using the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) in a cross section (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Francis et al. 1998).   
The results of the study indicate that macro and micro level variables have a strong 
impact on earnings management behaviour and thus earnings quality.  The limits imposed by 
a country’s legal, cultural and institutional setting on managerial discretionary accruals 
choices, strongly impact the quality of reported earnings.  Future research on earnings 
management should therefore control both micro and macro level variables.  
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1.1 Introduction 
This study examines the macro and micro-level determinants of earnings 
management. Most studies on earnings management attempt to identify firm 
attributes affecting earnings management by analyzing cross-sectional variation in 
earnings quality1 in a single country setting, that is, where all firms operate under the 
same institutional, economic, and regulatory arrangement. While this approach has 
merit, it ignores the context in which accounting information is produced in that it 
fails to capture the role of macro variables such as rule of law, economic freedom, 
press freedom, degree of corruption, level of auditor professionalism, effectiveness of 
securities market oversight bodies, and rigor of law enforcement (both securities law 
and other laws). Therefore, the present study deals with a multi country sample of 
156,906 firm year observations from 63 countries and thus permits investigation of 
the impact on earnings quality of both firm level and country level variables2. As 
such, the present study extends and complements the accounting literature that 
examines the association between governance quality and firms’ earnings 
management practices. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the 
background of the study. Section 1.3 discusses the significance of earnings 
management. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 discuss the relevance of macro and micro 
governance on earnings management. Section 1.6 discusses the motivation for the 
study and, finally, Section 1.7 sets out the structure of the thesis. 
                                                 
1 In the accounting literature, the terms, earnings quality, and accounting quality are interchangeably used. 
 
2  In the accounting literature, the terms firm level and micro governance and country level and macro governance are 
interchangeably used. 
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1.2 Background of the study 
Financial statements prepared by business organizations are expected to provide 
information relevant to users making investment, enduring and other decisions. To be 
useful, these statements should be prepared on the basis of accounting principles 
generally accepted in the country or jurisdiction (GAAP) where the firm is based or 
where its securities are listed. GAAP in any jurisdiction provides a degree of latitude 
in allowing firms to selectively use principles and procedures in accounting for and 
reporting firm performance to stakeholders. Managers’ have information advantage 
over the users of accounting information and they can use this advantage in selecting 
the procedures for estimation and even the timing and language of disclosure to suit 
their own short-term goals, often to the detriment of the long-term value of the firm. 
This potentially decreases the value of accounting as a relevant and credible form of 
communication. Opportunistic use of this discretion is described as “earnings 
management”, in which managers choose reporting methods and estimates to bias 
accounting numbers by masking true firm performance. At least two aspects of the 
debate on alternative accounting policy choice are relevant at this point. One, whether 
choice in accounting should exist at all, that is whether managers should be allowed 
to choose a method to account for an underlying economic event from a pool of 
methods -  all of which are regarded as being legitimate? Two, whether the existence 
of choice per se has a link to managerial opportunism in the form of earnings 
management (Houlthausen and Larker 1996). Unfortunately, neither aspect of the 
accounting policy choice debate has been resolved although in recent years regulators 
appear to prefer fewer choices over more. In regards to reporting flexibility, Mulford 
and Comiskey (2002) believe flexibility is essential to allow accounting numbers to 
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reflect the often varied underlying economic substance of the transactions undertaken 
by firms even within the same industry. The US SEC is clearly in favour of fewer 
options while many IASB standards still allow choices. In spite of the recent wave of 
global convergence of accounting standards, it appears likely that legitimate 
accounting choices will remain a fact of life. 
Besides the existence of choice in accounting, accrual accounting of itself 
creates opportunities for earnings management. The principal goal of accrual 
accounting is to help stakeholders assess an entity’s economic performance through 
the use of a number of accounting principles such as revenue recognition and 
matching (FASB 1985). However, accrual accounting is often subjective, leaving 
room for managerial discretion and hence a potential for misuse. Thus, on the one 
hand, accrual accounting is expected to enhance the value of accounting information 
by improving relevance and allowing managers to share their private knowledge of 
the firm with outsiders. On the other hand, the subjectivity involved in accrual 
accounting could allow managers to be opportunistic and mislead investors in order 
to acquire private gains. Therefore, understanding earnings management requires 
understanding managerial intent. It is important to note that neither the existence of 
accounting alternatives nor application of the accrual basis of accounting per se result 
in earnings management. Rather it is the managerial intent behind using a particular 
discretion that may result in earnings management (Mulford and Comiskey 2002).  
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 Diagram 1-1: The distinction between fraud and earnings management 
 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) makes explicit reference to the lack of a clear 
definition of earnings management in both the academic and professional literature. 
They offer their own view on how different types of managerial choices can be 
characterized, as reproduced in Diagram 1-1. Academic research on earnings 
management has focused much on identifying various incentives for earnings 
management and how to appropriately measure the ‘managed’ portion of reported 
earnings. Recent research has further extended the boundary of earnings management 
to identify factors that constrain earnings management behavior of corporate 
managers.  
The bulk of the research on earnings management has been conducted on 
countries with more effective governance mechanisms in place. Few studies have 
“Conservative 
Accounting”
“Neutral Earnings”
“Aggressive 
Accounting”
“Fraudulent 
Accounting” 
Within GAAP
- Overly aggressive recognition 
      of provisions or reserves
- Over valuation of acquired in 
      process R  & D in purchase 
      acquisitions 
- Overstatement of 
      restructuring charges and asset 
      writeo-offs 
- Earnings that result from a 
      neutral operation of the 
      process
- Understatement of the 
      provision for bad debts
- Drawing down provision or 
      reserves in an overly aggressive 
      manner
Violates GAAP
- Recording sales before they 
    are “realizable”
- Recording fictitious sales
- Backdating sales invoices
- Overstating inventory by 
    recording fictitious inventory
- Delaying sales
- Accelerating  R &D or 
     advertising expenditures
- Postponing R & D or 
     advertising expenditures 
- Accelerating sales
      Accounting Choices      “Real” Cash Flow Choices 
The Distinction between Fraud and Earnings Management 
Source : Dechow & Skinner (2000 : 239 )
Source : Dechow & Skinner (2000 : 239 ) 
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focussed on emerging markets where it is relatively easier for management to 
expropriate minority shareholders’ interest because of lack of effective governance 
structure such as dispersed ownership, independent boards, independent auditors, 
existence of active takeover markets, and higher quality disclosure. Moreover, the 
extant literature focuses mainly on firm-level determinants of earnings management 
and thus largely ignores cross-country variation due to macro governance factors. 
Only a handful of studies have been undertaken to examine the possible effect of 
political, cultural, and institutional governance mechanisms on earnings quality at a 
county level. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the 
impact of macro as well as micro governance factors on earnings management from a 
global perspective. 
 
1.3 Significance of earnings management 
Accounting numbers are extensively used in writing contracts between and among 
stakeholders, most of whom are external to the firm. They do not have physical or 
direct access to the day-to-day operations of the business and rely heavily on the 
accounting numbers produced by the accounting information systems, certified by 
directors and verified by auditors. Since the seminal work of Beaver (1968) and Ball 
and Brown (1968), much evidence has accumulated showing that accounting 
numbers have information content, albeit of different magnitudes. The very 
functioning of financial markets involving trillions of dollars of transactions every 
day critically depends on the credibility of accounting numbers underlying those 
transactions. Therefore, the need for high quality of accounting numbers in general 
and accounting earnings in particular cannot be overemphasized. The high profile 
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accounting scandals of the last decade emphasise the high reliance of global 
capitalism on the veracity of the financial statements of publicly held corporations. 
There is a relatively long history of debate between regulators, auditors, and 
academic researchers on the potential threat of earnings management that reduces the 
quality of financial reporting (La Porta et al. 1999).  
“Earnings management” has been a key concern of the IASB, FASB, AICPA, 
PCAOB and other regulatory bodies and is the central reason behind many aspects of 
accounting regulation (Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002). It impacts on the confidence of 
investors and other actors in all financial markets. In recent years there has been a 
heightened emphasis on corporate governance issues. Most countries have either 
adopted SOX-type rules for the corporate sectors or legislated similar provisions to 
improve accountability and transparency. However, most regulators have not 
addressed or are powerless to address the political governance prevailing in their 
countries. Accountability and transparency at the macro governance level has largely 
escaped scrutiny. This study reflects the view that improvement in accounting quality 
cannot be achieved by effecting reforms in corporate boardrooms alone. It is 
therefore important to work on the political (macro) governance framework vis-a-vis 
corporate governance if improvement in accounting quality is to be made. For this 
reason, this study contributes to the literature by incorporating a comprehensive set of 
governance (both micro and macro) variables on a sample drawn from across the 
globe. The concept of earnings quality relates to preparers understanding the 
economic substance of a transaction, and then reflecting it without distortion in the 
books of the firm. However, this is not always a simple task, as accounting rules are 
not always black and white, and with transactions becoming ever more complex. The 
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CFO, an expert in the management of process, technology and resources has a key 
role in a company’s decision-making process to guide and shape decisions that make 
better sense of transactions within the context of GAAP and regulatory reporting 
requirements. 
  While managing the underlying operations of a business to achieve a desired 
outcome or to hit an earnings target is entirely appropriate; managing earnings 
estimates to hit earnings targets however, is not an acceptable means. The IASB, 
FASB, AICPA and other regulatory bodies continue to provide guidance and 
direction to ensure that the financial reporting community report high quality 
earnings and provide the necessary disclosures to enable the investing public to make 
better informed decisions. One way of doing this is through the creation of a robust 
performance measurement system incorporating both financial and non-financial 
measures that not only measure the current performance and position but are also 
predictive of future conditions in the business. Knowing and understanding key 
metrics in a company can lead to better decision-making and reporting, and thus 
higher quality of earnings. Having an effective early-warning system in place could 
obviate any need for managing earnings. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as the alteration of 
firms’ reported economic performance by insiders to either “mislead some 
stakeholders” or to “influence contractual outcomes.” The disclosure of “true and 
fair” financial earnings is crucial to corporate governance because it provides 
outsiders with a basis to monitor their claims and exercise their rights (OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance 1999). The incentives to misrepresent firm 
performance through earnings management arise from the conflict of interest between 
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the firms’ insiders and outsiders. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out, insiders 
have an incentive to use the firms’ resources in a way that benefits them, possibly at 
the expense of outsiders. In the presence of extensive earnings management, financial 
reports inaccurately reflect firm performance and consequently the ability of outsiders 
to monitor the performance of the firm is weakened. The ability of insiders to acquire 
private control benefits is limited by an explicit institutional framework, through 
corporate governance mechanisms and the legal system in protecting the interests of 
outside minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 2000). 
The majority of studies on earnings management are performed at firm level, 
within one country. Typically, the research investigates the relationship between 
corporate governance settings and earnings management (Peasnell et al. 2000; 
Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991). Recently, several studies 
have compared macro governance settings and management practices across 
countries (Leuz et al. 2003; Francis and Wang 2008). Prior research suggests that 
greater legal protection of outside investors increases insiders’ costs of diverting firm 
profits or assets (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2000; Claessens et al. 2000a; Nenova 
2000). Consistently, Leuz et al. (2003) find a significant negative relationship 
between outside minority protection and earnings management.  
 
1.4 Earnings management and macro governance 
Reports of earnings management frequently appear in the financial press. The 
Financial Times (June 19, 2004) reports that UK companies were less likely to use 
aggressive accounting practices to manage their earnings than a few years ago 
because of changes in the corporate environment. This report preliminary finding by 
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John Collier, chief executive of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, the threat of aggressive earnings management could increase when financial 
markets start to heat up again. Many corporate respondents interviewed by Mr. 
Collier complained of the considerable pressure that companies remained under to 
meet market expectations, for fear of being labelled “unreliable” by analysts. Bonuses 
are also cited as a cause of aggressive earnings management. In September 1998, UK 
accounting standard setters attempted to limit the use of provisions as a profit 
manipulation device. The Accountant (November 1, 1998) reports this event with an 
article titled “Standard-setter bans ‘big-bath’ accounting.” By depressing profits in 
good years and bumping up the bottom line when times are bad, over-generous 
provisions are a classic creative accounting device for smoothing earnings. In good 
years UK companies made excessive provisions for future reorganizations, and later 
fed those provisions back into income. 
Prior academic literature tends to argue that high-quality investor protection, 
strong legal enforcement, and a common law legal system are fundamental 
determinants of high-quality financial statement numbers (Luez et al. 2003). This 
study contributes to a growing literature that examines how a country’s corporate 
governance model, legal system and the existence and enforcement of laws, and other 
institutional factors affect the quality of reported financial information.  
Consistent with Kothari (2000), this study argues that the quality of financial 
information is a function of both the quality of accounting standards and the 
regulatory enforcement of the standards that is macro governance. In line with Ball et 
al. (2003), the present study argues that a country with high-quality accounting 
standards would or does not necessarily have high-quality reported financial 
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information. However, it is extremely unlikely that a country with a low-quality 
accounting and disclosure system would have high-quality reported financial 
information, even though it has strong investor protection and legal enforcement. 
Hung (2001) examines the relation between accrual accounting and the value 
relevance of accounting measures in countries with different levels of shareholder 
protection. She finds that stronger shareholder protection improves the effectiveness 
of the accrual system. She argues that accrual accounting provides better matching of 
revenues and expenses than cash accounting and therefore makes accounting 
information more value relevant. However, accrual accounting also presents more 
opportunities for managers to manage earnings and hence may cause accounting 
information to be less value relevant. She predicts that weak shareholder protection 
will attenuate this negative impact.  
Hope (2003) investigates the relation between the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure, and the relation between 
forecast accuracy and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. He finds 
that firm-level disclosures in annual reports are positively associated with analyst 
forecast accuracy, suggesting that such disclosures provide useful information to 
analysts. Using a comprehensive measure of enforcement, he finds that strong 
enforcement is associated with higher forecast accuracy. He concludes that 
enforcement encourages managers to follow prescribed accounting rules, which in 
turn reduces analysts’ uncertainty about future earnings. 
A potential question is why managers would choose to “openly” manage 
earnings if it could have negative effects on investors’ willingness to hold shares. In 
some cases, it may result from managers creating capacity for personal gain. 
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However, it is important to note that earnings management, even if it reduces 
investors’ willingness to trade, may be optimal for the firm. For example, in many 
countries stakeholders other than shareholders are important and this may create 
incentives to manage earnings. Labour unions, for instance, may create incentives to 
manage earnings because high profits attract greater compensation demands while 
losses create concerns about viability. Similarly, firms may manage earnings to 
reduce perceived risk and attract lower interest rates on debt, lower taxes or reduce 
political costs. Dichev and Tang (2005) suggest that earnings management is a 
function of matching and could enhance transparency while research such as Leuz et 
al. (2003) argues that opportunistic smoothing reduces transparency. Similarly, this 
study expects that both factors may be at work in practice, with innate earnings 
management increasing transparency and discretionary smoothing increasing opacity. 
While the former effect may dominate in US settings, where governance tends to be 
relatively strong, this study expects that the latter effect may be particularly 
pronounced in certain country settings where incentives to manage earnings may be 
relatively strong and oversight relatively weak.  
This study seeks to identify the effects, if any, of macro governance, in 
particular, country level governance on earnings management. It views rule of law, 
press freedom, judiciary independence, institutional settings, political systems, and 
corruption as constituents of “macro-level governance.” Macro-level governance 
prescribes desirable modes of wielding political, economic, or other forms of power. 
This study postulates that the potency of such norms depends upon the effectiveness 
of prevailing macro level governance in a society. Poor political governance breeds 
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corruption and this in turn is likely to impede production of high quality accounting 
numbers. This leads to the question: 
 
“Does macro governance influence earnings management?” 
 
1.5 Earnings management and micro governance 
‘Earnings management’ is a form of earnings manipulation that is likely to reduce the 
quality of earnings that interference with the estimation process to misrepresent 
reality is, by definition, poor quality 3 This relation is empirically established in the 
literature (Francis and Wang 2008; Hope et al. 2008; Wang et al. 1994; Ali and 
Hwang 1995; and Cheng et al. 1997). When mangers manage earnings for 
opportunistic purposes, accounting earnings become a less dependable measure of a 
firms’ financial performance. Accordingly, it is justifiable to use earnings 
management as an indicator of the quality of earnings. 
Accounting earnings are more dependable and consequently of higher quality 
when managers’ opportunistic behaviour is controlled using monitoring systems 
(Wild 1996; Dechow et al. 1996). Klein (2002b) and Peasnell et al. (2000a) show that 
                                                 
3 Managers have some degree of flexibility and discretion in reporting their financial performance and they may use it either 
opportunistically to manage earnings (Christie and Zimmerman 1994) or they may use it to communicate private value-relevant 
information about the firm’s future performance (Jones 1991; Healy and Palepu 1993). However, much of the extant literature 
finds that earnings management is carried out with the intention of either misleading financial statement users or of biasing 
contractual outcomes that depend on accounting earnings. Recent studies have provided evidence of income-increasing 
opportunistic earnings management related to initial public offerings (Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998), seasoned public 
offerings (Teoh et al. 1998b), stock financed acquisitions (Erickson and Wang 1998), meeting analyst earnings expectations 
(Payne and Robb 2000; Burgstahler and Eames 2006), meeting management forecasts (Kasznik 1999), and avoiding earnings 
decreases and losses (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Examples of settings leading to income-decreasing earnings management 
include management buyouts (DeAngelo 1988; Perry and Williams 1994), executive compensation (Healy 1985; Holthausen et 
al. 1995), and appeals for import relief (Jones 1991). This body of research has found convincing evidence of opportunistic 
earnings management in settings where strong incentives to manage earnings exist. 
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monitoring attributable to micro or firm-level governance reduces managements’ 
capacity to manage earnings.4 Monitoring attributable to firm-level governance has 
the capacity to improve the dependability of accounting earnings; and therefore, 
increases the quality of accounting earnings. Micro governance also helps investors 
by aligning the interest of managers with the interests of shareholders and enhancing 
the dependability of financial information and the integrity of the financial reporting 
process (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).5 The results of Gul and Tsui (2001) support 
the effectiveness of micro governance as a monitoring system. Given that earnings 
management is negatively related with micro governance and that micro governance 
is positively related with the integrity of the financial reporting process, it is then 
justifiable to also use micro governance as an indicator of the quality of accounting 
earnings. 
If micro governance and/or earnings management improve the explanatory 
power of accounting earnings, then the results should support the proposition that 
investors use other value relevant information (i.e. micro governance and earnings 
management) to assess earnings quality. There is little guidance on how micro 
governance impacts on the quality of accounting earnings. Prior research offers no 
comprehensive theoretical explanation for the role earnings management tends to 
                                                 
4 Micro governance is a system used to achieve firm objectives and monitor performance (OECD 1999). Good micro-level 
governance should align the objectives of management with the objectives of shareholders (Cadbury report 1992; OECD 1999) 
and should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby encouraging managers to use resources more efficiently (OECD 1999). 
 
5 Micro governance’s primary objective is not to directly improve corporate performance, but to resolve agency problems by 
aligning management’s interests with the interests of shareholders (Maher and Andersson 2000). A large segment of the firm-
level governance literature focuses on directly linking firm-level governance to corporate performance. Empirical results from 
the literature are mixed and indecisive (Lawrence and Stapledon 1999). 
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play in the micro governance-earnings management relationship. As a result, the 
second relevant question is: 
 
“Does micro governance influence earnings management?” 
 
1.6 Motivation of the study 
The aim of the proposed study is to examine the impact of governance on accounting 
quality across national boundaries. For the purpose of this study, accounting quality is 
measured by discretionary accruals (DACCR)6. In its attempt to explain managerial 
discretion on accruals’ choice, earnings management research to date has mainly 
focused on specific characteristics of a firm including its governance. In her seminal 
work on examining managers’ accrual choice behavior, Jones (1991) finds that 
managers decrease earnings through earnings management during import relief 
investigation. Dechow et al. (1995) examine alternative accruals-based models for 
detecting earnings management. They find that a modified version of the model 
developed by Jones (1991) exhibits the most power in detecting earnings 
management. Kothari et al. (2002) finds that performance matched discretionary 
measures enhance the reliability of inferences from earnings management research 
when the hypothesis being tested does not imply that earnings management will vary 
with performance or where the control firms are not expected to have engaged in 
earnings management. 
 A significant body of earnings management research tends to relate 
accounting discretion to aspects of firm-level governance, such as  the level of 
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive discussion on discretionary accruals, see Healy and Wahlen (1999). 
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managerial ownership (Warfield et al. 1995), auditor quality (Becker et al. 1998; 
Chen et al. 2005), audit committee independence and board independence (Klein 
2002; Lin et al. 2006; Ebrahim 2007). However, individual aspects of governance 
structure are likely to be interrelated and ignoring such relationships can lead to 
spurious inferences (Bhagat and Jefferris 2002). This study contributes to the 
literature on the relation between macro and micro governance and accounting 
discretion by using a comprehensive set of governance variables. It also aims to 
identify firm-level incentives for and constraints on earnings management.  
While the area of earnings management boasts a huge body of literature 
produced over the period since Jones (1991), it ignores the role of national political 
governance arrangements such as the existence and practice of democracy, 
enforcement of law, degree of corruption in bureaucracy and government, in shaping 
managers’ earnings management behavior. The broad premise of the present study is 
based on the established argument that accounting does not exist in a vacuum, rather 
it ‘is a product of its environment’ (Mueller 1968; Nobes 1988 and 1992; Karim 
1995). Therefore, it can be argued that earnings management is more likely to take 
place in countries with higher levels of overall corruption associated with poor 
governance. In other words, the quality of political governance is linked to the quality 
of corporate governance which, in turn, is linked to the quality of accounting 
numbers.   
Given accounting differences across countries the traditional approaches taken 
in the extant earnings management literature might be considered a sensible approach 
to identify corporate attributes determining the existence and magnitude of earnings 
management within individual countries. However, with adoption of or 
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announcement of a decision to adopt IFRS by the EU, Australia, New Zealand and 
many developing countries in recent years, national accounting differences are likely 
to reduce if not disappear altogether. Therefore, the present international accounting 
scene provides an opportunity to see if differences in international governance 
arrangements are linked to observed levels of earnings management i.e. differences in 
earning quality. This study uses a multinational sample covering firms from all over 
the world as available from the OSIRIS database. This will, on the one hand, allow 
investigation of firm-level determinants of earnings quality such as size, leverage, 
profitability, timing of the issue of financial statements, likelihood of breaching debt 
covenants, in addition to corporate governance attributes such as board size, board 
effectiveness, ownership concentration extent of incentive-based compensation and 
auditor quality. On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, it will allow 
investigation of influence of macro governance variables such as country-level 
perceived corruption, freedom of judiciary, press freedom, securities market oversight 
capacity, strength of the accounting profession, national culture and level of 
bureaucratic corruption within sample countries. On the basis of above discussion, 
diagram 1-2 shows how macro and micro level governance affects earnings 
management.  
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Diagram 1-2: Motivation of the study 
 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
Chapter one has provided an introduction to the thesis.  
Chapter Two reviews the empirical studies on earnings management 
incentives with macro and micro governance and earnings management relationships.  
Chapter Three develops the research questions tested in this study. The 
research questions pertain to the relationship between both macro and micro 
governance on earnings management and reflect the review of the literature set out in 
Chapter Two. 
Chapter Four describes the research method and techniques used to test the 
research questions developed in Chapter Three. The chapter begins with an overview 
of the models and restates the propositions as research questions to be empirically 
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tested. A description of the sample, study period, and data collection is followed by 
the operationalisation of the theoretical constructs. Finally, the chapter presents an 
explanation of the analytical procedure. 
Chapter Five starts with descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. This is 
followed by the presentation of the results of the tests and the inferences drawn from 
the tests. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the robustness checks. 
Chapter Six summarises the finding of the study including limitations on the 
results. The chapter also investigates the implications of the study for practitioners, 
and regulators.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Earnings management research has addressed a variety of micro and macro 
governance mechanisms to mitigate the managerial rent seeking behaviour. This 
chapter reviews the relevant literature to date, with particular focus on possible 
motivations for and constraints on earnings management.  
The chapter proceeds with a discussion of incentives of earnings management 
in the next section. Section 2.3 discusses literature on constraints to earnings 
management while Section 2.4 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Earnings management incentives 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify two critical research design issues arising from 
earnings management literature. They argue that researchers have to first identify 
managers’ reporting incentives and secondly measure discretion in accounting 
method choices. With regard to the first issue, the literature has identified the 
following major factors : (i) Socio-political incentives; (ii) Capital market incentives; 
(iii) Contractual incentives; and (iv) Regulatory incentives; (v) Industry sectoral 
differences; and (vi) Adoption of IFRS.  
  Management exercise of discretion in accounting policy choice can be 
estimated from unexpected accruals, with some (inevitable) degree of error. To 
estimate unexpected accruals, many studies begin with total accruals, measured as the 
difference between reported net income and cash flows from operations (Jones 1991; 
Dechow et al. 1995; and Subramanyam 1996). Total accruals are then regressed on 
variables that are proxies for non-discretionary (normal) accruals, such as revenues 
(or cash collections from customers), to allow for typical working capital needs (such 
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as receivables, inventory, and trade credit), and gross fixed assets to allow for normal 
depreciation. Discretionary (unexpected) accruals are thus the unexplained (i.e. the 
residual) component of total accruals.  A number of recent studies have developed 
estimates of the unexpected components of specific accruals, such as loan loss 
provisions for banks, claim loss reserves for property casualty insurers (Beaver and 
McNichols 1998; Petroni 1992), and deferred tax valuation allowances.  
 
2.2.1 Socio-political incentives 
Culturally diverse views on macro governance as a desirable mode of governance 
date from antiquity. The scholastic debate over the optimal mechanisms of social 
order has not subsided since. Collectively referred to as “social institutions” (or 
simply “institutions”), macro governance, together with accountability and curbing 
corruption, are considered primary mediators for development.7 These principles are 
the central tenets in international institutions’ policies on “good governance” and 
“empowerment” (IMF 1997; World Bank 2000 and 2001). International bodies are 
careful to acknowledge that reform programs need to be attentive to broader country-
level governance yet fail to specify ways to achieve this goal. The social, cultural, 
political, legal and economic environment that is broader governance affects the 
accounting accrual choices of a firm. Accounting literature provides evidence that 
social values are reflected in accounting values (Pourgalali and Meek 1995). 
Accounting practices (or accounting values) are affected by cultural and social 
values. Different accounting practices result in different choice of accounting 
                                                 
7 The literature on this subject is burgeoning. For sample works, Kufamnn et al. (1999); Knack and Keefer (1995); La Porta et 
al. (1997a); Hall and Jones (1999); Mauro (1995 and 1997) and Easterly and Levine (2002). 
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accruals. As a result, this study proposes that accounting values affect the choice of 
earnings management. For example, countries with a high degree of conservatism 
may choose income decreasing accruals more often than those with a low degree of 
conservatism. On the other hand, if a country is ranked high in secrecy, then the 
accounting information systems would provide a greater chance for earnings 
management since managers are not required to disclose as much information as 
managers of countries that are ranked low in secrecy. Socio-political incentives on 
earnings management can be classified into five categories: 
 
2.2.1.1 Degree of enforcement 
In principle, a strong system of legal enforcement could substitute for weak rules 
since active and well-functioning courts can step in and rescue investors from the 
adverse effects of management discretion. A legal system providing investor 
protection helps resolve agency problems (La Porta et al. 2000). Countries whose 
legal systems protect shareholders have relatively larger and broader capital markets 
(La Porta et al. 1997). La Porta et al. (1998) find evidence, based on 49 countries, that 
common law countries generally have the strongest investor protection while French 
civil law countries have the weakest protection with, German-Scandinavian civil law 
countries sitting in the middle. Countries with strong property laws and enforcement 
mechanisms facilitate informed arbitrage and capitalization of firm specific 
information (Morck et al. 2000). In response to the above studies, Shen and Chih 
(2005) used banking industry data to calculate earnings management across 48 
countries based on the methodologies of DeGeorge et al. (1999) and Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997). They find that the propensity to avoid small losses and report small 
 25
increases in earnings is quite pervasive in the banking sector around the world. They 
also suggest that legal enforcement is a key factor in explaining variation in earnings 
management across countries. 
Brown and Higgins (2001) compare the distribution of earnings surprises in 
the US to those of 12 other countries and provide evidence that US managers are 
relatively more likely to manage earnings surprises due to differences in US firm-
level governance and legal environments. The US ranks among the top of all 
countries in investor protection (La Porta et al. 1998). Managers who knowingly 
make misleading or false forecasts are subject to liability under both SEC Act of 1934 
via Rule 10b-5 and the principles of common law. A typical 10b-5 lawsuit occurs 
after a steep stock price decline, where plaintiffs allege that they bought stock at 
inflated prices because managers either failed to disclose materially adverse 
information or disseminated overly optimistic information (Kellogg 1984; Francis et 
al. 1994). 
The legal liability climate is more intense in the US than any other country 
due to the American rule and its uses of class action suits. The American rules require 
each party to bear its own costs, including litigation (Hughes and Snyder 1995). In 
contrast, the English rule, used in most of the Western world, requires losers to pay 
the winners legal fees, reducing the frequency of low-merit claims (Hughes and 
Snyder 1995). Legal liability is lower in France, Germany and Japan, whose judicial 
systems are less favourable to plaintiffs than are the US and the UK, and the legal 
risk is low (but increasing) (Frost 1999). Civil litigation is rare in continental 
European countries compared to the US and the UK (Ball et al. 2000). As a result, 
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non-US managers providing negative earnings surprises face fewer, less severe legal 
expenses.  
Following English rules, class action suits are generally not permitted in other 
common law countries (Romano 1993). Once a judge allows a case in the US to 
receive class action status, defendants often capitulate given the sheer number of 
plaintiffs. The rate of class action suits kept rising in the US despite laws to curb 
abusive litigation. Plaintiffs agree to settle less often than they used to, and they seek 
larger and larger percentages of recovery. After a stock drops, litigious shareholders 
seek to be appointed lead plaintiffs, as being so named means higher compensation. 
 
2.2.1.2 Institutional setting 
In general, a strong institutional setting facilitates reduced private benefits that 
insiders receive because of their affiliation with the corporation (Dyck and Zingales 
2002). To understand this causal relation, consider directors’ incentives in countries 
with weak institutional settings. A distinctive feature of such countries is that 
managers and directors (collectively known as insiders) receive large personal 
benefits from their controlling positions through various forms of self-dealing, such 
as additional stock issuance to insiders and sophisticated transfer pricing schemes 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For example, in some countries it is common for 
corporations to routinely sell assets to insider-controlled companies at below-market 
prices and for corporations to purchase assets from insider-controlled vendors at 
above-market prices. Thus, directors in these countries frequently profit from their 
affiliation with the firm through activities that involve colluding with other insiders. 
Furthermore, because self-dealing is not consistent with profit maximization, the 
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directors themselves are likely to bear at least partial responsibility for firms with 
poor earnings and stock price performance 
Institutional weakness provides incentive for managing earnings. In the 
absence of strict enforcement of law, managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management due to the low probability of being caught and low cost associated with 
being disciplined if caught. Peter (2004) recommends strengthening the institutional 
base and policy efforts to reduce insiders’ private control and earnings management 
activities.  Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006) test the determinants of earnings opacity 
internationally. The determinants are hypothesized to be the elements of the social, 
economic and accounting order in each of the 34 countries of the study. They find 
that earnings opacity internationally is negatively related to the levels of economic 
freedom and quality of life, and positively related to the rule of law, economic growth 
and level of corruption. Further, the findings are surprising in that the level of 
disclosure, the number of auditors per 100,000 inhabitants and the adoption of 
international accounting standards (as elements of the accounting order) are not 
significantly related to earnings opacity internationally. It appears that the social and 
economic climate rather than the technical accounting climate is at the core of the 
lack of accounting quality in general and earnings opacity in particular. Soderstrom 
and Sun (2008) suggests that accounting quality is a function of the firms’ overall 
institutional setting, including the legal and political system of the country in which 
the firm resides. 
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2.2.1.3 Political system 
Recent accounting scandals in countries across the globe have sparked strong reaction 
from shareholders and other parties against accounting quality. Dozens of high profile 
corporate failures that were somehow linked to accounting irregularities also 
discredited the accounting and auditing profession. Even prior to these recent 
collapses, the political system was viewed as one of the main obstacles facing post-
communist countries in attempts to establish democratic institutions and open, market 
economies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). As yet there is limited knowledge about what 
causes accounting manipulation in one country to be higher than that in another. 
While theories abound and cross-country studies examining details of accounting 
manipulation in particular countries or regions are increasing in number, cross-
national comparative empirical research is much rarer. The difficulty of measuring 
relative levels of perceived accounting quality in different countries has presented a 
major obstacle. Recently, however, economists and political scientists have begun to 
analyze indexes of ‘perceived’ accounting quality prepared by business risk analysts 
and polling organizations, based on survey responses of businessmen and local 
residents. 
Why do managers in some firms misuse discretionary power for private gains 
more frequently, and for large payoffs, than do managers in others? The manager can 
be construed as balancing the expected cost of earnings manipulations, including 
psychological and social as well as financial costs, against expected benefits. Political 
scientists and economists have suggested a variety of characteristics of countries’ 
economic, political, and social systems that might affect expected costs, benefits, or 
both. As rule of law is considered a precondition for democracy survival, democratic 
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governance may constrain accounting manipulation, but corrupt managers have 
incentives to create barriers to democratic rule to perpetuate corrupt accounting 
practices. Regardless of the type of governance, the size of the government can 
contribute to corrupt accounting via the size and complexity of bureaucracy. The 
bigger the government, the bigger the power distance observed by Hofstede (1980). 
Therefore, corrupt managers have incentives to support a bigger government 
consistent with empire building behavior of underperforming managers.  
Political instability may also enhance incentives (or reduce opportunities) for 
earnings management. This occurs because political unrest may divert peoples’ 
attention to more pressing day-to-day issues instead of scrutinizing accounting 
irregularities. In addition, political instability means frequent changes in policies, and 
personnel in the functioning of institutions-all of which are conducive to a relatively 
easy pass with irregularities than in times of peace. It is therefore not surprising those 
countries that had seen democracies (by the classification of Alvarez et al. 1996) 
uninterrupted since 1950 tend to be perceived as less prone to earnings management. 
The political culture of a country determines, to a large extent, the soundness 
of its business environment. In general, it is believed that a democratic system and the 
institutions that come along with democratic practices are conducive to businesses. 
Hence political stability works as an antidote for political risk, which, in turn, attracts 
investment to the country boosting its capital market. Under democracy, regulators 
are likely to have more power in performing their oversight function as the 
government of the day has incentives to be seen as performing in the best interest of 
the investors and businesses. On the other hand, governments of autocratic regimes 
do not necessarily consider themselves accountable to the people and are more likely 
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to discriminate in enforcement of the law, allowing its supporters to engage in 
accounting irregularities including earnings management. Nevertheless, it is 
acknowledged that autocrats could be argued to have incentives to promote good 
governance to ensure that opposition to the regime does not easily gain popular 
support. Countries like China, Iran, and Myanmar provide examples of totalitarian 
models of governance with reasonably strict law enforcement.  
 
2.2.1.4 Perceived corruption 
Extant research suggests that the level of earnings management is positively related to 
the level of perceived corruption in the country. Today there is general consensus that 
corruption negatively affects organizations, economies and societies (Mauro 1995; 
Pierre and Sekkat 2005; Wei 2000). Hoopes et al. (2006) investigate the relationship 
between various measures of accounting and corruption, suggesting that better 
accounting and auditing quality can reduce corruption. A more specific example of 
the costs of corruption are provided by Hu (2000), who estimates the economic cost 
of corruption to the Chinese economy between 1995 and 1998 of between 13.2 and 
16.8 percent of Chinas’ GDP. Hall and Yago (2002) indicate, “A key reason for 
keeping transactions secret is to conceal corrupt practices. With transparency comes 
prying eyes.” Theoretical scholars have suggested that there are three central 
elements to corruption (Jain 2001). Jain explains these three elements as:  
“First, someone must have discretionary power…Second, there must be 
economic rents associated with this power…and third, the legal/judicial system 
must offer sufficiently low probability of detection and/or penalty for the wrong 
doing (Jain, 2001: 77)”.  
 
Since, these three factors provide a basis for corruption, analyzing these 
elements could prove helpful in developing strategies to combat corruption. 
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Furthermore, as Jain (2001) indicates, these elements of corruption can be broken into 
two parts; the first two requirements serve as incentives for corruption and the third 
requirement acts as a deterrent to corruption. Ades and Di Tella (1997) examine 
whether the possible benefits of interventionist industrial policies such as the 
promotion of investment or the support for research and development must be 
qualified in the presence of corruption. Using a large sample from surveys conducted 
amongst top managers and economic leaders in the surveyed countries over 1989-
1992, they find that it is more expensive to achieve such objectives using active 
industrial policies in economies where corruption is widespread than in corruption-
free environments. On the other hand, Rock and Bonnett (2004) test the relationship 
between corruption, investment and growth during four different time periods 1980-
83, 1988-92, 1984-96 and 1994-96. They find that corruption is more damaging to 
investment and growth in small developing countries than in large ones. This is 
important because it tentatively suggests that the international institutions, regional 
development banks and bilateral aid donors might have more to gain by focusing 
their anti-corruption programs on small developing countries.  
While corrupt politicians and government officials are the bribe-takers, it is 
often the private sector (especially the corporate sector) that offers the bribes (Vogl 
1998; Wu 2005). The corporate sector is both the victim and perpetrator of corruption: 
while businesses are often subject to extortion from corrupt government officials, it is 
not uncommon to find that businesses themselves initiate the bribery deal in order to 
evade their responsibilities to the public or to undermine the efforts of their 
competitors.  
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Corruption, regardless of the form it takes, usually involves a financial 
payment, inevitably leaving a paper trail behind in accounting records. Accountants 
and auditors are thus in a unique position to detect and prevent corrupt acts. In Asia, 
however, the accounting practices in many firms are often of low quality. On the one 
hand, firms may find it convenient to have murky accounting practices because they 
can easily tamper with their accounting books to evade extortion or to shield 
themselves from unfair discrimination by the government. On the other hand, bad 
accounting practices also make it difficult to detect and prevent other business flaws 
that are detrimental to the firms.  
 
2.2.4.5 National culture  
Accounting literature provides evidence that social values are reflected in accounting 
values or numbers (Pourjalali and Meek 1995; Chow et al. 1999). Extant research 
suggests that culture has been shown to influence corporate financial and operating 
strategies (Schuler and Rogovsky 1998) and impact accounting choices that is 
earnings management (Nabar and Boonlert 2007; Guan et al. 2005). In accounting 
literature, Gray (1988) was the first to theorize that national culture influences 
countries’ adoption of accounting systems and values. He suggested that accounting 
values are derived from cultural values and by the way cultural values would affect 
various accounting decisions and choices, including managers’ tendencies to manage 
earnings. Subsequent studies (Salter and Niswander 1995; Hope 2003) examine the 
effect of culture on accounting system attributes such as authority, enforcement, 
measurement and disclosure. Elias (2004) empirically investigates the relationship 
between corporate ethical values and earnings management. The results indicate that 
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CPAs employed in organizations with high (low) ethical standards view earnings 
management activities as more unethical (ethical). The impact of culture on earnings 
management, however, has received limited attention. 
In this review, this study conjectures on the possible link between Hofstede 
(1980) cultural dimension and earnings management. Hofstede proposed four 
dimensions of societal values: uncertainty avoidance, individualism, power distance, 
and masculinity. Uncertainty avoidance implies a preference for unambiguity. Gray 
(1988) argues that strong uncertainty avoidance leads to a preference for conservative 
measurement. Since earnings management typically implies the use of aggressive 
accounting techniques, an extension of Gray’s (1988) hypothesis would suggest a 
negative association between uncertainty avoidance and earnings management. 
Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004), however, contend that the impact of culture on 
conservatism has not been empirically established. Moreover, the relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and earnings management could be positive for the 
following reasons. Strong uncertainty avoidance could lead to a demand for earnings 
smoothing and earnings signalling, both of which can be achieved through earnings 
management. Second, recent finance and accounting research has demonstrated that 
in the US, managers strive to meet or beat earnings thresholds (DeGeorge et al. 
1999), that investors reward firms that consistently report  increasing earnings (Barth 
et al. 1999), and that firms reporting negative earnings surprises bear a relatively high 
cost of equity capital (Mikhail et al. 2004). If these rewards and penalties are high in 
strong uncertainty avoidance countries, because people value consistency in firms’ 
earnings streams, then managers in such countries are likely to manage earnings. 
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Hofstede (2001) asserts that highly individualistic societies are characterized 
by self-orientation, autonomy, low-context communication, and emphasis on 
individual achievement. Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) find that individualism is 
positively associated with the use of pay-for-performance contracts. Thus, personal 
gain is likely to be an important motivator in high individualism societies. Prior 
research on earnings management (Beneish 1999) suggests that managers misstate 
earnings to maximize their own wealth, often at a significant cost to other 
stakeholders in the firm. Concern for other stakeholders’ welfare is indicative of 
collectivism, not individualism. Accordingly, earnings management is likely to be 
high in highly individualistic societies. 
High power distance implies that decision structures in organizations are 
centralized and the authority is concentrated in the hands of the top managers 
(Hofstede 2001). High power-distance countries are characterized by the lack of both 
leader communication (Offerman and Hellman 1997) and participative leadership 
(House et al. 2004). Prior research indicates a high incidence of earnings management 
when top managers are powerful. For example, Dechow et al. (1996) find that 
earnings management is prevalent in firms in which the chief executive officer also 
either serves as chairman of the board or is the firms’ founder. Gray (1998) also 
argues that information sharing is low in high power-distance societies.  
Masculinity indicates a preference for achievement, assertiveness and material 
success. In high-masculinity societies, according to Hofstede (2001), desirable 
managerial qualities include decisiveness and competitiveness. The society places 
high emphasis on performance, and managers hold ambitious career aspirations, 
preferring to work for prominent companies and earn high salaries. Masculinity has 
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also been shown to be positively associated with society’s acceptance of aggressive 
behaviour and consumers desire to keep up appearances (Hoopes et al. 2006). This 
suggests that managers in high-masculinity societies are likely to endeavor to report 
strong profits that beat benchmarks. 
 
2.2.2 Capital market incentives 
One of the most important factors motivating managers to engage in earnings 
management is the existence of asymmetric information. Berle and Means (1932) 
suggest that in the widely held corporation, the risk bearing function of ownership 
and the managerial function of control are separate functions performed by different 
parties. This causes the classic principal-agent problem between owners and 
managers where, given the decision making discretion, managers could engage in 
non-value maximizing behaviours (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In this dispersed 
ownership scenario, managers have the incentive to engage in earnings management 
because (i) the existence of information asymmetry makes it difficult for outsiders to 
undo the effect of earnings management and (ii) managers usually own a very 
significant fraction of corporate wealth. Capital market-based earnings management 
incentives can be classified into three categories: 
 
2.2.2.1 Avoidance of reporting loss or earnings decrease 
Extant research suggests that managers have strong incentives to avoid reporting 
earnings decreases and losses. Barth et al. (1999) report that firms with a consistent 
pattern of earnings increases command higher price-earnings multiples. DeAngelo et 
al. (1996) document that firms breaking a pattern of consistent earnings growth 
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experience an average of 14% negative abnormal return in the year the pattern is 
broken. Hence, managers may manage earnings upward to avoid reporting earnings 
decreases and losses if the pre-managed earnings level is below the previous years’ 
earnings.  
There is a considerable literature that suggests that managers in the USA and 
the UK manage earnings to meet or beat targets. This is understandable because stock 
prices react to unexpected earnings surprises and hence managers have incentives to 
provide positive earnings surprises to the market. Further, substantial stock options 
granted to US and UK managers exacerbate this situation because managers are more 
likely to inflate earnings numbers to boost stock prices, and then exercise their 
options to make windfall gains.  
Another reason why managers tend to manage earnings is analysts’ forecasts. 
They do so because the market tends to penalize firms heavily for missing earnings 
targets issued by analysts. Myers and Skinner (1999) provide evidence that managers 
of firms with a long series of consecutive increases in quarterly EPS manage 
earnings. This is because these firms tend to have high stock market valuations 
relative to accounting metrics such as earnings and book values and if their earnings 
growth stops the market penalizes them severely.  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that earnings are managed to 
avoid earnings decreases and losses. Over the period 1977-1994 they show 
histograms of the scaled earnings changes for 64,666 firm-year observations and find 
unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losses and 
unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income. 
With respect to avoiding reporting losses, Hayn (1995) notes that: 
 37
Interestingly, there is a point of discontinuity around zero. Specifically, there is a 
concentration of cases just above zero, while there are fewer than expected 
cases… of small losses (i.e. just below zero). The frequency of observations in 
both the region just above and that just below zero departs significantly from 
expected frequency under the normal distribution at the 1% significance level 
using the binomial test. These results suggest that firms whose earnings are 
expected to fall just below the earnings point engage in earnings manipulations 
to help them cross the ‘red line’ for the year. 
 
This tendency of focusing on thresholds is termed ‘threshold mentality’ by 
DeGeorge et al. (1999). They identify three thresholds that help drive earnings 
management: the first is to report profits. The second and third benchmarks rely on 
performance relative to widely reported firm specific values, e.g. (i) performance 
relative to the prior comparable period and (ii) relative to analysts’ earnings 
projections. DeGeorge et al. (1999) elaborates on why this threshold mentality is 
exhibited by corporate executives. They explain that: 
The salience of thresholds arises from at least three psychological effects. First, 
there is something fundamental about positive and non-positive numbers in 
human thought processes…when looking at the benchmark of quarterly earnings 
a year back and the analysts’ consensus forecast, there is a salient dividing line 
between meeting and failing to meet the norm….Second, individuals choosing 
among risky alternatives behave as if they evaluate outcomes as changes from a 
reference point [prospect theory version]. The reference point is usually some 
aspect of the decision makers’ current state (e.g. wealth), and it shifts over time, 
sometimes with how the decision is framed……. If the preferences of executives, 
the boards that review them, or the investors who trade the firms’ stock are 
consistent with the predictions of prospect theory, then executives will have a 
threshold related reward schedule and are likely to manage reported earnings in 
response….. Third, thresholds come to the fore because people depend on rules 
of thumb to reduce transactions costs…Banks, for example, may grant loans only 
to firms that report positive numbers; that is  banks use a threshold of zero 
earnings as an initial screen.  
 
Using 5,387 firm year observations over the period 1974-1996, the authors 
provide convincing evidence that managers manage earnings to meet thresholds with 
positive profits (avoiding losses) receiving top priority among the thresholds. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) also find that managers manage earnings to report 
earnings increases as well as to avoid reporting losses. But according to Dechow et al. 
(2003) the evidence provided by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) in support of 
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earnings management is not that strong. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show an 
increase in the level of cash flows manipulation to boost earnings and that median 
change in working capital accruals slightly increase at the zero earnings benchmark. 
But Dechow et al. (2003) argue that these are not convincing arguments in favour of 
earnings management because: 
….. given the well-known positive relation between cash flows and earnings, an 
increase in cash flows is expected around the kink….[Increase in median change 
in working capital]… is not surprising since there is a well known positive 
relation between working capital accruals and earnings. 
 
Using 47,847 firm year observations from 1988-2000, they fail to find any 
convincing evidence that earnings management drives the discontinuity around zero 
earnings reference point since small profit firms and small loss firms both make 
income-increasing discretionary accruals choices. 
Thus even though an empirical examination of the distribution of earnings 
level and changes around a benchmark of zero provides an insight into earnings 
management behaviour, other explanations are also plausible. Habib (2005) finds 46 
firms from a sample of 107 firms in Bangladesh engage in at least one form of 
earnings management practice or other. Further a logistic regression result indicates 
that small firms and firms with high sponsor ownership are more likely to engage in 
earnings management practices. Also, firms having a higher debt equity ratio tend to 
engage more in earnings management. Kerstein and Rai (2007) test the upward 
earnings management which causes the kink and indicates which firms are likely to 
manage earnings upward. Using data from 1976-2005, they find that a high 
proportion of firms with small cumulative profits or losses at the beginning of the 
fourth-quarter, report small annual profits rather than small annual losses. Petrovits 
 39
(2006) examines the strategic use of corporate philanthropy programs to achieve 
financial reporting objectives. The result indicates that firms reporting small earnings 
increases make income-increasing discretionary foundation funding choices. 
 
2.2.2.2 Capital market transaction incentives 
Another incentive for earnings management arises from capital market transactions 
such as initial public offerings (IPO) or seasoned equity offerings (SEO). Since 
management would like to maximize the proceeds from IPOs and SEOs, and one of 
the metrics that  investors use in deciding whether to subscribe for the issue is likely 
to be the past earnings series, managers might manage earnings upward through 
accruals manipulation.  
The poor stock price performance of firms that raise capital through seasoned 
equity offerings is one of the important anomalies of the market. Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) document that firms under-perform in 
the five years after a seasoned equity issue. For example, Loughran and Ritter report 
average annual return of only 7%, while comparable non-issuing firms average 15% 
per year. 
Teoh et al. (1998a) examine whether unusually aggressive earnings 
management through income increasing accruals adjustments leads to the post-issue 
under-performance. They note that: 
…… investors may misinterpret high earnings reported at the time of the 
offerings, and consequently overvalue the new issues. When high pre-issue 
earnings are not sustained, disappointed investors subsequently revalue the firm 
down to a level justified by fundamentals. This earnings management hypothesis 
predicts that issuers have unusually high-income increasing adjustments pre-
issue and unusually poor earnings and stock return performance post-issue. 
Further, the hypothesis predicts worse performance for issuers with unusually 
large income-increasing accounting adjustments prior to the offerings. 
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Using 1,265 seasoned equity offering observations over 1976-1989, Teoh et 
al. (1998a) report that, the annual growth in the issuers’ asset-scaled net income 
exceeds that of the matched non-issuers by a median of 1.60% and 0.32% in the two 
subsequent years. With respect to discretionary accruals they find that, in the year of 
offering, the asset scaled discretionary current accruals of issuers exceed their pre-
issue performance matched industry peers by 2.9%. Rangan (1998) investigates 
whether earnings management around the time of seasoned equity offerings can 
explain why firms conducting such offerings experience subsequent price and 
earnings performance. For a sample of 230 seasoned offerings from the years 1987-
1990, Rangan finds median discretionary accruals scaled by beginning total assets to 
be 0.83% in the quarter of offering announcement and 1.15% in the following 
quarter, which are statistically significantly different from zero.  
On the question of when the manager should start managing earnings given a 
decision to make a seasoned equity offering, Rangan (1998) hypothesizes that: 
If the decision is to issue equity and the public announcement of the offering is 
within a quarter of each other, the earliest quarter in which earnings 
management is likely to occur is  the quarter immediately preceding the offering 
announcement. If their decision to issue equity occurred well before the 
announcement of the offering, the manager would choose to manipulate earnings 
and influence investors’ expectations over an extended time before the offering 
announcement. Even in this case, the incentives to manipulate will be strongest in 
the quarter immediately preceding the offering announcement, because this is the 
quarter in which they would want the firm to be most over valued….. I expect that 
managers will continue to manage earnings in the quarters after the offering 
announcement for two reasons. First, an earnings reversal immediately after the 
offering and the associated price drop could participate lawsuits against the firm 
and its manager…, second, firms enter into “lock up agreements” with their 
underwriters that prevent insiders at issuing firms from selling their holdings 
until 90 to 180 days after the offering date….. Insiders who wish to sell shares at 
the end of this lock-up period clearly have incentives to support the stock 
price….. 
 
Shivakumar (2000) proposes a non-opportunistic motive for earnings 
management, and challenges the frequently articulated view that earnings 
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management around corporate events is synonymous with managerial opportunism. 
Islam et al. (2002) investigate the operating performance of firms conducting SEOs in 
Bangladesh. However, they do not examine the behaviour of accruals and 
discretionary accruals in particular.  Teoh et al. (1998b) examine managerial 
incentives to manipulate earnings during IPO process. Using a sample of 1,649 
domestic IPO firms in the period from 1980-1992, they find that discretionary 
accruals scaled by prior year total assets, in the year of going public was 4.01% while 
it was 2.24% in the year following the issue. It then declines monotonically over time 
and reaches a level insignificantly different from zero by year 3. Yoon and Miller 
(2002) find that seasoned equity offering firms manage earnings in the year before a 
planned issue of seasoned equity stocks. Using a sample of 249 Korean listed firms 
that issued seasoned equity stocks from March 1995 to December 1997, the results 
support the earnings management hypothesis for the negative operating cash flow 
firm.  
 
2.2.2.3 ‘Beat or meet’ forecasts 
Heightened capital market pressure has created additional incentives in recent years 
for managers to engage in earnings manipulation. Firms have to operate under 
constant pressure to meet market expectations to maintain desired levels of market 
value. Financial analysts regularly release earnings forecasts that become unofficially 
binding on the firms to meet. Even narrow misses of analysts’ forecasts can be costly. 
Therefore, firms may resort to adoption of discretionary accounting policies to 
produce income numbers that save them from missing the earnings benchmarks set 
by the market. One common measure that firms appear to be anxious to maintain in 
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line with market expectations is earnings per share (EPS). Analysts make quarterly 
forecasts of EPS, revenue, revenue growth, and EPS growth. For publicly traded 
firms with analyst following, such forecasts increasingly dictate managers’ choice of 
accounting policies. Burgstahler and Eames (2006) find that managers take actions to 
manage earnings to avoid reporting earnings lower than analysts` expectations. 
Kasznik (1999) finds evidence that firms whose managers have overestimated 
earnings (44% of the sample) [forecasted EPS> actual EPS] have significant levels of 
positive discretionary accruals. Kasznik (1999) interprets this finding as evidence that 
managers manage reported earnings toward their forecasts. Brown (2001) provides 
evidence that the proportion of time that earnings exactly meet or just exceed 
analysts` forecasts has increased over time while the proportion of near misses has 
declined. He also documents that the trend is most pronounced for growth stocks, 
which are more sensitive to negative earnings surprises. Hribar et al. (2006) 
investigate whether firms use stock repurchases to meet or beat analysts’ earnings per 
share (EPS) forecasts. Using a 13-year sample period from 1988 to 2001, they find 
that a disproportionately large number of firms with EPS increasing stock 
repurchases would have missed analysts’ forecasts but for the repurchase. The 
repurchase-induced component of earnings surprises appears to be discounted by the 
market, and this discount is larger when the repurchase seems motivated by EPS 
management, although using the repurchase to avoid missing analyst forecasts 
appears to mitigate some of the negative stock price response.  
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2.2.3 Contractual incentives 
Organisations often enter into complex contracts with various stakeholders such as 
lenders and employees (e.g. senior executives). These contracts typically include 
specific clauses binding the organisation with certain accounting numbers such as 
requiring the organisation to maintain a specified interest coverage ratio, a maximum 
allowable level of leverage or a minimum level of liquidity. For example, at the time 
of issuing bonds, obtaining a loan, arranging a mortgage to finance acquisition of an 
item of PPE, arranging a lease of a major asset, negotiating employee bonuses or 
issuing stock options, organisations sign contracts with concerned counter-parties 
obliging themselves to maintain certain levels of earnings, debt, assets, or equity. 
Breaches of these covenants can be costly. Therefore, when they are close to 
breaching any such covenant, managers have incentives to use accounting discretion 
to prevent possible breach. In the earnings management literature, two forms of 
contracting motives have been investigated: debt contracts and performance based 
compensation contracts. 
 
2.2.3.1 Debt contracts 
Another incentive that motivates managers to engage in earnings management arises 
when debt-covenants are written in terms of accounting numbers. If violations of 
debt-covenants are costly then managers will attempt to make income-increasing 
accounting accruals to avoid violating debt covenants with the assumption that 
lenders will fail to detect their actions. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) articulate this in 
their “debt/equity” hypothesis in the following words: 
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Debt/equity hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, the larger a firms’ debt/equity ratio, the 
more likely the firms’ managers are to select accounting procedures that shift 
reported earnings from future periods to the current period. 
 
The optimal way of investigating this hypothesis would be to (i) collect a 
comprehensive sample of actual debt covenants; (ii) identify the restrictions (imposed 
by lenders) that are written in terms of accounting numbers; (iii) determine the 
borrowers’ proximity to violating such covenants; and finally, (iv) determine 
managers’ accruals choices. However, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) observe that 
accrual testing simply relies on finding out the relationship between existence of 
long-term debt in the financial statements and managers’ accruals choices. They note 
that: 
Just as early researcher(s) chose to investigate the bonus hypothesis rather than 
hypotheses based on the details of bonus plan, they also chose to investigate a 
simple debt contract hypothesis rather than hypotheses based on the details of 
debt covenant. Bonus plan and debt covenant details are costly together, and 
simple hypotheses such as the bonus plan hypotheses are one way to see whether 
incurring that cost is likely to pay off. Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 378) 
 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) examine abnormal accruals of a sample of 94 
firms that disclosed debt covenant violations during fiscal years 1985-1988. Both 
time-series and cross-sectional models indicate that abnormal total and working 
capital accruals are significantly positive in the year prior to violation. They 
hypothesize that if debt covenant restrictions influence accounting choices, the 
influence will be manifested in the year preceding and the year of violation of the 
relevant debt covenant. They find mean (median) discretionary accruals of 0.034 
(0.029) in the year before violation, and both these values are significantly different 
from zero at better than the 5% level. This, according to the authors, suggests 
earnings manipulation. However, in the years of violation, mean (median) 
discretionary accruals are reported to be -0.043 (-0.020) which are significantly 
 45
different from zero at better than the 5% level. As theory suggests a positive DACCR 
value in the year of violation, they control for management changes and going 
concern qualifications and report a mean (median) DACCR of 0.008(.011) though 
these are not statistically significant. 
Paek and Press (1997) argue that if income-increasing accruals succeed in 
reducing potential re-contracting costs with debt holders, this will enhance share 
value and stock prices should be positively associated with accrual decisions that 
lessen the expected costs of violating debt covenants. Regressing annual stock returns 
on leverage and interaction of leverage and DACCR after controlling for cash flow 
and accrual components of earnings, authors report a regression coefficient of the 
interaction term of 0.063 for the entire sample and 0.11 for the positive DACCR 
sample. Although the former was not statistically significant, the latter was at 5% 
level.  
 
2.2.3.2 Performance based compensation contracts  
A number of studies have examined actual compensation contracts to identify 
managers` earnings management incentives. On balance, the evidence reported in 
these studies is consistent with managers using accounting judgment to increase 
earnings-based bonus awards (Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; Jenkins 2002; 
Hanlon et al. 2003; Core et al. 2003 McVay 2006). This phenomenon is captured in 
Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986) bonus plan hypothesis. Bonuses could be important, 
because executives subject to large bonuses have increased incentives to meet bonus 
targets. Bonus targets typically are based on a specific definition of earnings, which 
means that executives would tend to focus on that specific target. Consequently, if the 
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target is based on some definition of income from current operations (above the line), 
earnings management strategies are expected to dump losses as nonrecurring items 
(below the line). 
Other evidence supporting the management compensation theory can be 
found in the research of Dechow and Sloan (1991), who finds that managers decrease 
research and development expenditure in the final year of their terms in order to 
increase earnings and thus their payout, upon leaving the company. Meek et al. 
(2007) examine the factors affecting the relationships between CEO stock option 
compensation and earnings management. They find that a positive relationship 
between CEO stock option compensation and discretionary accruals implies that 
earnings management is more likely where stock options are a larger part of CEO 
compensation. Earnings management is found to be moderated in large firms with 
stock option compensation and the relationship between stock options and earnings 
management has intensified in recent years. It was also found that stock options 
exacerbate earnings management in firms with growth opportunities. Weber (2006) 
investigates whether executive wealth sensitivity to stock price fluctuations serves as 
an incentive for earnings management. Using a sample of 410 chief executive officers 
(CEOs) from 475 randomly selected Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms, they find 
that CEO wealth sensitivity is positively associated with abnormal accrual usage and 
the relation is consistent with income-smoothing. They also find that governance does 
not significantly influence the association between CEO stock-based wealth 
sensitivity and earnings smoothing.  
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2.2.4 Regulatory incentives 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify two forms of regulation that have been 
investigated in earnings management literature so far. They are: industry-specific 
regulation and anti-trust regulation. It is argued that firms have incentives to use 
accounting to circumvent industry regulations such as the maintenance of specific 
levels of assets against specified levels of lending in the banking industry. Banking 
regulations in most countries require that banks maintain a specific level of equity 
against their lending activities. Banks are also required to observe specified levels of 
liquidity against deposits before lending part of the money received as deposits. To 
evade industry regulations, accounting standard setters have demonstrated an interest 
in earnings management. In fact, the shifts toward fair value accounting and increased 
risk-related disclosures (as well as specific changes in regulatory accounting 
standards for lending and other financial institutions) were initiated due to the 
financial chaos in the savings and loan industry in the U.S.A in the 1980s. These 
accounting changes were planned, at least in part, to alleviate earnings management, 
provide information for stakeholders, and improve decision-making by bank 
regulators. Standard setters may also be interested in earnings management for anti-
trust purposes. Evidence on both of these earnings management motives is provided 
below: 
 
2.2.4.1 Industry-specific regulation  
Banking regulations typically require banks to maintain a certain amount of capital, 
called capital adequacy requirements. Similarly, insurance regulations require that 
insurers meet certain conditions to maintain a minimum financial soundness. Finally, 
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utilities have historically been rate-regulated and permitted to earn only a normal 
return. It is frequently emphasized that such regulations create incentives to manage 
financial statement variables of interest to regulators (Healy and Wahlen 1999). A 
number of studies provide evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
There is significant evidence that banks that are close to minimum capital 
requirements overstate loan loss provisions, understate loan write-offs, and recognize 
abnormal realized gains on securities portfolios (Moyer 1990; Scholes et al. 1990; 
Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al. 1995). There is also evidence that financially weak 
property-casualty insurers that risk regulatory attention understate claim loss reserves 
(Petroni 1992) and engage in reinsurance transactions. 
From a regulatory view point, a number of studies provide evidence on the 
frequency which firms engage in earnings management. Collins et al. (1995) develop 
regulatory capital requirement scores for sixty sample banks based on tests of seven 
possible capital management options. They find that no banks have a maximum score 
of seven but 10 banks have a score of 6 and 19 banks have a score of 5. In sum, 
nearly half of their sample banks appear to use five out of seven possible options to 
manage regulatory capital requirement. Adiel (1996) examines data for 1,294 insurer-
years in the period 1980 to 1990 and reports that for 1.5% of the sample insurer-years 
financial reinsurance appeared to be used to avoid failing regulatory tests.  
 
2.2.4.2 Anti-trust and other regulations 
Managers vulnerable to anti-trust investigations or other adverse political 
consequences have incentives to manage earnings to appear less profitable and/or 
seek government subsidies or protection (Watts and Zimmerman 1978: 378). Cahan 
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(1992) explains that firms under investigation for anti-trust violations reported 
income-decreasing abnormal accruals during investigation years. Jones (1991) found 
that firms in industries seeking import relief tend to defer income in the year of 
application. Key (1997) examines unexpected accruals for firms in the cable 
television industry at the time of Congressional hearings considering deregulation of 
the industry. Her evidence is consistent with firms in the industry deferring earnings 
during the period of Congressional scrutiny. In order to avoid adverse political 
visibility, firms enjoying monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic or oligopolistic 
competition also have incentives to appear less profitable. By appearing less 
profitable, they try to avoid political costs. Firms that are politically visible-due to 
their monopoly status, for being too large and/or having a reputation of making 
unreasonably high profits, or being in a politically sensitive industry, e.g. healthcare, 
water or energy – have incentives to resort to ‘legitimate’ accounting manipulations 
to avoid political scrutiny. Political cost hypothesis states that political pressure to 
reduce prices or face penalties which may result from investigations of firms which 
are suspected of breaching anti-trust rules or otherwise taking advantage of the 
general public may create incentives for firms to manage earnings (Fong 2006). Han 
and Wong (1998), for instance, find that firms who expected to profit from the price 
increases during the 1990 Gulf War managed their accruals so as to reduce earnings 
and avoid political scrutiny.  
In sum, the earnings management studies suggest that regulatory 
considerations induce firms to manage earnings. However, there is limited evidence 
on whether this behaviour is widespread or rare, and very little evidence on the 
impact of regulators. 
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2.2.5 Industry sectoral differences 
The dual economy theory hypothesizes that as periphery sector firms face a stronger 
degree of environmental uncertainty and a more restricted opportunity structure, they 
are more likely to engage in earnings management than those in the core sector 
(Belkaoui and Picur 1984). Averitt (1968) defines the American Economy as ‘a 
composite of two business systems’ that later came to be called the core and the 
periphery. Moreover, Bluestone et al. (1973) define core economy sector firms as big 
in size, with high productivity, high profits, capital intensive, enjoying a high 
incidence of monopoly elements, and a high degree of unionization. In contrast, the 
periphery sector firms are noted for their small size, high labour intensity, low profit, 
low productivity, intensive product market competition, lack of unionization, and low 
wages. Beck et al. (1978) test the definition by classifying companies as core or 
peripheral on the basis of their two-digit SIC codes and find that core-firm labour 
characteristics differ from those of periphery-firm8. Rath and Sun (2007) concur with 
Belkaoui and Picur (1984) that those firms in the periphery sector are more likely to 
exhibit greater degrees of earnings management than firms in the core sector. 
However, based on the sample of 256 U.S firms, Albrecht and Richardson (1990) 
find no support for the Belkaoui and Picur hypothesis. Kinnunen et al. (1995) find 
that both potential and actual earnings management are significantly larger in the core 
                                                 
8  Under Beck et al. (1978) classification, Mining, Construction, Durable/Nondurable Manufacturing, Transportation, 
Communications, Utilities and Sanitary Services, Wholesale Trade, Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Professional and 
Related Services, and Public Administration are classified as core sector. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Miscellaneous 
Durable/Nondurable Manufacturing, Not Specified Nondurable Manufacturing, Retail Trade, Business and Repair Services, 
Personal Services, Entertainment and Recreation Services are classified as periphery sector. 
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sector. Jones and Sharma (2001) report significantly lower frequency of earnings 
management in the “new economy” firms compared to counterparts9. 
 
2.2.6 Adoption of IFRS 
The goal of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and its 
predecessor body, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), is to 
develop a single set of high quality financial reporting standards. To achieve this 
goal, the IASB (and IASC) has issued principles-based standards, and has taken steps 
to remove or narrow down allowable accounting alternatives and to require 
accounting measurements (i.e. fair value) that better reflect firms’ economic 
performance and position. Accounting quality could improve if these actions by 
standard setters limit managements’ opportunistic discretion in determining 
accounting numbers. Accounting quality also could improve because of changes in 
the financial reporting framework contemporaneous with firms’ adoption of IAS e.g. 
from more rigorous enforcement.  
  Adopting IFRS would be expected to reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders. Barth et al. (2006) suggest that firms that adopt IFRS are 
less prone to engage in earnings smoothing and are more likely to recognize losses in 
a timely manner. However, contrary to Barth et al. (2006), van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005), Lin and Paananen (2007)  examine discretionary accruals of 
German firms adopting IFRS and find that IFRS firms have more discretionary 
accruals and a lower correlation between accruals and cash flows. Paananen (2008) 
                                                 
9 The ‘new economy’ is defined by Lev (2000) discussion Paper “New Accounting for New Economy” suggests that ‘new 
economy’ refer to those firms with high growth, negative income and cash flows.  
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investigates whether the quality of financial reporting in Sweden increased after the 
adoption of IFRS and finds that the quality of financial reporting (measured as 
smoothing of earnings) decreased after the adoption of IFRS. Platikanova and Nobes 
(2006) compare the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread among 
companies before and after EU’s adoption of IFRS in 2005. They find a larger 
volatility in the information asymmetry for UK and German companies. Contrary to 
expectations, they also find that companies from countries where earnings 
management is more common exhibit a lower information asymmetry component 
compared to other groups of countries. They interpret this result as indicating that 
income smoothing reduces information asymmetry. Ball et al. (2003) argue that 
adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for acquiring high 
quality information, without being a sufficient one.  
 
2.3 Constraints on earnings management  
The Berle and Means (1932) model of corporate governance depicts firms as owned 
by dispersed shareholders, who lack the ability, skill and incentives to monitor 
manager performance. As ownership is separate from management, information is 
distributed asymmetrically (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1990). Managers, who are better 
informed than shareholders about business prospects, shift earnings from a future 
time period to the current one (Jacobson and Aaker 1993). Investors are aware of this, 
but they are unable to determine its extent, pressuring all managers to emphasize 
current-term results. The information asymmetry leaves investors unaware of long-
term value enhancing options, and induces them to attach more importance to current 
term results than they otherwise would. 
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The agency problem in the diffused-ownership corporation is to minimize the 
sum of costs of aligning managers and shareholders incentives (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Corporate governance mechanisms can reduce agency problems, but managers 
focus on short term performance due to information asymmetries. The three most 
important corporate governance mechanisms in the US reflect a focus on current 
stock price: Independent directors, the market for corporate control, and equity-based 
compensation to managers. German and Japanese firms, for example, have 
independent directors on their boards, but these relationships generally last a long 
time, placing less emphasis on short term performance (Kaplan 1994; Kaplan and 
Minton 1994). Unfriendly mergers and acquisitions rarely occur outside the US and 
the UK (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), and non-US managers are rarely compensated in 
stock and options (Share and Share 1999). 
Independent directors are found to help mitigate agency costs (Bacon and 
Brown 1975; Gilson and Roe 1993). In the US, shareholders bridge their separation 
from managers by electing non-employee directors to stimulate and oversee 
competition among top performers (Fama 1980). These directors play an important 
monitoring role, as seen by higher CEO turnover for poorly performing firms with 
independent board members (Weisbach 1988). Non-US governance systems are less 
short-term oriented because their managers either are controlling shareholders or 
relationships between managers and stakeholders are maintained for a long time. In 
contrast, US managers stress short-term goals, such as achieving forecast profit 
(Eccles et al. 2001; Collingwood 2001). Peasnall et al. (2000) find that the likelihood 
of managers making income-increasing abnormal accruals to avoid reporting both 
losses and earnings reductions are negatively related to the proportion of outsiders on 
 54
the board. Further tests indicate that this association is more pronounced in firms 
where the separation of corporate ownership and decision control is the greatest (i.e. 
where managerial equity ownership is very low). Chung et al. (2002) find that the 
presence of large institutional shareholding inhibits managers from increasing or 
decreasing reported profits towards managers’ desired levels of profits. 
The market for corporate control serves as a governance mechanism (Manne 
1965; Jensen 1988), by removing poorly performing managers (Martin and 
McConnell 1991). Undervalued firms become acquisition targets (Pelapu 1986), 
creating market-induced incentives for managers to boost their firms’ stock prices to 
retain their jobs. A popular way to boost stock prices is to play the earnings game, 
whose rules include creating small positive surprises and avoiding large negative 
ones (Brown 2001). 
Executive compensation contracts, when combined with pressures of product 
and capital markets, monitor corporate managers (Hart 1983). In recent years, almost 
every large US firm has used equity as a management incentive whereas ten years 
ago only about half of all US firms did (Share and Share 1999). Japanese managers 
own much less equity (Lichtenberg and Pushner 1994), and stock option plans are 
uncommon (Aoki 1988). In many European countries, the heavy tax on option gains 
wiped out incentives to issue options so there was considerably less focus on current 
stock price and earnings (Foreign 1999).  
Although it is expected that managers engage in earnings management, it is 
hypothesized that the degree of such behaviour would vary among companies due to 
the presence or absence of certain firm-specific characteristics. Managerial 
opportunism, whether in the form of expropriation of investors or misallocation of 
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company funds, reduces the amount of resources that investors’ are willing to put up 
to finance the firm. Firm-level governance deals with designing constraints that 
reduce the ex-post misallocation and thus induces investors to provide more funds ex-
ante (Shleifer and Vishny 1997: 773).  
Firm-level governance may take the form of internal and/or external 
mechanisms. Internal mechanisms could include adopting a dispersed ownership 
structure, taking measures to enhance board independence, instituting audit 
committees, and employing high quality auditors. Conversely, external mechanisms 
may include an active external takeover market, shareholder-friendly legal 
arrangements (soft infrastructure). Firm-level governance attributes are useful in 
signalling to shareholders the potential for managerial manipulations (Basley 1996; 
Dechow et al. 1996) that could be expected or tolerated within the firm. Ebrahim 
(2007) examines the relation between earnings management behaviour and the 
activity of both the board and audit committee. They find that earnings management 
is negatively related to both board and audit committee independence. Such negative 
relation is stronger when the audit committee is more active.  
Becker et al. (1998) and Chen et al. (2005) report that Big 5 audit firms allow 
less income-increasing discretionary accruals choices compared to their non-big 5 
counterparts. Liu and Lu (2002) find that the earnings management endeavours of 
managers in China are constrained to a certain extent when the firms are dominated 
by outside directors and when firms have shares traded by foreign investors. Their 
sample consists of 894 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchanges in 
2002. Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) provide empirical evidence on the impact of 
non-audit services (NAS) as well as other firm characteristics on auditor 
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independence by testing the relationship of NAS fees to the occurrence of financial 
statement restatements. They find evidence that the level of total fees paid to the audit 
firm is significant in the prediction of a restatement. In addition, the study also finds 
conclusive evidence of a negative association between audit firm industry 
specialization and a positive association to Big 5 audit firms. Caramanis and Lennox 
(2008), and Lin et al. (2006) test the greater audit effort to reduce the extent to which 
managers report aggressively high earnings. They suggest that low audit effort 
increases the extent to which managers are able to report aggressively high earnings. 
Chia et al. (2007) and Johl et al. (2007) examine the effect of the choice of auditors in 
constraining earnings management within a rule-based reporting framework during 
the Asian financial crisis and suggested that service-oriented companies engage in 
income decreasing earnings management during the crisis period. More importantly, 
the results indicate that only the Big-6 firms are able to significantly constrain the 
earnings management of managers of such companies.  
Rahman and Ali (2006) investigate the extent of the effectiveness of 
monitoring functions of the board of directors, audit committee and concentrated 
ownership in reducing earnings management. Using a sample of 97 firms listed on the 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia over the period 2002-2003, they find that earnings 
management is positively related to the size of the board of directors. The study also 
finds that ethnicity (race) has no effect in mitigating earnings management, possibly 
due to the more individualistic behaviour of the Bumiputra directors. The 
modernisation of Malaysia and also the increase in Bumiputra ownership of national 
wealth may have caused the Malays to be more individualistic, similar to their 
Chinese counterparts.  
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2.4 Summary 
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of earnings management literature 
relevant to the present study. Specifically, it identifies two streams of research that 
have considerable attention on the nature and direction of macro and micro 
governance on earnings management relationship namely, incentives for earnings 
management and constraints on earnings management. The diversity of the empirical 
findings is due to the differences in methodological choice, assumptions, hypotheses 
adopted, sample size and variables selected etc. The effect of earnings management 
on macro and micro governance is an interesting research question not only from an 
academic perspective but also from a policy setting framework. Prior research has 
focused almost exclusively on understanding whether earnings management exists 
and why. The findings indicate that earnings management occurs for a variety of 
reasons, including to country level investor protection, to influence stock market 
perceptions, to increase managements’ compensation, to reduce the likelihood of 
violating debt agreements, to avoid regulatory intervention, to sectoral differences 
and to IFRS adoption. A brief summary of empirical studies on earnings management 
is provided in Appendix C. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The literature on macro and micro governance on earnings management reviewed in 
Chapter Three, has underlined the fact that most studies in this area focus on one or 
more aspects of the issue of earnings management without incorporating all of them 
in a single study. One possible reason that could explain this trend in literature is that 
earnings management research, like most other areas of accounting research, evolved 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries where variations in macro governance parameters are 
minimal across the countries concerned. A limited number of country-level variables 
such as code law versus common law or equity versus credit models have become 
relevant as the literature has expanded to cover the European markets. It was not until 
recently (Luez et al. 2003; Francis and Wang 2008) that earnings quality outside 
developed capital markets has drawn serious attention.  Secondly, country-level 
metrics are unstable and often lack comparability and therefore are likely to have 
measurement errors posing a threat to model validity. Finally, there are multiple 
dimensions of the concept of macro governance and there is no well developed theory 
of macro governance that could explain variation in earnings management across 
countries. In the absence of a well developed theory predicting earnings quality from 
a political governance perspective, it is difficult to test any particular proxy for the 
effect of macro governance on earnings quality in multi-country studies of earnings 
management. Researchers thus look for multiple variables in cross-country research 
to achieve greater confidence if results are consistent across alternative proxies and 
across studies. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes macro governance 
and earnings management research questions for empirical specification of the study 
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along with their economic rationale. Section 3.3 presents the micro governance and 
earnings management research questions along with their economic rationale. Finally, 
Section 3.4 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
3.2 Macro governance and earnings management 
Luez et al. (2003) show that, firms in countries with developed equity markets, 
dispersed ownership structures, strong investor rights, and strict legal enforcement 
engage in less earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003) argue that strong and well-
enforced outsider rights limit insiders’ acquisition of private benefits of control 
commonly achieved through the use of corporate resources to pay for perquisites of 
the controlling party (Dyck and Zingales 2004). This mitigates insiders’ incentives to 
manage accounting earnings because they have to disclose the true operating 
performance of the firm. Therefore, earnings management increases with the ease 
with which private benefits of control can be enjoyed by the insiders and decreases 
with the strength of minority shareholders protection interests. These results are 
consistent with the prediction that investor protection plays a crucial role in 
mitigating earnings management in international context.   
Yu (2005) finds that international accounting standards, accruals-based 
accounting standards, accounting standards with increased disclosure requirements, 
and separating tax and financial reporting all constrain earnings management. Francis 
and Wang (2008) examine the association of a country’s investor protection regime 
with the quality of reported earnings for a large sample of firms from 42 countries. 
They find that abnormal accruals are smaller, there is a greater likelihood of reporting 
losses, and earnings conservatism is greater for firms with Big 4 auditors if a 
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country’s investor protection regime gives stronger protection to investors. In 
contrast, earnings of firms with non-Big 4 auditors are largely unaffected by different 
investor protection regimes. However, Fan and Wong (2005) find that high quality 
audits serve as an alternative governance mechanism in countries with weak investor 
protection. Krishnan (2003b) reports that clients of industry specialist auditors report 
lower discretionary current accruals and higher earnings response coefficients than 
clients of non-specialist auditors. They also show that the impact of industry 
specialist auditors in providing high quality earnings increase as the legal 
environment weakens.  Countries with strong property laws and enforcement 
mechanisms facilitate informed arbitrage and capitalization of firm-specific 
information (Morck et al. 2000). 
However, strong macro-governance in the market place should attenuate 
management opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Holmstrom 1979). 
Alternatively poor macro governance will exacerbate opportunism. Therefore, this 
study argues that managers are more likely to manipulate accruals in poor macro 
governance environments than in strong macro governance environments.  
The “law and finance theory” argues that a country’s broader governance, 
particularly investor protection, is crucial in furthering a country’s financial 
development. 10  Moreover, financial development is now widely recognized as a 
major driving force of economic growth and development (Graff 2006). Recent 
research also suggests that high quality accounting information contributes toward 
financial development and ultimately economic growth. Thus the chain of causation 
                                                 
10 For a recent review on legal institutions and financial development, see Beck and Levine (2005). 
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appears to run from legal system to public accounting information and financial 
development and finally to economic growth. 
A number of research questions have been developed in the literature and 
these are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 Enforcement and earnings management  
There is no straightforward and uncontroversial way to measure the strength of the 
legal enforcement of accounting.11 This study therefore considers a range of measures 
of enforcement based on six country-level factors: judicial independence, 
enforcement of securities laws, protection of minority shareholders’ interest, 
enforcement of accounting and auditing standards, rule of law and press freedom. For 
each of these variables, a higher score denotes stronger enforcement and vice-versa.  
Judicial independence measures the “efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business” (La Porta et al. 1998 and 2006; Francis and Wang 
2008). A country’s judicial system might be functioning well but enforcement of 
accounting regulations may be lacking. It is difficult, however, to think of a situation 
in which the judicial system in general works poorly but enforcement of accounting 
regulation is strong. This study uses the judicial efficiency index produced by the 
World Economic Forum (2008) as the measure of efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business. It runs on a scale from 1 to 7, with lower scores 
indicating lower efficiency and integrity and vice-versa.  
                                                 
11 The difficulty in measuring enforcement arises in part because enforcement takes different forms in different countries. As 
Ball (2001) puts it, “The accounting infrastructure complements the overall economic, legal and political infrastructure in all 
countries.” 
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The next enforcement variable is based on a country’s securities law. 
Enforcement of securities laws may deter insiders from manipulating earnings to 
benefit from trading in the firms’ stock (Hope 2003a). Beneish and Vargus (2002) 
provide evidence that insider trading is associated with earnings management. 
Aboody et al. (2005) find that privately informed traders earn greater profits when 
trading stocks with high earnings quality risk factors. This study uses the enforcement 
of the securities exchange index developed by the World Economic Forum (2008) as 
the measure of enforcement (of securities laws). It ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 
representing the most lax enforcement regime and 7 representing the most restrictive 
enforcement regime.  
Hung (2001), Ball et al. (2000), Leuz et al. (2003), Daske et al. (2008), La 
Porta et al. (1998, 2000 and 2006), and Francis and Wang (2008), conclude that 
countries with strong minority shareholders’ interest protection are expected to enact 
and enforce accounting regulations that limit managerial discretionary behaviour. 
Therefore, weak shareholder protection environments provide managers with greater 
incentives as well as opportunities to engage in misleading accounting practices. 
Hence the third level of investor protection is minority shareholder rights. It is a 
measure of minority shareholders’ interest protection and ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 
signifies not protected by law and 7 signifies protected by law and actively enforced.  
Researchers argue that enforcement of accounting standards is as important as 
the accounting standards themselves (e.g. Sunder 1997; Ball 2001; Ding et al. 2007). 
Strong enforcement puts pressure on management and auditors are less prone to 
exercising their discretionary activities (FEE 2002: 29). Holthausen (2003) argues 
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that adopting IAS 12  with weak investor protection will likely (lead to) ruin the 
perceived quality of accounting standards, and suggests that it would be useful for the 
literature to begin to structure and quantify the country descriptions by developing 
more informative tests. Yu (2005) finds that IAS, accrual-based accounting standards, 
accounting standards with increased disclosure requirements, and separating tax and 
financial reporting all constrain earnings management. She also suggests that high 
quality accounting standards decrease analysts’ forecast error. Hope (2003) develops 
a comprehensive measure of accounting standards enforcement and suggests that 
strong investor protection encourages managers to follow the rules. Based on these 
arguments, this study expects a strong enforcement of accounting and auditing 
standards will decrease earnings management. Therefore the fourth level of investor 
protection is enforcement of accounting & auditing standards. It ranges from 1 to 7, 
with 1 representing the most lax enforcement of accounting and auditing standards 
regime and 7 representing the most restrictive enforcement of accounting and 
auditing standards regime.  
The fifth component of enforcement, rule of law, assesses a country’s law and 
order tradition (La Porta et al. 1998; 2000 and 2006). If no one cares, regulations 
covering the content of financial reports are not likely to be effective. Assessment of 
law and order tradition is produced by the World Bank (1999-2007). It measures the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular, the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
                                                 
12  IAS were the predecessors of IFRS.  
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likelihood of crime and violence. It ranges from -1.39 to 2.03, with higher scores 
indicating a strong rule of law and vice-versa. 
 Finally, press freedom enforcement assesses whether a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their governments, as well as enjoying freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and a free media. Even prior to these recent 
collapses, free media was viewed as one of the main obstacles facing post-communist 
countries in attempts to introduce democratic institutions and open, market 
economies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Press freedom is also produced by the World 
Bank (1999-2007). It ranges from -1.66 to 1.72, with higher scores indicating 
freedom of association and a free media and vice-versa.  
 Consistent with prior research, this study will examine the relationship 
between enforcement and earnings management and the relevant research question is: 
 
Does a strong system of enforcement affect earnings management? 
 
3.2.2 Institutional setting and earnings management 
Earnings management is also determined by a country’s overall institutional setting 
(Ball et al. 2000 and 2003). Leuz et al. (2003) examine the relationship between 
investor protection and earnings management across 31 countries using non-financial 
industry data. They find that a strong institutional setting at a country level reduces 
firms’ earnings management activities and they interpret this as evidence of higher 
accounting quality. Bushman and Smith (2001) propose a theoretical link between 
high quality accounting information and economic performance and suggest that the 
financial accounting regime is affected by a country’s broader socio-political factors 
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such as legal origin, legal enforcement, and the institutional settings. Prior research 
also documents greater financial transparency in countries with strong institutional 
settings (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bushman and Smith 2003), and there is evidence 
that there is a lower earnings management in those countries (Ball et al. 2000; Hung 
2001; La Porta et al. 1998, 2000 and 2006; Daske et al. 2008). North and Weingast 
(1989) argue that Britain has a stronger institutional setting than France. According to 
this view, British colonies are likely to have inherited better institutions than French 
colonies, and with positive implications for financial development. Thus, institutional 
settings may proxy for better investor protection that is not related fundamentally to 
the legal system. To address these issues, this study examines a proxy for the 
institutional setting, namely the estimate of “Regulatory Quality” in different countries 
compiled by The World Bank (1999-2007) for the use of foreign investors interested in 
doing business in the respective countries.  It measures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. It ranges from -1.35 to 1.85, with higher scores indicating 
strong institutional setting and vice-versa. The relevant research question related to the 
institutional settings is: 
 
Does institutional setting affect earnings management? 
 
3.2.3 Political system and earnings management 
Public interest theory holds that democratic regulation is supplied in response to the 
demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices. 
Democratic regulation is assumed initially to benefit society as a whole rather than 
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particular vested interest. A democratic regulatory body is considered to represent the 
interest of the society in which it operates rather than the private interests of the 
regulators. According to public interest theory, regulation is the manifestation of 
accountability pressure on management brought by the investors, which demands that 
managers’ rent seeking behaviour is monitored. Accountability is assumed initially to 
benefit investors as a whole rather than particular vested interest groups. Management 
is considered to represent the interest of the investors in which it operates rather than 
the private interests of the managers. In contrast, McChesney (2001) claims that rent 
extraction by managers causes considerable manipulation of accounting numbers in 
order to extract private benefits. 
In general, political stability may value high quality accounting because 
accounting is needed for a robust financial system. Therefore, it might be that 
political stability and democracy affect both accounting and irregularities. Political 
instability has been credited with eroding trust in the political system and reducing 
interpersonal trust in society (Seligson 2002). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) indicate 
that, “the first step to reduce accounting irregularities should be to create an 
accounting system that prevents theft from the government”. Further, Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) explain that less political stability encourages irregularities in 
government budgeting and is highly likely when “some of the essential controlling or 
auditing institutions are not well developed”. Likewise, Leiken (1997) indicates that 
the US can help control accounting irregularities in multilateral development banks 
by demanding that these banks “enforce their own rules on effective accounting 
systems, adequate internal controls, and timely audits”. A detailed study of 
institutional determinants of reporting conservatism internationally by Bushman and 
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Piotroski (2006) finds support for this political economy hypothesis, which connects 
the role of government to the properties of accounting information. Managers will opt 
for income decreasing earnings management if politicians are likely to expropriate 
resources from their firms if perceived to be successful. On the other hand, managers 
could opt for income increasing earnings management if they expect that government 
is aiming to penalise inefficient organizations. 
Countries with unstable and unwieldy governments are more prone to be 
corrupt (DiRienzo et al.  20007; Alam 1995; Rose-Ackerman 1978; and Tanzi 1998). 
Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Terisman (2000) claim that more open economies are 
less likely to experience financial irregularities. Further, it is often the politicians that 
create laws and organizations that govern accounting standards and enforcement. 
Since rent-seeking public officials have the incentive to allow financial irregularities, 
they may create a situation in which poor accounting and auditing occurs. As a proxy 
for the political  system, this study uses the estimate of ‘‘Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence’’ in different countries compiled by the World Bank (1999-
2007) for the use of capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
political-motivated violence and terrorism. It ranges from -1.99 to 1.51, with higher 
scores indicating stable political regime and vice-versa. The research question 
regarding the political system is: 
 
Does the political system affect earnings management? 
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3.2.4 Corruption and earnings management 
Corruption has been defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain 
(Transparency International 2008). By definition it requires illegal practices and often 
has to do with illegal cash payments, misallocation of assets, and other inappropriate 
transactions (Husted 1999; Terisman 2000). Corruption is a serious global problem 
that affects many countries throughout the world (Transparency International 2008; 
United Nations 2008; World Health Organization 2008). The World Bank (2001) has 
indicated that corruption is “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social 
development.” Research has suggested that corruption reduces foreign direct 
investment and hence economic growth (Mauro 1995; Wei 1997), lowers investment 
in education and health (Mauro 1997), and places less corrupt countries at a 
disadvantage when seeking international contracts (Kantor 1996).  
Corruption distorts public investment and decreases public expenditures for 
operation and maintenance of investments (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). Furthermore, 
corruption reduces revenues generated through taxation, contributing to the inability 
of some governments to function properly (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997). Corruption has 
been credited with eroding trust in the political system and reducing interpersonal 
trust in society (Seligson 2002). Accounting seeks to make all economic transactions 
of an organization transparent. In other words, accounting helps to ensure that private 
companies demonstrate that they operate legally, and that public institutions are 
accountable to the public. As a result, there should be an inverse relationship between 
a country’s accounting quality and its perceived level of corruption. To capture this 
phenomenon, this study examines as a proxy for corruption, estimates of “Control of 
Corruption” in different countries compiled by the World Bank (1999-2007), 
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capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
state by elites and private interests. It ranges from -1.29 to 2.57, with higher scores 
indicating least corrupt regime and vice-versa. The research question regarding 
perceived corruption is: 
 
Does perceived corruption affect earnings management? 
 
3.2.5 Culture and earnings management 
Business research suggests that national cultural values influence managerial decision 
making (Hofstede 1980; Gray 1988; Salter and Niswander 1995; Stulz and 
Williamson 2003; Hope 2003; House et al. 2004; Guisao et al. 2006). Accounting 
research has also taken a strong interest in the role that culture plays in financial and 
managerial accounting settings. In particular, accounting researchers have employed 
“Gray’s (1988)” framework for linking commonly identified national culture values 
(based on Hofstede 1981) to accounting. Jaggi and Low (2000) examine the relation 
between culture, legal systems, and accounting disclosures. They find that culture has 
little or no effect on disclosure levels once the legal system taken into account. In 
contrast, using a larger sample than Jaggi and Low (2000), Hope (2003) documents 
that culture values have explanatory power for firms’ disclosure even after 
controlling for variation in legal origin. 
To understand the association between culture and earnings management, 
prior research has focused primarily on the association between culture and firm 
disclosure (Jaggi and Low 2000; Hope 2003). This study examines the relation 
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between culture and earnings management directly and uses as a proxy for culture the 
culture value index developed by the World Economic Forum (2008) as the measure 
of ethical behaviour in interactions with public officials, politicians, and other 
enterprises in countries. It ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the world’s worst 
level of corporate ethics of firms and 7 representing the best level of corporate ethics 
of firms. The research question is: 
 
Does national culture affect earnings management? 
 
3.2.6 Adoption of IFRS and earnings management 
Schipper (2005) argues that the adoption of IFRS in the European Union (EU) 
provides a more powerful setting to test the determinants and economic consequences 
of accounting quality because accounting standards across EU countries are now the 
same. Barth et al. (2006) suggests that firms that adopt IFRS are less prone to engage 
in earnings smoothing and are more likely to recognize losses in a timely manner. 
Similar findings are reported by Jennings et al. (2004) and Armstrong et al. (2010). 
According to Soderstrom and Sun (2007), adoption of a common set of accounting 
standards such as IFRS improves earnings quality because management is under 
pressure to report a true and fair view and engage in less earnings management 
activities. Reflecting this line of thought, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) find that high 
quality accounting standards reduce earnings management and improve reporting 
quality.  
Ball (2001) argues that IFRSs will provide high quality accounting 
information in a public financial reporting and disclosure system characterized by (i) 
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training of the audit profession in adequate numbers, high professional ability, (ii) 
independence from managers to certify reliably the quality of financial statements; 
(iii) separation as far as possible, of the systems of public financial reporting and 
corporate income taxation, so that tax objectives do not distort financial information,  
(iv) reform of the structure of corporate ownership and governance to achieve an 
open-market process for reliable public information, (v) establishment of  a system 
for setting and maintaining high-quality, independent accounting standards, and (vi)  
perhaps most important of all, establishment of an effective independent legal system 
for detecting and penalizing fraud, manipulation, and failure to comply with 
standards accounting and other required disclosure, including provision for private 
litigation by stockholders and lenders who are adversely affected by deficient 
financial reporting and disclosures. Biddle and Hillary (2006) find that high quality 
accounting information reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity in market based 
economics (strong investor protection) but not in bank-based, creditor dominated 
economies. 
Contrary to the above studies, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), and Lin 
and Paananen (2007) examine the discretionary accruals of German firms adopting 
IFRS and find that IFRS firms have more discretionary accruals and that there is a 
low correlation between accruals and cash flows. Similarly Paananen, (2008) 
investigates whether the quality of financial reporting in Sweden increased after the 
adoption of IFRS and finds that the quality of financial reporting (measured by the 
degree of smoothing of earnings) decreased after the adoption of IFRS. Platikanova 
and Nobes (2006) compare the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask 
spread among companies before and after the EU’s adoption of IFRS in 2005. They 
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find a larger volatility in the information asymmetry component for UK and German 
companies. They also find that companies from countries where earnings 
management is more common exhibit a lower information asymmetry component 
compared to other groups of countries. They interpret this result as indicating that 
income smoothing reduces information asymmetry. 
 This study uses as the proxy for IFRS adoption a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for a given country in years after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0, 
otherwise. The relevant research question is: 
 
Does adoption of IFRS affect earnings management? 
 
3.3 Micro governance and earnings management 
There has been considerable research examining the impact of various measures of 
governance on the likelihood of observing earnings management (Farber 2005). For 
example, with board and audit committee characteristics (Dechow et al. 1996; 
Beasley 1996), measures of board characteristics, block holders and CEO duality 
(Peng and Roell 2006; Erickson et al. 2006), and measures of executive compensation 
(Share and Share 1999).  
 Consistent with prior research, a number of research questions have been 
developed in the literature and these are discussed in the following sections: 
 
3.3.1 Initial public offerings and earnings management 
Capital market transactions, such as an IPO or SEO could provide an incentive for 
earnings management. If management assumes that investors decide on whether to 
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subscribe for an issue on the basis of past earnings, managers could attempt to 
manage earnings upward through accruals manipulation. According to catering 
theory, managers cater to investors by inflating earnings in periods when investors 
react optimistically to positive earnings surprises (during IPO, SEO) relative to 
negative earnings surprises and report more conservatively when investors react 
pessimistically to earnings news. This study considers earnings management during 
IPOs and uses as a proxy the IPO index developed by the World Economic Forum 
(2008), viz, the measure of total IPO proceeds as a percentage of GDP. The relevant 
research question is as follows: 
 
Do managers manage earnings during initial public offerings? 
 
3.3.2 Debt contracts and earnings management 
A debt contract can be regarded as a governance mechanism, on the basis that debt-
holders monitor and evaluate managerial performance. Although the level of debt is 
an internal decision, higher debt is expected to be associated with higher monitoring 
from debt holders (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Daniels 1995). While the literature 
suggests firms with high debt are more likely to be associated with earnings 
management to avoid debt covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Sweeney 1994), a counter response from the finance literature recognises that debt 
could have a positive monitoring effect (Keasey and Wright 1997; Rubin 1990; 
Jensen 1986; OECD 1999; Maher and Andersson 2000). An important part of the 
financing process is risk assessment by debt holders. Hence, debt holders have an 
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incentive to monitor managerial performance to assess the risk of the firm (Barua et 
al. 1999).  
Debt holders have the potential to increase the level of external monitoring 
because of their industrial knowledge and continuous transactions. Debt holders are 
able to develop a broadly based benchmark to evaluate firm performance when they 
provide loans to a number of different firms in the same industry (Daniels 1995). The 
renewal of short term or medium term loan agreements gives debt holders the 
opportunity to act on the result of monitoring managerial performance (Daniels 1995). 
Debt holders are able to make demands on a firms’ management within the debt 
contract and have the capacity to pressure managers to act in the interests of debt 
holder (Dedman 2000).  
Monitoring by debt-holders will depend on the size of the stake the debt-
holder in the business (Daniels 1995). The higher the debt reliance (leverage), the 
closer the firm is likely to be to constraints in the debt contract (Kalay 1982). Unless 
firms are reasonably close to violation, it is unlikely that the choice of an accounting 
method will be constrained by debt restrictions (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Hence, 
high leverage justifies a strong monitoring role by debt-holders (OECD 1995).  
It can be argued that managers have the incentive to provide more relevant 
and reliable information to debt-holders and comply with debt covenants in order to 
obtain finance on more favourable terms and/or gain renewal of financing. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) find that the evidence is broadly consistent with the view that debt can 
mitigate agency conflicts. Grossman and Hart (1982) assert that debt forces managers 
to conduct operations more efficiently in order to lessen the probability of 
bankruptcy, loss of control and loss of reputation. This study uses, as the proxy for 
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debt covenant violation, the long-term debt to equity ratio, labelled as LEV. This is 
obviously an indirect approach, but provided DACCR is measured with minimum of 
noise and the debt level represents the actual outstanding obligations of the borrower, 
a relationship is expected between the two (Ashton et al. 2004 and Ataullah et al. 
2007). We expect a positive association between accounting discretion and leverage. 
This leads to the following research question: 
 
Do managers manage earnings to avoid violating debt covenants? 
 
3.3.3 Performance based compensation contracts and earnings management 
Explicit and implicit management compensation contracts are often used to align the 
interests of management and external stakeholders. These contracts create incentives 
for earnings management and it is likely that creditors and compensation committees 
may find it costly to undo the effects of earnings management. Evidence supporting 
this management compensation theory can be found in Dechow and Sloan (1991) 
who find that managers decrease research and development expenditure in the final 
year of their term in order to increase earnings and thus their payout, upon leaving the 
company. A number of studies have examined actual compensation contracts to 
identify managers` earnings management incentives. On balance, the evidence 
reported in these studies is consistent with managers’ using accounting judgment to 
increase earnings-based bonus awards (Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995). Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986) found that executives manage earnings to meet the bonus 
targets. Earnings were managed upwards to avoid falling short of earnings-based 
 77
bonus targets (Larcker 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004; and Peng and Roell 
2006).  
Clearly, firms may engage in earnings management to manage earnings either 
up or down, depending on the management incentives that may be present. This 
conclusion is supported in the theoretical model recently developed by Koch and 
Wall (2000). In their model, executives maximize their compensation by using 
accruals to manage earnings. This study examines the relation between bonus and 
earnings management directly and uses, as a proxy for bonus, the extent of incentive-
based compensation index developed by the World Economic Forum (2008). An 
aggregate measure of management compensation package ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 
signifying compensation exclusively on salary and 7 signifying in larger part of 
income is derived from performance-based benefits (bonus, stock options, etc.). This 
leads to the following research question: 
 
Do managers manage earnings to increase performance based compensation? 
 
3.3.4 Audit quality and earnings management 
Ball et al. (2003) study the influence of the incentives of managers and auditors on 
the properties of reported accounting numbers under high quality accounting 
standards. They find that earnings reported in four East Asian countries exhibit 
properties similar to code law accounting, even though these countries have common 
law standard setting and their recent standards closely resemble International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). They conclude that auditor and manager incentives 
influence choice among accounting standards, and thus the quality of reported 
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earnings. Similarly, Francis and Wang (2008) find that earnings quality is higher as 
the country’s investor protection regime becomes stronger, but only for firms with 
Big 4 auditors. External stakeholders expect the Big 4 auditors to limit earnings 
management and, more generally, ensure fair financial reporting. Thus, stakeholders 
are more likely to sue the auditor if they perceive a failure in financial reporting 
(Palmorse 1987 and 1988; Stice 1991; Francis et al. 1994; Lys and Watts 1994). The 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) explains: 
The media, litigants, the congress, and others often allege, rightly or wrongly, 
that audit failures contributed to many business failures. In that context, the 
public views audit failure as including not only the failure to discover and report 
material negative facts, but also the failure of financial statements to serve as an 
adequately early-warning device for the protection of investors and creditors. 
 
DeAngelo (1981) explains that Big 4 auditors in the US push for a high level 
of earnings quality in order to protect their brand name reputation from legal 
exposure and reputation risk which can arise from misleading financial reports by 
clients and, in particular, from overly optimistic earnings reports.  In the same line of 
study, Krishnan (2003b) finds that Big 4 auditors mitigate accruals-based earnings 
management more than non Big 4 auditors and therefore influence the quality of 
earnings. Similar results may hold for other countries with strong investor protection. 
This study investigates Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors by including a dummy coded 
1 for firms audited by Big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise. The relevant research question 
is:    
Do quality auditors affect earnings management? 
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3.3.5 Board size and earnings management 
Board size is another important firm characteristic that may have an effect on 
earnings management. The board of a company provides leadership and strategic 
guidance, objective judgement independent of management to the company and 
exercises control over the company, while remaining accountable to the shareholders. 
The board directs the company, by formulating and reviewing company policies, 
strategies, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans, 
setting performance objectives, monitoring implementation and corporate 
performance, and overseeing major capital expenditure, acquisitions and divestitures, 
changes in financial control and compliance with applicable laws, taking into account 
the interests of stakeholders. It controls the company and its management by laying 
down a code of conduct, overseeing the process of disclosure and communications, 
ensuring that appropriate systems for financial control and reporting and monitoring 
risk are in place, evaluating the performance of management, chief executive, 
executive directors and providing checks and balances to reduce potential conflicts 
between the specific interests of management and the wider interest of the company 
and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party 
transactions. The board is accountable to the shareholders for creating, protecting and 
enhancing wealth and resources for the company and reporting to them on 
performance in a timely and transparent manner. Goodstein et al. (1994) argue that 
smaller boards, between four to six members might be more effective since they are 
able to make more timely strategic decisions, while larger boards may have greater 
capability for monitoring the actions of top management (Zahra and Pearce 1989). 
Large boards with members with a wide range of expertise could increase the 
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synergetic monitoring of the board in reducing the incidence of earnings 
management. Rahman and Ali (2006), Peasnell et al. (2005), and Xie et al. (2003) 
found that having a larger board is associated with less earnings management. The 
relevant research question is as follows: 
Does board size affect earnings management? 
 
3.3.6 Board effectiveness and earnings management 
Board effectiveness 13  also plays an important role as independent scrutinisers of 
managements’ actions and custodians of shareholder wealth. The concept of 
‘independence’ in independent directors was defined as “[I]ndependent directors are 
directors who, apart from receiving directors’ remuneration, do not have any other 
material pecuniary relationship or transaction with the company, its promoters, its 
management or its subsidiaries, which in the judgement of the board, may affect their 
independence of judgement” (OECD 1999). All pecuniary relationships or 
transactions of the non-executive directors should be disclosed in the annual report. 
The literature on governance emphasises the role played by an independent board in 
ameliorating agency problems between the divergent interests of shareholders and 
management of the company through monitoring managerial behaviour (Peasnell et 
al. 2005). Moreover, Fama (1980) argues that independent directors have an incentive 
to protect shareholder wealth in order to protect the value of their reputation capital. 
Peasnell et al. (2006) and Ebrahim (2007) find that companies with a higher 
proportion of independent directors on the board tend to have lower abnormal 
accruals. Liu and Lu (2002) find that earnings management by managers in China is 
                                                 
13 Board independence and board effectiveness are used often interchangeably in the literature. 
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constrained to a certain extent when the firms are dominated by outside directors and 
when firms have shares traded by foreign investors. This study uses the board 
effectiveness index developed by the World Economic Forum (2008) as a proxy for 
board effectiveness. It is a measure of corporate governance by investors and boards 
of directors in a country and ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying management has 
little accountability and 7 signifying investors and boards exert strong supervision of 
management decisions. The relevant research question is: 
 
Does board effectiveness affect earnings management? 
 
3.3.7 Ownership concentration and earnings management 
Separating the risk bearing function of ownership and the managerial function of 
control in the modern corporation causes the classic principal-agent problem between 
owners and managers for non-value maximizing behaviour by managers (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In a dispersed ownership scenario, with manager owing a significant 
share of the company, managers have a strong incentive to engage in earnings 
management and the existence of information asymmetry makes it difficult for 
outsiders to undo the effects of earnings management. 
Recent research provides evidence that many US corporations have 
significant equity ownership by insiders (CEO, officers, and executive members of 
the board of directors) and/or shareholders that own a significant block of equity 
(Holderness and Sheehan 1998).  
 In a concentrated ownership environment, agency problems arise between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) find a high 
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degree of ownership concentration in firms from countries with relatively poor 
country-level governance and argue that the conflict between large 
shareholders/sponsor owners and minority shareholders is the primary firm-level 
governance problem in such countries. In companies with concentrated ownership, 
controlling shareholders can expropriate wealth from minority shareholders in many 
ways. For example, they can extract cash by selling assets, goods or services to the 
company through self-dealing transactions, they can obtain loans on preferential 
terms, they can transfer assets from the listed company to other companies or entities 
under their control, or they can dilute the interest of minority shareholders by 
acquiring shares at a preferential price (Johnson et al. 2000). 
 Although these activities are not within the narrow purview of earnings 
management, the argument here makes it clear that even in countries with 
concentrated ownership; sponsor/owners families have incentives to engage in 
earnings management activities to portray their corporate performance in the best 
possible light to minority shareholders. This study uses the average percentage of 
common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the ten largest firms in a 
given country from La Porta et al. (1998 and 2006) to measure the overall extent of 
ownership concentration (OWN) as the proxy for the level of agency costs in that 
country. High values stand for higher ownership concentration. The relevant research 
question is: 
 
Does higher concentration of ownership affect earnings management? 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter has set out the research questions for testing this study. The research 
questions relate to the relationship between both macro and micro governance factors 
and earnings management and reflect the review of the literature set out in this 
chapter and earlier chapters.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Chapter One identified earnings management as the broad area of this research. 
Chapter Two developed the link between governance (both micro and macro level) 
and earnings management, Chapter Three set out the questions to be empirically 
tested in this study, and this chapter describes the research design. The Chapter 
proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 gives an overview of the research design, Section 4.3 
discusses the control variables, Section 4.4 describes the sample selection and data 
collection procedures, Section 4.5 describes the operationalisation of the constructs in 
the model and Sections 4.6 describes the analytical procedures undertaken. Section 
4.7 provides the summary of the research questions and, finally Section 4.8 
summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2 Overview of research design 
Signed discretionary accruals, estimated using the modified Jones Model (Dechow et 
al. 1995) was used as the measure of earnings management. Signed discretionary 
accruals are used rather than unsigned discretionary accruals for two reasons. First, 
we are interested primary in the use of managerial discretion to increase reported 
earnings as this is the misreporting scenario most likely to impair accounting 
objectives. Finally, Hribar and Nichols (2006) report empirical evidence that signed 
discretionary accruals are a better measure of earnings quality than the unsigned 
value of discretionary accruals. Importantly, note that this model is not a random 
walk expectation model in which total accruals are simply expected to be the same 
dollar amount as last year’s accruals. Rather, accruals are assumed to have a constant 
liner relationship over time with sales and gross PPE that can be used to predict 
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current period accruals for a given level of sales and gross PPE14. The accounting and 
corporate disclosure data for the study was collected from the OSIRIS 
(http://www.osiris.com/home) database (2009); World Economic Forum 
(http://www.weforum.org/home) database (2008) and The World Bank 
(http://www.worldbank.org/home) database (1999-2007) and covers the period 
1998/99 to 2006/2007. Financial and mining companies were excluded from the 
sample because of their special economic structure and regulated entities because of 
the nature of their operating environment. 
Researchers have primarily relied on the legal protection database compiled 
by La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) for their investor protection measures. Spamann 
(2006), however, raises concern over the construction of one of the most routinely 
used investor protection measures ‘Antidirector Right Index’ (ADRI). Following a 
consistent coding process, Spamann (2006) does not find any significant differences 
between common law and code law countries with respect to ADRI values.  
Moreover, Kaufmann et al. (2007) report that there were substantial changes in 
governance structure over the period 1996-2006. For this reason this study uses the 
recent World Economic Forum data (2008) and the World Bank data (1999-2007).   
 The general structure of the models tested is shown below and illustrated in 
diagram 5-1 and was tested using both pooled and year wise OLS regression. 
 
Dependent variable i,t = α +  Σ β Governance Factors i,t  + Σ β Controls i,t   
 
 
                                                 
14
 Francis and Wang (2008) also adopt the same techniques to study in a cross-country comparison. 
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Diagram 4 -1 below depicts the conceptual model underlying the thesis. 
 
Diagram 5 – 1: Conceptual Model 
 
Conceptual Model
 
The following sections present the proposed models and state the specific 
research questions based on the discussions in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
4.2.1 Macro governance and earnings management 
The following model is used to examine the impact of macro governance on earnings 
management. 
 
DACCR = β0 + β1ENF++ β2INS + β3POL+ β4COR + β5CUL+ β6 IFRS + β7 SIZE + β8 LEV + 
β9GWTH + β10CFO + β11CAP + β12LOSS + fixed effects................................................................. (i) 
 
where, 
  
DACCR = discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets for firm i in year t. 
ENF = enforcement measured six ways: 
    (i) JUD = judiciary independence (WEF 2008) 
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     (ii) SEC = enforcement of securities laws (WEF 2008) 
             (iii)MIN = protection of minority shareholders’ interest (WEF 2008 ) 
       (iv) ACC = enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008) 
         (v) RLAW = rule of law (WB  999-2007) 
       (vi) Press = press freedom (WB 1999-2007) 
INS = regulatory quality (WB 1999-2007) 
POL = political stability (WB 1999-2007) 
COR = control of corruption (WB 1999-2007) 
CUL = ethical behaviour (WEF 2008) 
IFRS = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a given country in the 
years after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t 
LEV = total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t 
GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and 
scaled by sales in year t-1 
CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets 
CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total Assets in year t 
LOSS = dummy variable equals 1 if firm i reports negative net income in year t -1 
fixed effects = country and year fixed effects 
 
Francis and Wang (2008), Daske et al. (2008), Hope et al. (2008) and Leuz et 
al. (2003) found a significant association between country-level governance and 
earnings management. Similar results are anticipated in this study. All country-level 
governance variables are expected to display a negative association with the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals15. 
 
                                                 
15 As country-level governance is represented by ten variables, there are five sub-hypotheses and the primary hypothesis is 
expressed in general terms as the directionality of the coefficient depends on the nature of each country-level governance 
variable. 
 90
4.2.2 Micro governance and earnings management 
The following model is used to examine the impact of micro governance on earnings 
management. 
 
DACCRit = α0 + α1IPO + α2LEV + α3BONUS + α4BIG4+ α5BOD + α6BIND + α7OWN + α8SIZE + 
α9GWTH + α10CFO + α 11CAP + α 12LOSS + fixed effects................................................................ (ii) 
 
where,   
IPO = initial public offerings (WEF 2008) 
LEV = total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t 
BONUS = incentive based compensation (WEF 2008) 
BIG4 = dummy variable, equal 1 if the firm audited by a BIG 4 and 0 otherwise 
BOD = no of directors on the board of a firm 
BIND = board effectiveness (WEF 2008) 
OWN = ownership concentration (La Porta at al.  2006) 
 
The other variables are defined as in equation (1), and the coefficients α1 to α7 
are the basis for
 
tests of the effects of micro-level governance on earnings 
management. 
 
4.2.3 Joint effect of   micro and macro governance on earnings management 
Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary 
condition for achieving high quality information, but not a sufficient one. This study 
therefore examines earnings quality as a joint function of macro governance and 
micro governance variables by using exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) 
of 10 macro governance variables, viz, judicial independence, enforcement of 
securities laws, protection of minority shareholders’ interest, enforcement of 
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accounting & auditing standards, rule of law, press freedom, regulatory quality, 
political stability, control of corruption, and ethical behaviour. 
The following model is used to examine this issue:  
 
DACCRit = γ0 + γ1MACRO + γ2MICRO + γ3MACRO * MICRO + γ4SIZE + γ5LEV+ + γ6GWTH 
+ γ7CFO + γ8 CAP + γ9LOSS + fixed effects..................................................................................... (iii) 
 
 
 
All of the variables are defined as in equations (1) and (2), and the 
coefficients (γ1, γ2, and γ3) test the joint effect of micro and macro governance on 
earnings management. Equations (i) to (iii) are estimated using the procedure in 
Rogers (1993) to derive t-statistics and p-values that are robust in respect of 
hetroscedasticity. In addition, since macro governance variables take on the same 
value for every firm within a country, it is possible that country effects are overstated 
due to repeated observations within countries. The Rogers (1993) procedure also 
controls for the country clustering effects and the common variance among 
observations within a particular country. Equation (1 to 3) is estimated as a fixed 
effects model with year-specific dummy variables to control for systematic time 
period effects and country dummies to provide additional controls for omitted 
variables that could affect firm-level accruals. For succinctness, the year and country 
dummies are not reported in the tables. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
The above models include control variables which have been identified in the prior 
literature as being relevant to explanation of variation in discretionary accruals. The 
individual variables are discussed below. 
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4.3.1 Size 
Two opposing views exist on the role of firm size in earnings management. Kim et al. 
(2003) note that the larger the firm’s size, less that earnings management may be 
feasible. First, the size of firms is related to its internal control system. Larger sized 
firms may have more sophisticated internal control systems and have more competent 
internal auditors as compared to small sized firms. An effective control system 
contributes to the reliability of financial information disclosed to the public (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1978). Second, larger firms are usually audited by auditors from the 
big6/5/4 accounting firms who could prevent earnings misrepresentation. Third, large 
firms take into account the reputation costs when engaging in earnings management. 
Finally, large firms may be less likely to manage earnings relative to smaller 
counterpart firms because they are followed by more financial analysts.  
 In contrast, an opposing view suggests that larger sized firms are more likely 
to manage earnings than small-sized firms. First, large-sized firms face more pressure 
to meet analysts’ expectations. Second, large sized firms have greater bargaining 
power with auditors. Nelson et al. (2002) document that auditors are more likely to 
waive earnings management attempts by large clients. Third, large sized firms have 
more room to manoeuvre given the wider range of accounting treatments available. 
Finally, large- sized firms may manage earnings to decrease political costs (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979; Bowen et al 1981; Dhaliwal 
1988). Bathke et al (1989) document a positive relationship between firm size and 
earnings quality. This study uses the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for firm 
size (SIZE) and, on balance, the association between discretionary accruals and firm 
size is expected to be positive. 
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4.3.2 Leverage 
As discussed in section 3.3.2 on debt contracting, LEV is included as a proxy for debt 
covenant violation. LEV is measured as the ratio of total long term-debt to equity, 
where total long term debt in the OSIRIS database represents all interest bearing 
obligations due after the current operating cycle.16 The sign of the coefficient on LEV 
is expected to be positive, that is, earnings management increases with leverage. Note 
that while LEV is a control variable in equations (i) and (iii) it is one of the micro 
governance variable in equation (ii). 
 
4.3.3 Growth 
To avoid adverse affects on the cost of capital, managers have an incentive to smooth 
earnings as earnings volatility increases with high growth and the market tends to 
punish growth firms for negative earnings surprises (Sloan 2001; Beaver 1968). 
Therefore, high growth firms are likely to have strong incentives to meet earnings 
targets. Krishnan (2003a) documents a significant positive relationship between 
firms’ growth level and earnings management. Young (2000) finds that discretionary 
accruals are positively associated with firm growth since firms experiencing large 
growth will incur high investment in working capital. Moreover, firms with more 
growth potential are expected to make more accruals and hence discretionary accruals 
choices (Firth et al. 2007; Rath and Sun 2007). This study uses the return on equity 
(ROE) as a proxy for growth opportunities and the association is expected to be 
positive.  
                                                 
16 Bank debt is not available in the OSIRIS database 
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4.3.4 Cash flow from operations 
To control for firm performance, cash flow from operations (CFO) is included as a 
control variable. This study includes cash flow from operations (CFO) deflated by 
lagged total assets, and the coefficient on CFO in expected to be negative because 
there is a well documented inverse relation between CFO and accruals (Francis and 
Wang 2008).  
 
4.3.5 Capital intensity 
Managers’ discretionary accruals choices depend on the mix of current versus non-
current assets and liabilities. Capital intensity measures a firms’ efficiency in 
deployment of its non current (fixed) assets to its total assets. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) suggest that firms with a larger current ratio provide more opportunity for the 
managers to manage earnings through working capital accruals than firms with large 
non-current assets/liabilities. Ruth and Sun (2007) and Young (1999) report a 
negative relationship between capital intensity and discretionary accruals. On the 
other hand, Francis and Wang (2008) report a positive insignificant relationship 
between capital intensity and discretionary accruals choices. Thus, no prediction is 
made regarding the sign of CAP. This study includes capital intensity as the ratio of 
non-current assets to the total assets (CAP). 
 
4.3.6 Loss dummy 
Lower reported earnings also provide the motivation for firms to manipulate earnings 
because these firms possibly facing more financial difficulties. Prior research 
suggests that earnings management firms tend to exhibit high profitability given the 
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link to managers’ job security and accounting profit based compensation contracts. 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; Rath and Sun 2007). Wang (2004) provides convincing 
evidence that the firms’ propensity to manipulate earnings is positively related to 
growth prospects and negatively to the profitability of the firms’ current assets. The 
basis for his anticipation is that firms with strong growth opportunities but low 
profitability (or low cash flow) should have greater demand for more profit. Earnings 
management is also a forward-looking exercise. Managers are more likely to consider 
future earnings when they make accounting policy choices. If current earnings are 
low but managers expect that future earnings will be high, they may engage in 
income-increasing earnings management (borrowing future earnings). On the other 
hand, if current earnings are high but managers expect that future earnings will be 
low, they may engage in income-decreasing earnings management (saving today’s 
income for tomorrow’s use). A dummy variable is used for firms with losses (LOSS) 
as a proxy for financial distress and bankruptcy risk and therefore an incentive to 
increase reported earnings in the subsequent year.  
 
4.4 Sample selection and data collection procedure 
4.4.1 Study period 
The study focuses on a 9-year period beginning in the 1998-1999 financial year and 
ending in the 2006-2007 financial year because of the following reasons: 
(i) The last decade was highly eventful in the history of accounting.  It saw 
some of the biggest accounting scandals in history led by Enron in 2001 and followed 
by many high profile accounting failures around the world. 
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(ii) Enron’s accounting failings not only led to the biggest bankruptcy in US 
corporate history, it led to the demise of the fifth largest professional accounting firm 
and one of the oldest brands in the professional accounting services industry. The 
regulatory response to the events surrounding Enron and Andersen was equally 
spectacular.  Sarbanes Oxley Act, passed in July 2002 by the US Congress, brought 
about radical changes affecting accounting, auditing and corporate governance, not 
seen since the formation of US SEC in 1934. Many other developed economies in 
Europe, the Far East and Australia carried out similar reforms of their auditing and 
corporate governance regulations. Due to the sweeping changes in auditing and 
corporate governance introduced by SOX, earnings management in the US and 
countries’ implementing SOX-like provisions is likely to have decreased. However, it 
is also possible that earnings management has actually increased post-SOX as 
managers have incentives to smooth the impact of SOX on financial performance. 
(iii) The reorganisation of the IASC as IASB in 2001 and the subsequent 
revitalization of its activities have led to the rise of IASB as the global accounting 
standard setter with IFRS adopted or permitted in more than 100 countries around the 
world. With the adoption of IFRS, international differences in accounting are likely to 
decrease and therefore it is also a useful setting to examine the effects of macro 
governance on earnings quality. There has been a common expectation that adoption 
of IFRS would result in higher earnings quality. However, growing evidence 
indicates that actually it may not be resulting in increased quality. In any case, the 
impact appears to be crucially dependent on the macro setting. 
(iv) The Asian financial crisis of 1997 also brought corporate governance and 
accountability to the forefront.  While several reforms have been implemented in the 
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Asian region post the 1997 financial crises, it is also possible that the incidence of 
earnings management has increased in order to smooth the effects of the crisis. 
 
4.4.2 Sample selection 
The selection procedure followed two stages. The first stage commenced with 
selecting all countries in the OSIRIS database. Only countries with at least 90 firm-
year observations were selected in order to ensure sufficient observations to carry out 
the tests planned for the study. 
In the second stage, regulated, financial and mining industries were excluded 
from the sample (Table 4-1). These industries are excluded for the following reasons: 
 
Table 4 -1: Sample Selection 
 
Total number of observations (1998-2007)                                                        505594                    
Less: Missing values on dependent and independent variables                        (297644)                        
Less: Financial Institution                                                                                   (15490) 
Less: Energy and mining sector                        (5032) 
Less: top and bottom 1% of DACCR accruals                  (17844)                                                   
Less: # of observations with │Studentized residuals│>3                                  (12678)                                                         
Final # of observations used in the tests                                                             156906                                                                                    
 
(i) Revenues in regulated industries are often set on accounting rates of return, 
which gives firms an incentive to adopt conservative accounting practices and thus 
defer income recognition. Given that the deferral of income recognition is common 
practice for regulated industries, it would be difficult to uncover opportunistic 
manipulation of earnings by management. 
(ii) Financial entities such as banks and insurance companies are excluded 
because the structure of their assets and liabilities is different from firms in other 
industries and because in many countries, they are subject to different accounting 
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regulations. These differences make problematic the estimation of discretionary 
accruals, as explained in prior empirical studies (Peasnell et al. 1998 and 2005; 
Chtourou et al. 2001; Bugshan 2005; Habib 2007; Francis and Wang 2008). 
(iii) Mining firms also demonstrate significant differences from firms in other 
industries because of the unique nature of their assets.  Such uniqueness includes 
heavy reliance on non-current assets, difference in inventory and receivables, 
dominance of intangibles, and frequent incidence of firms with negative equity. 
Another reason for excluding mining companies is that the empirical evidence 
indicates that investors recognise the value inherent in operating flexibility in the 
mining industry (Kelly 2004). Thus, the market value of mining firms differs from 
other firms in that it includes other major factors, such as the value of real operating 
options (Kelly 2004; Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Brennan and Schwartz 1985). 
Pooled OLS regression is used to estimate discretionary accruals; it is 
therefore necessary to include only countries with sufficient firm observations to 
ensure reasonable precision in the parameter estimates. Following prior research 
(Francis and Wang 2008 and Cai et al. 2008), countries with less than 90 observations 
were dropped from the sample. Due to the sensitivity of regressions to extreme values, 
outlier observations were deleted from the sample. 
 
4.5 Operationalisation of the constructs 
4.5.1 Macro governance 
Operationalisation of macro governance attributes follows the practices previously 
applied in the literature. The following table shows the operationalisation of the 
macro governance variables. 
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Table 4-2: Operationalisation of explaining constructs (macro) 
Macro governance 
 
Variables Symbols Operationalisation 
 
(1) Enforcement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUD 
 
 
Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of legal environment 
as it affects businesses. Scale ranges from 1 to 7, with lower 
scores signifying lower efficiency levels. The World Economic 
Forum (2008). 
 
 
SEC 
 
An aggregate measure of regulation of securities exchanges in 
the respective country and ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying 
not transparent, ineffective, and subject to undue influence 
from industry and government; and 7 signifying transparent, 
effective and independent of undue influence from industry and 
government. The World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
MIN 
 
A measure of the protection of the interest of minority 
shareholders’ and ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying not 
protected by law and 7 signifying protected by law and actively 
enforced. The World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
ACC 
 
An aggregate measure of auditing and financial reporting 
standards relevant to company financial performance and 
ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying extremely weak and 7 
signifying extremely strong enforcement. The World Economic 
Forum (2008). 
 
 
RLAW 
 
Measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
likelihood of crime and violence. It ranges from -1.39 to 2.03, 
with higher scores indicating strong rule of law and vice-versa. 
The World Bank (1999-2007). 
 
 
PRESS 
 
Measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selection of their government, as well as enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media. 
It ranges from -1.66 to 1.72, with higher scores indicating 
freedom of association and a free media and vice-versa. The 
World Bank (1999-2007). 
 
 
(2) Institutional  
      setting 
 
INS 
 
It measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. It ranges from -1.35 to 
1.85, with higher scores indicating strong institutional setting 
and vice-versa. The World Bank (1999-2007). 
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(3) Political  
     system 
 
POL 
 
Measures the perception of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. It 
ranges from -1.99 to 1.51, with higher scores indicating greater 
political stability and control and vice-versa. The World Bank 
(1999-2007). 
 
 
(4) Corruption 
 
COR 
 
Measures the perception of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. It ranges from -1.29 to 2.57, with higher scores 
indicating least corrupt practices taking place and vice-versa. 
The World Bank (1999-2007). 
 
 
(5) Culture 
 
CUL 
 
An aggregate measure of the corporate ethics (ethical behaviour 
in interactions with public officials, politicians, and other 
enterprises) of firms in the country, ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 
signifying among the world worst, and 7 signifying among the 
best in the world. The World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
(6) IFRS adoption 
 
IFRS 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a given country 
in the years after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. 
Deloite IAS Plus Website (2008). 
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4.5.2 Micro governance 
Micro governance attributes are operationlized following existing practice in the 
literature. The following table shows the operationalisation of the micro governance 
variables. 
Table 4-3: Operationalisation of explaining constructs (micro) 
 
Micro governance  
 
Variables Symbols Operationalisation 
 
(1) Capital market 
transaction 
      motive  
 
 
IPO 
 
 
Total IPO (Initial public offerings) proceeds as a 
percentage of GDP. The World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
(2) Debt contracts 
 
 
LEV 
 
Total long-term debt/equity. OSIRIS (2009).   
 
 
 
(3) Performance  based   
      compensation  
 
BONUS 
 
An aggregate measure of management compensation 
package and ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying 
compensation exclusively on salary and 7 signifying that 
a larger part of income is derived from performance-based 
benefits (bonus, stock options, etc.). The World Economic 
Forum (2008). 
 
 
(4) Auditor quality  
 
 
BIG4 
 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm is audited 
by one of the BIG 4 and 0 otherwise. OSIRIS (2009).   
 
 
(5) Board size 
 
BOD 
 
No. of directors on the board of a firm. OSIRIS (2009). 
 
 
(6) Board effectiveness 
 
 
BIND 
 
A measure of corporate governance by investors and 
boards of directors in the country, characterized by 1 to 7, 
with 1 signifying management has little accountability 
and 7 signifying investors and boards exert strong 
supervision of management decisions. The World 
Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
(7) Ownership 
concentration  
 
OWN 
 
Measured as the median percentage of common shares 
owned by the top 3 shareholders in the ten largest 
privately owned non-financial firms in a given country. 
High values stand for higher ownership concentration and 
vice-versa. La Porta et al. (1998 and 2006) 
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4.5.3 Earnings management 
Even though researchers are quite certain earnings management exist, it has been 
difficult to convincingly document it. Healy and Wahlen (1999) succinctly point it 
out by commenting that: 
“Despite the popular wisdom that earnings management exists, it has been 
remarkably difficult for researchers to convincingly document it. The problem 
arises primarily because to identify whether earnings have been managed, 
researchers first have to estimate earnings before the effects of earnings 
management. This is not an easy task. One common approach is to first identify 
condition in which managers’ inducement to manage earnings are likely to be 
strong, and then test whether pattern of unexpected accruals (or accounting 
choices) are consistent with these incentives (italics added)”. 
 
This study tests for earnings management by the three tests described above 
and in each case discretionary accruals is used as the measure of earnings 
management.17  
McNichols (2000) discusses three research designs commonly used in the 
earnings management literature, which are shown in the following table. McNichols 
(2000) argues that selecting a research design to measure earnings management 
depends on the question addressed by the research. Two of the three research designs 
focus on accruals management rather than earnings management, because of the 
following: 
(i) Cash earnings are less likely to be managed, because they are harder to 
manipulate. 
(ii) Accruals are the favoured instrument for earnings management (Schipper 
1989; Burilovich and Kattelus 1997; Ronen and Yaari 2008). 
                                                 
17 While opportunistic accrual management is often difficult to observe directly, analysis of patterns in accruals may reveal to 
investors that cash flow changes move in a different direction from accruals (Ayres 1994). 
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Table 4-4: Research designs from the earnings management literature. 
Research design in the 
earnings management 
literature. 
 
Studies implementing the design. 
 
Aggregate Accruals Models 
 
(Francis and Wang 2008; Habib 2008; Kothari et al. 2005; 
DuCharme et al.  2001; Erickson and Wang 1999; DeFond and 
Subramanyam 1998; Becker et al. 1998; Han and Wang 1998; 
Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 1991; DeAngelo 1986; Healy 1985). 
 
 
Specific Accrual Models 
 
(Beaver and McNichols 1998; Beneish 1997; Beaver and Engel 
1996; Petroni 1992; McNichols and Wilson 1988). 
 
 
Frequency Distribution 
Approach 
 
(DeGeorge et al. 1999; Myers and Skinner 1999; Burgstahler and 
Dichev1997). 
 
 
McNichols (2000) provides the following reasons to justify the selection of 
the aggregate accruals approach over specific accruals approach: 
(i) The aggregate accruals approach allows for control of additional variables, 
while the specific accruals models’ approach is not flexible in investigating additional 
variables (i.e. micro and macro governance). 
(ii) Aggregate accruals model may help the generalizability of the findings, 
because the number of firms for which a specific accrual is managed may be small 
relative to the number of firms with aggregate accruals (Beneish 2001). 
(iii) If it is not clear which accruals management might be used to manage 
earnings, then the power of a specific accruals test for earnings management is 
reduced.18 
                                                 
18 Prior studies do not specify any accruals item that is specifically associated with corporate governance attributes; and 
therefore does not promote the use of specific accrual models in corporate governance studies. 
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(iv) If the aim is to examine the association between earnings management 
and other hypothesised factors, then a specific accruals model is less tractable 
because it requires a separate model for each accrual likely to be influenced by the 
hypothesised factors. 
(v) Finally, the large number of studies published using aggregate accruals 
models indicates the wide acceptance of the aggregate accruals approach as a proper 
proxy for earnings management. 
The aggregate accruals approach is selected over the frequency distribution 
approach for the following reasons: 
(i) The frequency distribution approach can only be justified where there is a 
known symmetrical distribution for the data in question (Holland 2004). 
(ii) There is no clear evidence supporting the constant assumption that the 
discontinuities at zero in the frequency distribution approach are due to earnings 
management (Durtschi and Easton 2004). 
(iii) The frequency distribution approach measures discretion over earnings as 
the behaviour of earnings after they are managed. 
(iv) The frequency distribution approach does not differentiate between 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals (McNichols 2000).  
(v) The frequency distribution approach provides results specifying which 
group of firms will manage earnings rather than forming a better measure of 
discretionary accruals (McNichols 2000).  
The aggregate accruals approach is selected due to three factors. First, it 
captures the net effect of all accounting estimates and choices that influence reported 
earnings. This factor is needed because the governance literature does not specify the 
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accounting manipulations meaningfully related to governance. Second, examining the 
behaviour of total discretionary accruals fulfils the need to measure whether 
managers had an incentive to manage earnings. Managers only manage earnings 
when they have an incentive to do so (Dechow et al. 2000; DeGeorge et al. 1999). 
Finally, the aggregate accruals approach has been the primary focus of earnings 
management studies measuring opportunistic earnings management (McNichols 
2000). 
 
4.5.3.1 Aggregate accruals model 
Accruals modify the timing of accounting earnings and are composed of discretionary 
and non-discretionary accruals (Healy 1985). Extant research documents that firms 
use discretionary accruals to exercise earnings management (Kasznik 1999; Hall and 
Johan 1997; Robinson and Grant 1997; Dechow et al. 1995; Gaver et al. 1995; 
Holthausen et al. 1995; Warfield et al. 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Perry and 
Williams 1994; Sweeny 1994; Cahan 1992; Jones 1991). 
While non-discretionary accruals represents accruals allowed by accounting 
standard setting bodies and are beyond the control of management, discretionary 
accruals enable managers to transfer earnings between periods and is proxy for 
earnings management (Healy 1985; Teoh et al. 1998a and 1998b). The most 
commonly used discretionary accruals models by empirical studies in the area of 
earnings management are the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 
1995) models (Kothari et al. 2005; Bartov et al. 2000; Thomas and Zhang 2000; 
Kasznik 1999; Becker et al. 1998; Beneish 1997; Guay et al. 1996; Subramanyam 
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1996; Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Table 4-5 summarises the 
description and the limitation of each of the models. 
Table 4-5: Discretionary accruals models 
 
Model Description Limitations 
 
Jones (1991) 
 
Expresses accruals as a function of 
changes in sales revenue and the 
level of gross total property, plant, 
and equipment (PPE). 
 
 
It assumes that revenues are unmanaged. 
It may provide biased accruals, because it 
omits expenses. 
 
 
Modified Jones 
model 
(Dechow 
et al. 1995) 
 
 
It attempts to mitigate potential bias 
from assuming manipulation-free 
revenues. 
 
 
It assumes that all changes in credit sales 
are results of earnings management 
activity. It also may provide biased 
accruals, because it omits expenses. 
 
 
A number of researchers argue that only the Jones and the modified Jones 
models appear to have the potential to provide reliable estimates of discretionary 
accruals (Kothari 2001; Guay et al. 1996; Subramanyam 1996; Dechow et al. 1995).  
 Few of the proposed earnings management models proposed by accounting 
researchers have received as much attention as Jones (1991) model. The following 
are noteworthy in terms of the earnings management empirical model development 
milestones: 
 (i) Healy (1985) shows that compensation contracts may induce management 
to take measures to decrease reported income when it cannot increase its bonus, thus 
hoarding reported income. 
 (ii) Schipper (1989) provides a discussion of the different definitions of 
earnings management and critically summarizes recent empirical developments. Her 
commentary appeared after a Journal of Accounting Research conference, Studies on 
Managements’ Ability and Incentives to Affect the Timing and Magnitude of 
 107
Accounting Accruals. The most cited paper from this conference in the earnings 
management literature is by McNichols and Wilson (1988), on manipulation of the 
bad-debt expense. 
  (iii) Jones (1991) separates discretionary accruals from non-discretionary 
accruals when she examined the demand of regulators for earnings information 
during import relief investigations; the same approach to detecting earnings 
management has been examined further by Dechow et al. (1995); Bartov et al.(2000); 
Dechow and Dichev (2002); Kang (2005); Kothari et al. (2005); Ye (2006) and Yaari 
et al. (2007). 
 
4.5.3.1. (i) Jones (1991) model 
Jones (1991) is motivated to confine a larger portion of managers’ manipulations 
rather than selecting a single accrual account as suggested by McNichols and Wilson 
(1988). Jones (1991) argues that accruals are influenced by economic circumstances. 
Jones (1991) attempts to control for the effect of changing economic conditions on 
accounting accruals by controlling changes in non-discretionary accruals. While sales 
growth controls a firms’ non-discretionary working capital, the level of property, 
plant, and equipment controls the firms’ non-discretionary depreciation expense 
(Bernard and Skinner 1996). Jones (1991) uses the discretionary portion of total 
accruals to capture earnings management. 
 
4.5.3.1. (ii) Modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model 
Dechow et al. (1995) explain that a weakness of the Jones (1991) model lies in its 
inability to capture the impact of sales-based manipulations, because Jones (1991) 
 108
assumes changes in sales are associated with non-discretionary accruals. Dechow et 
al. (1995) proposes a modification that would help detect sales-based earnings 
management. While Jones (1991) implicitly assumes that revenues are 
nondiscretionary, Dechow et al. (1995) assumes that only collected revenues are 
nondiscretionary. Dechow et al. (1995) modifies the Jones model by eliminating 
errors caused when discretion is exercised over revenue through credit sales.  
The Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) models are time series. However, 
recent studies (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Subramanyam 1996; DeFond and 
Subramanyam 1998; Becker et al. 1998; Peasnall et al. 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a and 
1998b; Bartov et al. 2000) prefer cross-sectional discretionary accruals models to 
time-series models for the following reasons: 
(i) The cross-sectional model generates a larger sample (Peasnell et al. 2005 
and Subramanyam 1996). 
(ii) The number of observations per model is consistently higher for the cross 
sectional model (Subramanyam 1996; Peasnell et al. 2005). Some studies resort to 
using a pooled sample (Erickson and Wang 1999; Cahan 1992; Han and Wang 1998; 
Hribar and Collins 2002; and Park and Park 2004). 
(iii) Since the estimation period of time series model is at least ten years, it is 
possible for the model to be miss-specified due to being non-stationary ( Peasnell et 
al. 2005) 
(iv) Use of time series lowers the power of tests which examine time series 
behavior in discretionary accruals, because of possible overlaps in estimation and 
treatment periods Bartov et al. (2000). 
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The above reasoning justifies the selection of the cross-sectional model in 
performance to time-series model. 
 
4.5.3.2 Cross-sectional models 
The cross-sectional approach adjusts for changing industry wide economic 
conditions, which influence accruals independently of earnings management (Teoh et 
al. 1998a & 1998b). However, this is based on the assumption that all firms in the 
industry have a similar operating cycle. Recent studies measure discretionary accruals 
using cross-sectional models (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Subramanyam 1996; 
DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Chambers 
1999; Teoh et al. 1998a and 1998b; Kasznik 1999; Klein 2000b; Bartov et al. 2000; 
Chtourou et al. 2001; Kothari, S. 2001; Xie et al. 2003; Bedard et al. 2004; Kang 
2005; Kothari et al. 2005). Details of the application of the cross-sectional Jones 
(1991) and modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) models are set out below. 
 
4.5.3.2. (i) Cross-sectional Jones model 
Discretionary accruals are measured in two steps. Firstly, the Jones model measures 
nondiscretionary accruals as a function of the level of property, plant and equipment, 
and changes in revenue. All variables in the accruals expectations model are scaled 
by lagged assets to reduce heteroskedasticity (Jones 1991).  
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Equation (iv): Cross-sectional Jones (1991) non-discretionary accruals model 
 
TAit /Ait-1 = β0 (1/Ait-1) + β1 (∆REVit /Ait-1) + β2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + ε..................................................... (iv) 
 
where  
TAit is total accruals,  
∆REVit  is the change in revenue of firm i, for the period t-1 to t.  
PPEit is gross property, plant, and equipment of firm of firm i, for the period t, all scaled by the 
lagged total assets. 
 
 
Discretionary accruals for each sample firm i, are estimated as the residual 
from Equation (iv). That is, 
Equation (v): Cross-sectional Jones (1991) discretionary accruals model 
 
DACCRit /Ait-1 = TAit /Ait-1 – [β0 (1/Ait-1) + β1 (∆REVit /Ait-1) + β2 (PPEit/Ait-1)]…….……….…….(v) 
           
 where,  
DACCRit = discretionary accruals as measured by the difference between total accruals and 
predicted total accruals.  
β0, β1, and β2 are the fitted coefficients from Equation (iv). 
 
 
4.5.3.2. (ii) Cross-sectional modified Jones model 
The extension that Dechow et al. (1995) made to the original Jones (1991) model was 
to adjust the change in revenues for the change in receivables in the event period.  
Equation (vi): Dechow et al. (1995) modification of the cross-sectional Jones model 
 
TAit /Ait-1 = α0 (1/Ait-1) + α1 (∆REVit  - ∆RECit /Ait-1) + α2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + ε…………………………………… (vi) 
 
 
Equation (vii): Dechow et al. (1995) modification of the cross-sectional Jones model 
 
DACCRit /Ait-1 = TAit /Ait-1 – [ά0 (1/Ait-1) + ά1 (∆REVit  - ∆RECit /Ait-1) + ά2 (PPEit/Ait-1)]……… (vii) 
 
where  
ά0, ά1, and ά2 are the fitted coefficients from equation (vi). 
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In Equation (vii), the coefficients estimated from Equation (vi) are used to 
predict expected total accruals. Expected total accruals are deducted from actual total 
accruals (TAit /Ait-1) to obtain discretionary accruals (DACCRit /Ait-1).The 
effectiveness of the model in measuring earnings management depends on how well 
discretionary accruals are separated from nondiscretionary accruals. Dechow et al. 
(1995) conclude that their version of the modified Jones model is superior to all other 
currently available models, though it remains imperfect. Subramanyam (1996) finds 
that results obtained from cross-sectional modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) 
are qualitatively similar to the results obtained from cross-sectional Jones model. 
However, estimations cannot be very precise. 
Subramanyam (1996) argues that cross-sectional models are not free of 
measurement problems, similar to all other discretionary accruals models. It can be 
argued that the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) models 
misclassify discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. However, Bernard and 
Skinner (1996) state that the misclassification problem is common to all earnings 
management studies. 
The present study focuses on discretionary accruals from the modified Jones 
(Dechow et al. 1995) model as the key measure for earnings management for two 
reasons. First, the results obtained from the modified cross-sectional Jones model are 
qualitatively similar to the results obtained from cross-sectional Jones model 
(Subramanyam 1996). Second, the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model 
eliminates errors caused when discretion is exercised over revenue through credit 
sales. 
 112
4.5.3.3 Measuring total accruals 
To be able to estimate discretionary accruals, total accruals need to be computed. 
There are two methods for computing total accruals. The first method is the 
traditional balance sheet approach that has been used in the majority of prior studies 
(Healy 1985; Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Peasnell et al. 1998; Kothari 2001). 
The second method is the cash flow approach (Yaari et al. 2007; Subramanyam 1996; 
DeFond and Subramanyam 1997; Becker et al. 1998; Klein 2002b). 
Under the traditional balance sheet approach, total accruals are measured as 
follows: 
Equation (viii): Balance sheet approach.  
 
TA = (∆CA – ∆ Cash) – (∆CL – ∆STD) – depreciation…………….................……………... (viii) 
 
 where  
TA represents total Accruals 
 ∆CA represents change in current assets 
∆ Cash denotes change in cash and cash equivalents  
∆CL denotes change in current liabilities, and  
∆STD refers to change in short-term debt included in current liabilities. 
 
 
Under the cash flow approach, total accruals are measured as follows: 
 
Equation (ix): Cash flow approach 
 
 
TA= EBIT – OCF…………………………………………………….……..………….………. (ix) 
 
where 
TA represents total accruals,  
EBIT represents earnings before interest and taxes, and  
OCF denotes operating cash flow. 
 
 
However, recent studies prefer the cash flow approach to the traditional 
balance sheet approach because of the following reasons: 
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(i) The balance sheet approach omits non-current accruals (except for 
deprecation and amortisation), the cash flow approach accounts for both current and 
non-current accruals.  
(ii)The balance sheet approach is less efficient than the cash flow approach 
when firms experience mergers or acquisitions (Collins and Hribar 2002).  
(iii) The balance sheet approach is biased in measuring accruals for firms 
experiencing discontinuing operations (Collins and Hribar 2002).  
Collins and Hribar (2002) point out that the frequency and magnitude of 
errors introduced when using the balance sheet approach can be substantial. For the 
reasons discussed above, the cash flow approach is used in the present study to 
calculate total accruals.19  
Total accruals’, using the cash flow approach, is divided into discretionary 
and non-discretionary accruals by using the modified Jones model. The level of 
discretionary accruals is then used as the empirical indicator of earnings management. 
 
4.6 Analytical procedures  
The analysis of the data was carried out in four distinct steps. Each of these steps and 
the associated research question to be tested is outlined below: 
 
4.6.1 Step one: Data collection and descriptive statistics 
Data for this study were collected from a combination of sources-all secondary. Firm-
level accounting data were collected from the OSIRIS database while country-level 
                                                 
19 Data results support Collins and Hribar’s (2002) findings that the cash flow approach has less bias than the balance sheet 
approach. 
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data were collected from the World Economic Forum and The World Bank. 
Descriptive statistics are computed to profile the data.  
 
4.6.2 Step two: Computing discretionary accruals 
The second step of the analysis is to compute discretionary accruals. As mentioned 
above, the study uses the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model to compute 
discretionary accruals. Estimation of discretionary accruals involves two steps. First 
nondiscretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional version of the 
modified Jones model, as in Krishnan (2003a). This model estimates total accruals as 
a function of the change in revenue (adjusted for the change in receivables) and the 
level of property, plant and equipment. Further, a correlation analysis is performed to 
examine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. This test 
examines the extent to which the dependent variable is related to each of the 
independent variables in the study. Prior to conducting the correlation analysis, the 
variables are examined to check for distributions. 
 
4.6.3 Step three: Regression analysis  
The proposed models are tested using both pooled and year-wise specifications of 
pooled OLS regression. To test the effect of governance on earnings management, 
this study regress the DACCR on governance and a number of control variables. 
 
4.6.4 Step four: Robustness checks 
The fourth step in the analysis is to test the regression assumptions and adjust the data 
for outliers and test for collinearity. For example, the regression assumptions are 
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tested by examining the residuals of the model (Pedhazur 1997). The assumptions 
are: normality, linearity, homoskedasticity, and independence of residuals (Pedhazur 
1997).  
Distributions with infinite variance tend to have thick tails, implying outliers 
(Malinvaud 1980; Rogers 1993). Relatively heavy weights can be placed on outliers 
(Judge et al. 1988). Thus, their presence tends to lead to bias and extremely sensitive 
least square estimates. Following prior studies (Francis and Wang 2008), if the 
earnings level or change in earnings, scaled by beginning total assets, is above 1.0 or 
below -1.0, then it is considered to be an outlier. This approach is proposed by 
Malinvaud (1980) to transfer infinite variance into finite variance by assuming that 
the distribution of the disturbances is bounded. 
Macro and micro governance attributes could be interrelated leading to 
collinearity problems. Several methods are employed to reduce the severity of 
collinearity problems.   
 
4.7 Research questions 
Table 4-6 below shows the list of research questions tested. In each case the effect of 
a single explanatory variable is tested. This is different from the test equations (i) and 
(ii) developed above. However, the data limitations in cross country studies are such 
that it is common to focus on one variable (or subsets of the variables) rather than 
incorporating all of them in a single test. The testing of multiple variables gives 
greater confidence if the results found are consistent across variables. When testing 
each research question, pooled regressions as well as year wise cross section are 
reported. The joint effect of macro and micro governance on earnings management is 
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tested by using explanatory principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the ten 
macro governance variables to a single composite variable. 
Table 4-6 
Summary of research questions 
 
(1) Enforcement 
 
Does a strong system of enforcement 
affect earnings management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1ENF + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects  
 
(2) Institutional Setting 
 
Does the institutional setting affect 
earnings management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1INS + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + 
β5CFOit  + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects  
 
(3) Political system 
 
Does the political system affect 
earnings management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1POL + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(4) Corruption 
 
Does perceived corruption affect 
earnings management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1COR + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ β5CFOit  + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(5) Culture 
 
Does national culture affect earnings 
management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1CUL + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ β5CFOit  + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(6) IFRS 
 
Does adoption of IFRS affect earnings 
management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1IFRS + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ 5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(7) IPO 
 
Does manager manage earnings 
during initial public offerings? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1IPO + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + 
β5CFOit  + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(8) Debt contracts 
 
Do managers manage earnings to 
avoid violating debt covenants? 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1LEV + β2SIZEit + β3GWTHit + β4CFOit 
+ β5CAPit + β6LOSSit + fixed effects 
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(9) Performance based 
compensations 
 
Do managers manage earnings to 
increase performance based 
compensations? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1BONUS + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + 
β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(10) Audit quality 
 
Do quality auditors affect earnings 
management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1BIG4 + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(11) Board size 
 
Does board size affect earnings 
management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1BOD + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(12) Board effectiveness 
 
Does board effectiveness affect 
earnings management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1BIND + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + 
β4GWTHit+ β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
(13) Ownership concentration 
 
Does higher concentration of 
ownership affect earnings 
management? 
 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1OWN + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit 
+ β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
4.8 Summary  
This chapter has discussed the sample selection, data collection, and research 
question testing procedures. The chapter discussed the method used to test the 
research question, as developed in Chapter Three. It is clear that there is a friction 
regarding the economics of earnings management. The empirical research pays no 
attention to competition in product markets and other facets of business strategy, in 
that it assumes that controlling for industry and year in the regression analysis is 
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sufficient to control for all these aspects20. As yet there is no consensus methodology 
that perfectly overcomes the challenge posed by the fact that unmanaged earnings are 
unobservable. However, the work of Ye (2006), which supports the Jones model, 
seems promising in this regard. Considering the above discussion on all the variables 
of the developed models of the study, Table 4-7 is reproduced with the expected sign 
of the coefficients below. 
Table 4-7 
List of variables 
Symbol Variable Predicted 
sign 
Definition 
 
JUD 
 
Judicial 
independence 
 
- 
 
Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of legal 
environment as it affects businesses. Scale ranges from 
1 to 7, with lower scores signifying lower efficiency 
levels and vice versa. The World Economic Forum 
(2008). 
 
 
SEC 
 
Regulation of 
securities 
enforcement 
 
- 
 
An aggregate measure of regulation of securities 
exchanges in the respective country and ranges from 1 
to 7, with 1 signifying not transparent, ineffective, and 
subject to undue influence from industry and 
government; and 7 signifying transparent, effective and 
independent of undue influence from industry and 
government. The World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
MIN 
 
Protection of 
minority 
shareholders 
right 
 
- 
 
A measure of the protection of the interest of minority 
shareholders’ and ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying 
not protected by law and 7 signifying protected by law 
and actively enforced. The World Economic Forum 
(2008). 
 
 
ACC 
 
Enforcement of 
accounting and 
auditing 
standards 
 
- 
 
An aggregate measure of auditing and financial 
reporting standards relevant to company financial 
performance and ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying 
extremely weak and 7 signifying extremely strong 
enforcement. The World Economic Forum (2008). 
                                                 
20 The economic repercussions of earnings management (on firm-level investment) are studied in Kedia and Philippon (2005)  
and McNichols and Stubben (2005) . 
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RLAW 
 
Rule of Law 
 
- 
 
Measures the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as likelihood of crime and violence. It 
ranges from -13.9 to 2.03, with higher scores indicating 
strong rule of law and vice-versa. The World Bank 
(1999-2007). 
 
 
PRESS 
 
Press freedom  
 
- 
 
Measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selection of their government, as 
well as enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media. It ranges from -1.66 to 
1.72, with higher scores indicating greater participation 
and freedom and vice versa. The World Bank (1999-
2006). 
 
  
INS 
 
Institutional 
setting 
 
- 
 
Measures the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. It 
ranges from -1.35 to 1.85, with higher scores indicating 
greater potential for government to create an 
environment conducive to economic development and 
vice versa. The World Bank (1999-2007). 
 
  
POL 
 
Political 
system 
 
- 
 
Measures the perception of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism. It ranges from -1.99 
to 1.51, with higher scores indicating greater political 
stability and control and vice versa. The World Bank 
(1999-2007). 
 
 
COR 
 
Corruption 
 
- 
 
Measures the perception of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests. It ranges from -
1.29 to 2.57, with higher scores indicating least corrupt 
practices taking place and vice versa. The World Bank 
(1999-2007). 
 
 
 
CUL 
 
National culture 
 
- 
 
An aggregate measure of the corporate ethics (ethical 
behaviour in interactions with public officials, 
politicians, and other enterprises) of firms in the 
country, ranging from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying among 
the world worst, and 7 signifying among the best in the 
world. World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
IFRS 
               
IFRS Adoption 
 
- 
 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a given 
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 country in the years after mandatory IFRS adoption and 
0 otherwise. Deloite IAS Plus Website (2008). 
 
 
IPO 
 
Capital market 
transaction 
motive  
 
+ 
 
Total IPO (Initial public offerings) proceeds as a 
percentage of GDP. World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
LEV 
  
Debt contract 
 
 
+ 
 
Total long-term debt/ total equity 
 
 
BONUS 
 
Performance 
based 
compensations  
 
- 
 
An aggregate measure of management compensation 
package and ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 signifying 
compensation exclusively on salary and 7 signifying 
that a larger part of income is derived from 
performance-based benefits (bonus, stock options, etc.) 
The World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
BIG4 
 
Auditor quality  
      
 
- 
 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm is 
audited by one of the BIG 4 and 0 otherwise. OSIRIS 
(2009).   
   
 
BOD 
 
Board Size 
 
- 
 
No. of directors on the board of a firm. OSIRIS (2009). 
 
 
BIND 
 
Board 
independence  
 
 
- 
 
A measure of corporate governance by investors and 
boards of directors in the country, characterized by 1 to 
7, with 1 signifying management has little 
accountability and 7 signifying investors and boards 
exert strong supervision of management decisions. The 
World Economic Forum (2008). 
 
 
OWN 
 
Ownership 
concentration  
 
+ 
 
Measured as the median percentage of common shares 
owned by the top 3 shareholders in the ten largest 
privately owned non-financial firms in a given country. 
High values stand for higher ownership concentration. 
La Porta et al. (1998 and 2006) 
 
 
DACCR 
 
Discretionary 
accruals 
 
  
Discretionary accruals under modified (Dechow et al. 
1995) Jones model 
 
 
SIZE 
 
Firm size   
 
 
+ 
 
Natural log of firm total assets       
 
 
GWTH 
 
Return on 
equity 
 
+ 
 
Net income / Total equity 
 
 
CFO 
 
Cash flow from 
operations 
 
- 
 
Cash flow from operations 
 
 
CAP 
 
Capital 
 
+/- 
 
Non-current (fixed) assets/ Total assets  
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intensity 
 
LOSS 
 
Loss Dummy 
 
+/- 
 
If net income for the previous period is negative and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
∆REC 
 
Change in 
receivables  
 
  
Difference between current years and preceding year 
receivables 
 
∆REV 
 
Change in 
revenues 
 
  
Difference between current year and preceding year 
revenues. 
 
GPPE 
 
Gross property 
plant and 
equipment 
 
 
 
Net property plant and equipment plus accumulated 
depreciation. 
 
TACCR 
 
Total accruals 
  
Difference between earnings before interest and tax and 
operating cash flow 
 
 
NDACCR 
 
Non 
discretionary 
accruals 
  
Non discretionary accruals 
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Chapter Five 
Analysis of the Results 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Univariate analysis 
5.3 Discretionary accruals 
5.4 Test of the research questions  
5.5 Robustness tests 
5.5.1 Using cross-sectional Jones (1991) model 
5.5.2 Deleting smaller countries 
5.6 Summary
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis from the research method 
described in chapter four. Research questions one to thirteen are tested and 
conclusions are drawn. These research questions test the impact of macro governance 
attributes (research questions one to six) and micro governance attributes (research 
questions seven to thirteen) with earnings management.  
When testing the research questions with governance attributes the analysis 
proceeds in three stages. First, the relationship between the macro governance 
variables and earnings management is tested. The second stage assesses the 
relationship between micro governance variables and earnings management. Finally, 
the third stage of the analysis examines the joint effect of macro and micro 
governance variables on earnings management. The chapter proceeds as follows: 
Section 5.2 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients. Section 5.3 
describes the development of the variables for discretionary accruals. Section 5.4 
discusses testing of the research questions and, Section 5.5 set out the robustness 
checks. Section 5.6 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
5.2 Univariate analysis 
The number of firm-year observations for each of the 63 countries is reported in 
Table 5-1 for analyses in the study. Three countries have from 90 to 100 firm year 
observations, 34 countries have from 100 to 1000 firm-year observations, and 26 
countries have more than 1000 firm-year observations. 
[Insert Table 5-1, Panel A, See Appendix-A] 
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The univariate information regarding both earnings management and macro and 
micro level governance is presented in Table 5-1, panels B, C and D.  
[Insert Table 5-1, Panels B and C, See Appendix-A] 
The mean of ownership concentration is 26 percent. The ownership 
concentration derived in this study is comparable to that reported in previous studies 
reported by (i) Farooque et al. (2007) showing that Bangladesh institution owing 18 
percent of the shares of listed companies, and (ii) Peasnell et al. (2005) (UK listed 
companies) of 21.6 percent. The proportion of outside directors on board of 75.28 
percent is comparable with that reported in Lee et al. (2007) of 68 percent but is 
strongly dissimilar from that reported in Peasnell et al. (2005) of 43 percent. Table 5-
1, panel C, shows that 54 percent of the sample firms employ Big 4 audit firms. This 
result is consistent with Hope et al. (2008), 68 percent; Karim and van Zijl (2008), 33 
percent; Habib (2007) and Habib and Islam (2007), 30%. The mean board size of 
8.54 is consistent with prior studies. Firm size, as expressed by the natural log of total 
assets, shows considerable variation with a mean of 5.09 but standard deviation of 
.8753. The average debt-equity ratio is 46.62%, Return on equity 6.40 percent and 
capital intensity ratio 33.70, and Cash flow from operations 3.46 percent. These 
values are consistent with previous studies such as Francis and Wang (2008) and 
Hope et al. (2008).  
[Insert Table 5-1, Panel D, See Appendix-A] 
Table 5-1, panel D, shows the correlation among the seventeen variables. Not 
surprisingly the correlations are relatively high. However, there is no case with a 
variance inflation factor greater than 5, and thus collinearity is not a problem in this 
study.  
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[Insert Table 5-2, See Appendix-A] 
Table 5-2, shows that the mean (median) measure of discretionary accruals 
(DACCR) in this study is -.1674 (-.1655). The 25th percentile value of discretionary 
accruals is -.2756, and the 75th percentile value is -.0451. Taking into account the fact 
that 81 percent of the sampled companies had negative DACCR while the other 19 
percent of the companies had positive DACCR, this result seems to suggest that 
managers within the sample engaged in larger decreasing DACCR compared to 
income increasing DACCR in the choice of accounting policies. This finding lends 
support to conjectures reported in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) that, if the target is 
based on some definition of income from current operations (above the line), earnings 
management strategies are expected to dump losses as nonrecurring items (below the 
line). 
 
5.3 Discretionary accruals 
In order to estimate discretionary accruals, it is first necessary to calculate total 
accruals. As discussed in chapter 4, total accruals are calculated as the difference 
between earnings before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations 
(Equation ix). The modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model, represented by 
Equation (vi), is estimated by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the 
resulting equation is then used in equation (vii) to calculate discretionary accruals as 
the difference between actual and expected total accruals for each firm. 
The calculation of total accruals covers 156,906 firm year observations over 
ten financial years. Table 5-3 presents the estimated coefficients of the total accruals 
model. 
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Table 5-3: Estimation of the parameters of total accruals model for the full sample. 
 
TAit /Ait-1 = β0 (1/Ait-1) + β1it (∆REVit  - ∆RECit /Ait-1) + β2 (PPEit/Ait-1) + ε 
 
Adj. R2 
 
Intercept  
Estimate 
(p value) 
∆REV
  
- ∆REC  
Estimate 
            (p value) 
        PPE 
         Estimate 
(p value) 
.656 
 
                 .051 
               (.<01) 
                .079 
               (.<01) 
-.201 
(.<01) 
 
where  
TAit is total accruals. 
∆REVit  - ∆RECit is the difference between change in revenue and change in receivables of firm i, for the 
period t-1 to t. 
PPEit is gross property, plant, and equipment of firm of firm i, for the period t. 
 
 
 
The model is significant at the 1% level. The modified Jones (Dechow et al. 
1995) model has an explanatory power of 65.6 %. It allows for the estimation of 
discretionary accruals through deducting expected total accruals from actual total 
accruals (Equation vii).  
Tests of earnings management should first identify the managerial incentives 
for earnings management and then examine the sign and magnitude of DACCR. For 
example, if it is hypothesized that managers manage earnings upward to avoid debt 
covenant violation, then for firm observation that approach debt covenant violation, it 
is expected that DACCR should be positive and significantly different from zero after 
controlling for other factors that are expected to affect DACCR values.  
 
5.4 Test of the research questions  
5.4.1 Test results for research question one: Enforcement 
Research question one relates macro governance variable enforcement to the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. Table 5-1, panel B, appendix A, shows the 
country level enforcement scores across countries. In the case of enforcement 
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variable judicial independence, Germany, Finland, Australia, Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom have the strong judicial independence, while 
Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, Russia and Indonesia have the weakest judicial 
independence.  
The second enforcement variable, enforcement of securities law shows that 
Sweden, Australia, Hong Kong , South Africa have the most transparent, effective 
and independent from undue influence form of enforcement, whereas China, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan have the weakest enforcement of securities laws 
that is not transparent, ineffective and subject to undue influence from industry and 
government.  
The third enforcement variable, protection of minority shareholders rights 
shows that Sweden, Germany, United Kingdom, Finland and Austria have the 
strongest protection of minority shareholders interest. On the other hand, Russia, 
Argentina, China, Venezuela and Italy have the weakest protection of minority 
shareholders interest that is minority shareholders interest is not protected by law. 
Next, enforcement of accounting and auditing standard in a country level shows that 
Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom, Australia and Austria have extremely strong 
enforcement for financial reporting and auditing standards for company financial 
performance, while China, Vietnam, Russia, Argentina, Venezuela and Nigeria have 
extremely weak accounting and auditing standards enforcements. For the 
enforcement variable rule of law, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, New 
Zealand and Luxemburg have the highest scorers, while Nigeria, Venezuela, Russia, 
Paraguay, Colombia and Indonesia have the lowest scores. Finally, the enforcement 
variable press freedom shows that Netherlands, New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, 
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Sweden and Switzerland have the highest scores, while China, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, 
Russia, and Pakistan have the lowest scores.   Table 5–4 (i) to 5-4 (vi), display the 
pooled and year wise regression results for the association between enforcement and 
discretionary accruals.  
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Table 5-4 (i) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with judicial independence 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1JUD + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pooled 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.285 
(<0.01) 
-.226 
(<0.01) 
-.172 
(<0.01) 
-.293 
(<0.01) 
-.326 
(<0.01) 
-.282 
(<0.01) 
-.274 
(<0.01) 
-.264 
(<0.01) 
-.276 
(<0.01) 
-.300 
(<0.01) 
JUD -.008 
(<0.01) 
-.004 
(.039) 
-.005 
(.023) 
-.015 
(<0.01) 
-.010 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
-.006 
(<0.01) 
-.005 
(<0.01) 
-.008 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .011 
(<0.01) 
-.009 
(.002) 
.004 
(.144) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
LEV .020 
(<0.01) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.037 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.070 
(<0.01) 
.065 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.390 
(<0.01) 
-.296 
(<0.01) 
-.211 
(<0.01) 
-.334 
(<0.01) 
-.419 
(<0.01) 
-.430 
(<0.01) 
-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.464 
(<0.01) 
-.428 
(<0.01) 
-.466 
(<0.01) 
CAP .461 
(<0.01) 
.458 
(<0.01) 
.408 
(<0.01) 
.400 
(<0.01) 
.408 
(<0.01) 
.467 
(<0.01) 
.481 
(<0.01) 
.465 
(<0.01) 
.488 
(<0.01) 
.494 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.141 
(<0.01) 
-.155 
(<0.01) 
-.167 
(<0.01) 
-.136 
(<0.01) 
-.136 
(<0.01) 
-.122 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.146 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.416 .354 .322 .373 .412 .469 .471 .442 .449 .459 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. JUD = judicial independence (WEF 2008). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5-4 (ii) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with enforcement of securities laws 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1SEC + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pooled 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.304 
(<0.01) 
-.196 
(<0.01) 
-.173 
(<0.01) 
-.342 
(<0.01) 
-.356 
(<0.01) 
-.330 
(<0.01) 
-.310 
(<0.01) 
-.291 
(<0.01) 
-.297 
(<0.01) 
-.311 
(<0.01) 
SEC -.004 
(<0.01) 
-.019 
(<0.01) 
-.010 
(.017) 
-.006 
(.325) 
-.004 
(.319) 
-.002 
(<0.01) 
.001 
(.432) 
-.0004 
(.980) 
-.004 
(.018) 
-.008 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .011 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(.003) 
.004 
(.248) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.038 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.071 
(<0.01) 
.066 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.391 
(<0.01) 
-.291 
(<0.01) 
-.202 
(<0.01) 
-.335 
(<0.01) 
-.419 
(<0.01) 
-.433 
(<0.01) 
-.451 
(<0.01) 
-.465 
(<0.01) 
-.429 
(<0.01) 
-.467 
(<0.01) 
CAP .464 
(<0.01) 
.455 
(<0.01) 
.405 
(<0.01) 
.403 
(<0.01) 
.410 
(<0.01) 
.471 
(<0.01) 
.484 
(<0.01) 
.468 
(<0.01) 
.491 
(<0.01) 
.497 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.141 
(<0.01) 
-.158 
(<0.01) 
-.170 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.135 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.124 
(<0.01) 
-.134 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.147 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.415 .354 .313 .372 .411 .466 .471 .442 .448 .458 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993).  For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. SEC= enforcement of securities laws (WEF 2008).  SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in 
year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. 
CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator 
variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5-4 (iii) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with protection of minority shareholders interests 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1MIN + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pooled 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.253 
(<0.01) 
-.239 
(<0.01) 
-.173 
(<0.01) 
-.100 
(.002) 
-.256 
(<0.01) 
-.282 
(<0.01) 
-.290 
(<0.01) 
-.262 
(<0.01) 
-.258 
(<0.01) 
-.277 
(<0.01) 
MIN -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.015 
(.041) 
-.010 
(.017) 
-.050 
(<0.01) 
-.023 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
-.002 
(.219) 
-.005 
(.005) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .011 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(.004) 
.004 
(.248) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
LEV .020 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.038 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.071 
(<0.01) 
.066 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.390 
(<0.01) 
-.295 
(<0.01) 
-.202 
(<0.01) 
-.329 
(<0.01) 
-.419 
(<0.01) 
-.431 
(<0.01) 
-.450 
(<0.01) 
-.464 
(<0.01) 
-.428 
(<0.01) 
-.466 
(<0.01) 
CAP .461 
(<0.01) 
.473 
(<0.01) 
.405 
(<0.01) 
.396 
(<0.01) 
.407 
(<0.01) 
.469 
(<0.01) 
.483 
(<0.01) 
.466 
(<0.01) 
.489 
(<0.01) 
.495 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.139 
(<0.01) 
-.160 
(<0.01) 
-.170 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.134 
(<0.01) 
-.121 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.145 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.416 .347 .311 .379 .413 .467 .471 .442 .449 .459 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993).For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. MIN = protection of minority shareholders interest (WEF 2008). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands 
for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by 
sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS 
= indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5-4 (iv) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with enforcement of accounting and auditing standards 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1ACC + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pooled 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.255 
(<0.01) 
-.278 
(<0.01) 
-.218 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.245 
(<0.01) 
-.277 
(<0.01) 
-.282 
(<0.01) 
-.261 
(<0.01) 
-.267 
(<0.01) 
-.278 
(<0.01) 
ACC -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.007 
(.295) 
-.011 
(.130) 
-.043 
(<0.01) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
-.004 
(.041) 
-.005 
(.003) 
-.009 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .011 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(.004) 
.003 
(.377) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
LEV .020 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.043 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.038 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.071 
(<0.01) 
.066 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.390 
(<0.01) 
-.295 
(<0.01) 
-.212 
(<0.01) 
-.331 
(<0.01) 
-.418 
(<0.01) 
-.430 
(<0.01) 
-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.464 
(<0.01) 
-.428 
(<0.01) 
-.465 
(<0.01) 
CAP .461 
(<0.01) 
.474 
(<0.01) 
.425 
(<0.01) 
.396 
(<0.01) 
.406 
(<0.01) 
.468 
(<0.01) 
.482 
(<0.01) 
.466 
(<0.01) 
.489 
(<0.01) 
.494 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.139 
(<0.01) 
-.160 
(<0.01) 
-.175 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.134 
(<0.01) 
-.120 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.145 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.416 .347 .311 .378 .413 
 
.468 .471 .442 .448 .459 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. ACC = enforcement of accounting and auditing standards (WEF 2008). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ 
thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and 
scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in 
year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5-4 (v) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with rule of law 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1RLAW + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pooled 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.304 
(<0.01) 
-.289 
(<0.01) 
-.250 
(<0.01) 
-.315 
(<0.01) 
-.346 
(<0.01) 
-.320 
(<0.01) 
-.287 
(<0.01) 
-.279 
(<0.01) 
-.303 
(<0.01) 
-.326 
(<0.01) 
RLAW -.027 
(<0.01) 
-.027 
(<0.01) 
-.025 
(<0.01) 
-.046 
(<0.01) 
-.032 
(<0.01) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
-.019 
(<0.01) 
-.021 
(<0.01) 
-.025 
(<0.01) 
-.027 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.010 
(<0.01) 
.004 
(.168) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(<0.01) 
.010 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.051 
(<0.01) 
.043 
(<0.01) 
.048 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.052 
(<0.01) 
.055 
(<0.01) 
.070 
(<0.01) 
.064 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.449 
(<0.01) 
-.308 
(<0.01) 
-.220 
(<0.01) 
-.331 
(<0.01) 
-.419 
(<0.01) 
-.439 
(<0.01) 
-.450 
(<0.01) 
-.467 
(<0.01) 
-.448 
(<0.01) 
-.481 
(<0.01) 
CAP .449 
(<0.01) 
.465 
(<0.01) 
.418 
(<0.01) 
.390 
(<0.01) 
.402 
(<0.01) 
.459 
(<0.01) 
.469 
(<0.01) 
.450 
(<0.01) 
.472 
(<0.01) 
.480 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.134 
(<0.01) 
-.161 
(<0.01) 
-.173 
(<0.01) 
.129 
(<0.01) 
-.130 
(<0.01) 
-.117 
(<0.01) 
-.121 
(<0.01) 
-.126 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.139 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.424 .353 .315 .393 .422 .476 .472 .445 .454 .464 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. RLAW = rule of law (WB 1999-2007). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= 
total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = 
operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 5-4 (vi) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with press freedom 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1PRESS + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pooled 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.314 
(<0.01) 
-.309 
(<0.01) 
-.272 
(<0.01) 
-.342 
(<0.01) 
-.361 
(<0.01) 
-.331 
(<0.01) 
-.294 
(<0.01) 
-.284 
(<0.01) 
-.308 
(<0.01) 
-.348 
(<0.01) 
PRESS -.017 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(.019) 
-.009 
(.145) 
-.033 
(<0.01) 
-.023 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
-.008 
(<0.01) 
-.008 
(<0.01) 
-.012 
(<0.01) 
-.016 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .012 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(.001) 
.003 
(.255) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.010 
(<0.01) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
LEV .020 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .054 
(<0.01) 
.051 
(<0.01) 
.043 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.072 
(<0.01) 
.065 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.403 
(<0.01) 
-.308 
(<0.01) 
-.219 
(<0.01) 
-.340 
(<0.01) 
-.420 
(<0.01) 
-.443 
(<0.01) 
-.452 
(<0.01) 
-.470 
(<0.01) 
-.450 
(<0.01) 
-.483 
(<0.01) 
CAP .455 
(<0.01) 
.471 
(<0.01) 
.424 
(<0.01) 
.399 
(<0.01) 
-.420 
(<0.01) 
.466 
(<0.01) 
.475 
(<0.01) 
.459 
(<0.01) 
.481 
(<0.01) 
.486 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.136 
(<0.01) 
-.163 
(<0.01) 
-.176 
(<0.01) 
-.134 
(<0.01) 
-.131 
(<0.01) 
-.120 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.129 
(<0.01) 
-.135 
(<0.01) 
-.142 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 .420 .350 .312 .382 .417 .471 .468 .440 .448 .458 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. PRESS = press freedom (WB 1999-2007). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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The six enforcement variable results are reported in both pooled and year wise 
cross sectional form tested one at a time. All models are significant with adjusted R2 
of 31 to 47 percent, and the significance levels of individual coefficients are reported 
as two-tail p-values. The negative association between enforcement and discretionary 
accruals as the empirical indicator of earnings management is similar to the findings 
of La Porta et al.  (1998; 2002 and 2006); Luez et al. (2003) and Francis and Wang 
(2008). They found that strong enforcement is strongly associated with lower levels 
of earnings management. The findings of the current study are consistent with the 
Daske et al. (2008) argument that country level strong enforcement decreases the 
managerial discretionary behaviour. Control variables are in most cases consistent 
with earlier studies. 
 
5.4.2 Test results for research question two: Institutional setting 
The second research question focuses on the impact of the institutional setting on 
empirical indicator of earnings management. Singapore, Hong Kong, Luxemburg, 
Denmark, Finland and United Kingdom have the highest institutional settings scores; 
Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria, Argentina and Bangladesh have the lowest (Table 5-1, 
Panel B, Appendix A).    
The regression results are reported in Table 5-5. The institutional settings 
variable is significant at p<.01 in all models, both pooled and year wise and adjusted 
R2 range from 31 percent to 47 percent. This suggests that strong country level 
institutional settings reduce earnings management. The negative association between 
institutional settings and the empirical indicator of earnings management is similar to 
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the findings of Dyck and Zingales (2003); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Peter (2004); 
Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006) recommend strengthening of the institutional base to 
reduce insiders’ private control and earnings management activities. The impact of 
the control variables is generally consistent with the earlier results of prior studies. 
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Table 5-5 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with institutional setting 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1INS + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.308 
(<0.01) 
-.285 
(<0.01) 
-.245 
(<0.01) 
-.310 
(<0.01) 
-.349 
(<0.01) 
-.322 
(<0.01) 
-.289 
(<0.01) 
-.282 
(<0.01) 
-.307 
(<0.01) 
-.335 
(<0.01) 
INS -.028 
(<0.01) 
-.032 
(<0.01) 
-.032 
(<0.01) 
-.056 
(<0.01) 
-.035 
(<0.01) 
-.025 
(<0.01) 
-.019 
(<0.01) 
-.025 
(<0.01) 
-.030 
(<0.01) 
-.030 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .015 
(<0.01) 
.010 
(<0.01) 
.005 
(.128) 
.022 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.051 
(<0.01) 
.043 
(<0.01) 
.048 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.052 
(<0.01) 
.054 
(<0.01) 
.070 
(<0.01) 
.064 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.403 
(<0.01) 
-.308 
(<0.01) 
-.220 
(<0.01) 
-.333 
(<0.01) 
-.422 
(<0.01) 
-.442 
(<0.01) 
-.452 
(<0.01) 
-.468 
(<0.01) 
-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.483 
(<0.01) 
CAP .451 
(<0.01) 
.466 
(<0.01) 
.418 
(<0.01) 
.391 
(<0.01) 
.404 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.471 
(<0.01) 
.450 
(<0.01) 
.472 
(<0.01) 
.481 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.134 
(<0.01) 
-.160 
(<0.01) 
-.173 
(<0.01) 
-.129 
(<0.01) 
-.129 
(<0.01) 
-.117 
(<0.01) 
-.121 
(<0.01) 
-.126 
(<0.01) 
-.131 
(<0.01) 
-.139 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.417 .353 .315 .392 .421 .475 .471 .445 .455 .462 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. INS = regulatory quality (WB 1999-2007). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.3 Test results for research question three: Political system 
Research question three relates the macro governance variable political stability to 
earnings management. Table 5-6 present estimation results for both pooled and year 
specification of the association between political stability and discretionary accruals. 
Table 5-1, panel A, appendix A, provides the summary statistics of political stability 
scores by country and show that countries such as Luxemburg, Finland, Switzerland, 
Netherlands and Norway have the highest scores, while Nigeria, Pakistan, Srilanka, 
Colombia and Bangladesh have the least political stability. Table 5-1, panel C, 
appendix A, presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in this 
study. Panel C reports the there is a negative association between country-level 
political stability and discretionary accruals (DACCR), significant at p<.01.  
Table 5-6 reports regression results for the analysis of the relationship 
between political stability and earnings management. The political stability (POL) 
variable is significant in all models both pooled and year wise specifications and the 
adjusted R2 range from 32 percent to 47 percent.  This suggests that strong country 
level political stability reduce the earnings management practices. The results are 
similar to the findings of Seligson (2002); Alam (1995); Rose-Ackerman (1978); and 
Tanzi (1998). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) indicate that, “the first step to reduce 
accounting irregularities should be to create an accounting system that prevents theft 
from the government”. Further Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) explain that less political 
stability encourages irregularities in government budgeting - it is highly likely when 
“some of the essential controlling or auditing institutions are not well developed”.  
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient on CFO is negative and statistically 
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significant at (p<.01) level. The SIZE coefficient is positive and significant at (p<.01) 
level implying that larger firms make more income increasing DACCR choices 
consistent with larger firms having more ability to generate accruals. The coefficient 
on LEV is positive in all the year examined and statistically significant at (p<.01). 
GWTH coefficient is positive and statistically significant in the pooled model 
supporting McNichols hypothesis that growth firms generate more accruals. Capital 
intensity (CAP) as well as the loss dummy (LOSS) are also found significant at 
(p<.01) level in both the pooled and year wise specifications. 
The adjusted R2   values indicate that the regression model provides a good fit 
to the data. White’s test for hetroscedasticity indicates that the residuals from the 
regression model are homoskedastic. The variation inflation factor (VIF) values 
ranged from 1.09 to 2.41, and thus can reject multicollinearity in the data. 
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Table 5-6 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with political system 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1POL + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pooled 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.323 
(<0.01) 
-.255 
(<0.01) 
-.208 
(<0.01) 
-.362 
(<0.01) 
-.375 
(<0.01) 
-.338 
(<0.01) 
-.300 
(<0.01) 
-.293 
(<0.01) 
-.319 
(<0.01) 
-.351 
(<0.01) 
POL -.020 
(<0.01) 
-.018 
(.002) 
-.014 
(.026) 
-.019 
(<0.01) 
-.020 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
-.013 
(<0.01) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
-.018 
(<0.01) 
-.018 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.010 
(.001) 
.006 
(.066) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
LEV .018 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.052 
(<0.01) 
.055 
(<0.01) 
.071 
(<0.01) 
.065 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.406 
(<0.01) 
-.304 
(<0.01) 
-.215 
(<0.01) 
-.341 
(<0.01) 
-.422 
(<0.01) 
-.445 
(<0.01) 
-.454 
(<0.01) 
-.471 
(<0.01) 
-.451 
(<0.01) 
-.486 
(<0.01) 
CAP .458 
(<0.01) 
.458 
(<0.01) 
.407 
(<0.01) 
.405 
(<0.01) 
.412 
(<0.01) 
.468 
(<0.01) 
.476 
(<0.01) 
.459 
(<0.01) 
.482 
(<0.01) 
.492 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.139 
(<0.01) 
-.156 
(<0.01) 
-.167 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.134 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.125 
(<0.01) 
-.130 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.146 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.420 .358 .323 .378 .415 .471 .469 .441 .449 .457 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993).  For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. POL = political stability (WB 1999-2007). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.4 Test results of research question four: Corruption 
To test for the impact of corruption it is necessary to have some measure of 
corruption. There have been many different proxies for corruption used in the 
literature: the number of political figures convicted for abuse of power (Fisman and 
Gatti 1999; Goel and Nelson 1998), management time with bureaucracy (Kaufmann 
and Wei 2000), and a number of survey methods measuring corruption within a 
country. In recent research, the latter form has been the preferred approach with The 
World Bank control of corruption index being one of the more popular. The control 
of corruption index is a survey, taking results from many other surveys and 
combining them to make an index of control of corruption (Treisman 2000). Jain 
(2001) offers a review of corruption in general, and covers many of the different ways 
that corruption has been measured.  
Table 5-1, panel B, appendix A, report the summary statistics of corruption 
scores by country and shows that countries such as Finland, Denmark , New Zealand  
and Singapore have the highest scores, while Bangladesh, Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Venezuela and Paraguay have the lowest control of corruption. Table 5-1, panel D, 
appendix A, presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in this 
study. Panel D shows that there is a negative association between country-level 
control of corruption and discretionary accruals (DACCR), significant at p<.01.  
These results also suggest that there is a significant relationship between the 
discretionary accruals and control of corruption.  
Table 5-7 reports regression results for analysis of the impact of corruption on 
earnings management using both pooled and year wise specification. The corruption 
 142
(COR) variable is significant at p<.01 in all models, both pooled and year wise 
specifications and the adjusted R2 ranges from 31 percent to 47 percent.  This 
suggests that strong country level control of corruption reduces earnings management 
practices. The results are similar to the findings of Hoopes et al. (2006), who 
recommend that better accounting and auditing quality can reduce corruption at a 
country level. The coefficient on size is positive and highly significant. Evidently 
earnings management is prevalent in larger firms, relative to smaller firms (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). As hypothesized, the coefficient of the leverage is significantly 
positive (p<.01) and the coefficient of growth also appear to impact earnings 
management. CFO is significantly negative (p<.01), capital intensity (CAP) is 
significantly positive (p<.01) and the loss dummy (LOSS) significantly negative 
(p<.01).  
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Table 5-7 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with corruption 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1POL + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.311 
(<0.01) 
-.309 
(<0.01) 
-.268 
(<0.01) 
-.333 
(<0.01) 
-.360 
(<0.01) 
-.328 
(<0.01) 
-.292 
(<0.01) 
-.284 
(<0.01) 
-.309 
(<0.01) 
-.342 
(<0.01) 
COR -.021 
(<0.01) 
-.012 
(.002) 
-.012 
(.003) 
-.038 
(<0.01) 
-.026 
(<0.01) 
-.018 
(<0.01) 
-.012 
(<0.01) 
-.015 
(<0.01) 
-.019 
(<0.01) 
-.019 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.010 
(.001) 
.004 
(.212) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.051 
(<0.01) 
.043 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.052 
(<0.01) 
.055 
(<0.01) 
.071 
(<0.01) 
.065 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.403 
(<0.01) 
-.308 
(<0.01) 
-.220 
(<0.01) 
-.337 
(<0.01) 
-.422 
(<0.01) 
-.441 
(<0.01) 
-.451 
(<0.01) 
-.468 
(<0.01) 
-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.483 
(<0.01) 
CAP .452 
(<0.01) 
.471 
(<0.01) 
.423 
(<0.01) 
.396 
(<0.01) 
.406 
(<0.01) 
.462 
(<0.01) 
.473 
(<0.01) 
.454 
(<0.01) 
.475 
(<0.01) 
.484 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.134 
(<0.01) 
-.162 
(<0.01) 
-.175 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.131 
(<0.01) 
-.119 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.128 
(<0.01) 
-.134 
(<0.01) 
-.142 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.423 .349 .312 .387 .420 .474 .470 .443 .452 .460 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. COR = control of corruption (WB 1999-2007). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.5 Test results of research question five: Culture 
The fifth research question focuses on the impact of culture on earnings management. 
Table 5-1, panel B, appendix A, provides the summary statistics of culture values by 
country. The table shows Finland and Sweden have highest culture values whereas 
the Philippines and Argentina have the lowest culture values, respectively 3.51 and 
3.46. Table 5-1, panel D, appendix A, reports the there is a negative correlation 
between country-level culture values and discretionary accruals (DACCR), 
significant at p<.01.   
Table 5-8, reports regression results for analysis of the relationship between 
earnings management and culture. The culture (CUL) variable is significant at p<.01 
in all models, both pooled and year wise specifications, and the adjusted R2 ranges 
from around 32 percent to 47 percent (except in the year 1999).  This suggests that 
strong country level ethical practices reduce earnings management. The results for 
culture are  similar to the findings of Hopes et al. (2008); Nabar and Boonlert-U-Thai 
(2007); and Guam et al. (2005), and suggest that culture is an important determinant 
of accounting choice and should be considered by standard setters enacting and 
enforcing financial reporting standards. The control variable results are in general 
consistent with earlier results. 
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Table 5-8 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with culture 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1CUL + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.262 
(<0.01) 
-.247 
(<0.01) 
-.219 
(<0.01) 
-.271 
(<0.01) 
-.308 
(<0.01) 
-.270 
(<0.01) 
-.262 
(<0.01) 
-.238 
(<0.01) 
-.243 
(<0.01) 
-.275 
(<0.01) 
CUL -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.000 
(.118) 
-.000 
(<0.01) 
-.020 
(<0.01) 
-.015 
(<0.01) 
-.015 
(<0.01) 
-.009 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
-.017 
(<0.01) 
-.016 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .012 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(.002) 
.006 
(.054) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.037 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.055 
(<0.01) 
.069 
(<0.01) 
.065 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.391 
(<0.01) 
-.296 
(<0.01) 
-.215 
(<0.01) 
-.334 
(<0.01) 
-.420 
(<0.01) 
-.431 
(<0.01) 
-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.463 
(<0.01) 
-.428 
(<0.01) 
-.466 
(<0.01) 
CAP .461 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.411 
(<0.01) 
.401 
(<0.01) 
.409 
(<0.01) 
.467 
(<0.01) 
.480 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.485 
(<0.01) 
.493 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.140 
(<0.01) 
-.156 
(<0.01) 
-.168 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.135 
(<0.01) 
-.121 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.146 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.416 .354 .320 .373 .412 .469 .472 .443 .451 .460 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. CUL = ethical behaviour of firms (WEF 2008). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.6 Test results of research question six: Adoption of IFRS 
Table 5-9(i) shows that IFRS adoption explains a substantial portion (adjusted R2   
ranging from 0.416 to 0.445) of the variation in earnings management both in the 
pooled and year wise specifications. The impact of IFRS adoption appears to increase 
earnings management. This is similar to other studies of IFRS adoption such as the 
reported by van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), and Lin and Paananen (2007).  
Regarding the control variables, the coefficient on CFO is negative and 
statistically significant at (p<.01) level. The SIZE coefficient is positive and 
significant at (p<.01) level implying that larger firms make more income increasing 
DACCR choices consistent with larger firms having more ability to generate accruals. 
In the year-wise specifications the coefficient on LEV is positive in all the years 
examined and statistically significant at (p<.01) level. The GWTH coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant in the pooled model supporting at (p<0.01) level, 
the Larcker et al. (2007) hypothesis that growth firms generate more accruals.  
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Table 5-9(i) 
 
Regression Analysis of discretionary accruals with adoption of IFRS 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1IFRS + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent  
variables 
Pooled 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.320 
(<0.01) 
-.310 
(<0.01) 
-.353 
(<0.01) 
IFRS .013 
(<0.01) 
.004 
(.098) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .010 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .055 
(<0.01) 
.073 
(<0.01) 
.066 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.404 
(<0.01) 
-.450 
(<0.01) 
-.486 
(<0.01) 
CAP .464 
(<0.01) 
.489 
(<0.01) 
.498 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.141 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.148 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.416 .446 .455 
N 156,906 10,250 9,714 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been 
reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. IFRS = a dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given year after mandatory IFRS 
adoption and 0 otherwise. . SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term 
debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in 
year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / 
Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 
otherwise. 
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 In order to examines earnings quality as a joint function of macro governance 
and IFRS adoption, exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) is used to reduce 
the 10 macro governance variables, to a single composite variable.  
Table 5-9(ii) reports on the joint effect of IFRS adoption and the macro 
governance. The adjusted R2 is 43.10 percent; the significance levels of individual 
coefficients are reported as two-tail p-values. 
The macro governance variable by itself represents the effect on accruals as 
macro governance become stronger. The macro governance variable is significant and 
negatively related to DACCR at p<.01.  IFRS is significantly positively related to 
DACCR at p<.01, and thus adoption of IFRS reduces earnings quality. 
The interaction of macro governance with the IFRS adoption variable 
measures the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings quality relative to non-IFRS 
adopted countries as macro governance become stronger. The results show that the 
macro governance variables mediate the impact of IFRS adoption. The control 
variables are in general consistent with earlier results. 
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Table 5-9(ii) 
 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with IFRS adoption and macro governance 
 (Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1MACRO + β2IFRS + β3MACRO*IFRS + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GWTHit + 
β7CFOit + β8CAPit + β9LOSSit+ fixed effects 
 
 
Independent  
variables 
Pooled 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.307 
(<0.01) 
MACRO -.008 
(<.01) 
IFRS .016 
(<0.01) 
MACRO*IFRS -.006 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .052 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.421 
(<0.01) 
CAP .454 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.132 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included 
Adj. R2 
 
.431 
N 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country 
clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies 
have not been reported.  
 
MACRO = macro governance are computed using PCA for 10 macro variables. IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value of 
1 for a given country in years after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. 
SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year 
t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating 
cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. 
LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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 5.4.7 Test results of research question seven: Initial public offerings (IPOs) 
This study extends the literature by examining whether IPOs are associated with 
earnings management. Table 5-1, panel C, appendix A, reports the summary statistics 
of IPO data by country. The table shows that, France, Hong Kong, Bahrain and China 
have the highest IPO proceeds as a percentage of GDP, whereas Chile, Israel and 
Indonesia have the lowest IPO proceeds as a percentage of GDP respectively 0.15, 
0.12 and 0.08. Table 5-1, panel D, appendix A, reports the there is a positive relation 
between country-level IPO proceeds amount as a percentage of GDP and 
discretionary accruals (DACCR), significant at p<.01.   
Table 5-10 reports regression results for our analysis of the relationship 
between IPO issue and earnings management. The IPO variable is significant at p<.01 
in all models, both pooled and year wise specifications, and the adjusted R2 ranges 
from 32 percent to 47 percent. This suggests that manager make income-increasing 
discretionary accruals adjustments to portray a rosy picture in the year of an IPO 
offering to maximize the offer proceeds. However, this result should be interpreted 
with caution because country level IPO proceeds amount as a percentage of GDP is 
considered rather than firm level data. The results are thus, at best an indirect test of 
comparison with the studies conducted by Teoh et al. (1998) and Rangan (1998). 
Control variables are in general consistent with earlier results. 
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Table 5-10 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with initial public offerings (IPOs) 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1IPO + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.311 
(<0.01) 
-.282 
(<0.01) 
-.231 
(<0.01) 
-.324 
(<0.01) 
-.357 
(<0.01) 
-.330 
(<0.01) 
-.299 
(<0.01) 
-.283 
(<0.01) 
-.310 
(<0.01) 
-.348 
(<0.01) 
IPO 
 
.004 
(<0.01) 
.005 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.004 
(<0.01) 
.004 
(<0.01) 
.003 
(<0.01) 
.004 
(<0.01) 
.003 
(<0.01) 
.004 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .016 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(.053) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.022 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .051 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.047 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.035 
(<0.01) 
.051 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.069 
(<0.01) 
.062 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.388 
(<0.01) 
-.288 
(<0.01) 
-.205 
(<0.01) 
-.317 
(<0.01) 
-.409 
(<0.01) 
-.431 
(<0.01) 
-.452 
(<0.01) 
-.465 
(<0.01) 
-.433 
(<0.01) 
-.461 
(<0.01) 
CAP .449 
(<0.01) 
.457 
(<0.01) 
.403 
(<0.01) 
.378 
(<0.01) 
.395 
(<0.01) 
.454 
(<0.01) 
.468 
(<0.01) 
.454 
(<0.01) 
.480 
(<0.01) 
.488 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.134 
(<0.01) 
-.153 
(<0.01) 
-.164 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.128 
(<0.01) 
-.119 
(<0.01) 
-.120 
(<0.01) 
-.129 
(<0.01) 
-.136 
(<0.01) 
-.142 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.424 .356 .321 .393 .420 .476 .475 .448 .455 .468 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. IPO = initial public offerings (WEF 2008). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
 152
5.4.8 Test results of research question eight: Debt contracts 
As there is no comprehensive information available on the use of accounting 
information in debt covenants and collecting of actual debt covenants for the sample 
is not feasible earnings management was tested by regressing DACCR on long term 
debt to total equity after controlling for other factors known to affect DACCR. This is 
obviously an indirect approach, but provided DACCR is measured with minimum of 
noise and the debt level represents the actual outstanding obligations of the borrower, 
a relationship is expected between the two. 
The regression results in Table 5-11 show that in the pooled and year wise 
specifications, DACCR and LEV are positively related. In the pooled specification 
LEV enters the regression with a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
.018 (p<.01, two-tailed test). This suggests that as corporate leverage increases 
managers make income-increasing discretionary accruals choices to avoid costly 
breaches of debt contract. Regarding the control variables, coefficient on CFO is 
negative and statistically significant at (p<.01) level. The SIZE coefficient is positive 
and significant at (p<0.01) level implying that larger firms make more income 
increasing DACCR choices consistent with larger firms having more ability to 
generate accruals. The variables together explain about 45% variation in DACCR. In 
the year wise specifications the coefficient on LEV is positive in all the year 
examined and statistically significant except 2007. The GWTH coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant in the pooled model, except in 2000 and 2007 supporting 
McNichols hypothesis that growth firms generate more accruals. The yearly adjusted 
R2 varies from a low of 11.4% in 2005 to a high of 57.5% in 2003. 
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Table 5-11 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with debt contracts 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1LEV + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7 |TACCR|+ β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.317 
(<0.01) 
-.229 
(<0.01) 
-3.470 
(<0.01) 
-.270 
(<0.01) 
-.077 
(<0.01) 
-.155 
(<0.01) 
.189 
(<0.01) 
.160 
(<0.01) 
-.452 
(<0.01) 
.033 
(<0.01) 
LEV .018 
(<0.01) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(.029) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.005 
(.003) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.0005 
(.394) 
SIZE .010 
(<0.01) 
.002 
(.554) 
.095 
(<0.01) 
.035 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.029 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .055 
(<0.01) 
.054 
(<0.01) 
-.010 
(.232) 
.010 
(<0.01) 
.002 
(.358) 
.022 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(.005) 
.030 
(<0.01) 
.045 
(<0.01) 
.000 
(.141) 
CFO -.418 
(<0.01) 
-.402 
(<0.01) 
-.301 
(<0.01) 
-2.63 
(<0.01) 
-.215 
(<0.01) 
-.299 
(<0.01) 
-.327 
(<0.01) 
-.313 
(<0.01) 
-.230 
(<0.01) 
-.274 
(<0.01) 
CAP .468 
(<0.01) 
.452 
(<0.01) 
2.530 
(<0.01) 
-.058 
(<0.01) 
-.279 
(<0.01) 
.745 
(<0.01) 
.159 
(<0.01) 
-.041 
(<0.01) 
.471 
(<0.01) 
-.010 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.135 
(<0.01) 
-.157 
(<0.01) 
-.294 
(<0.01) 
-.146 
(<0.01) 
-.028 
(<0.01) 
-.111 
(<0.01) 
-.023 
(<0.01) 
-.073 
(<0.01) 
-.128 
(<0.01) 
-.155 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 .450 .412 .429 .243 .340 .575 .097 .114 .397 .194 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in 
year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t 
scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports 
negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.9 Test results of research question nine: Performance based compensations 
There is no aggregate information available on the use of accounting information in 
executive bonus plans and it is not feasible in this study to examine individual plans. 
The impact on earnings management is thus tested by use of an index of incentive-
based compensation. This provides only indirect evidence as compared to studies 
such as Healy (1985); Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Larcker et al. (2007).  
Table 5-1, panel C, appendix A, provides the summary statistics of the extent 
of incentive-based compensation data by country. The mean extent of incentive-based 
compensation is 5.09. The table shows that, France, South Africa, Switzerland and 
Germany rank highest on incentive-based compensation (made up in larger pert of 
performance-based benefits such as bonus, stock, option etc.), whereas Pakistan, 
Nigeria, Turkey and Egypt have the lowest ranking. Table 5-1, panel D, appendix A, 
reports a negative relation between country-level extent of incentive-based 
compensation and discretionary accruals (DACCR), significant at p<.01.   
Table 5-12 shows that the BONUS variable is significant at p<.01 in all 
models, both pooled and year wise specifications, but negative. Adjusted R2 ranges 
from 31 to 47 percent.  The results suggest that managers do not manage earnings in 
order to improve their incentive based compensation. However, caution in 
interpretation is required as country level extent of incentive-based compensation has 
been considered instead of firm level data. The control variables are in general 
consistent with earlier results. 
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Table 5-12 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with performance based compensations (BONUS) 
 (Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1BONUS + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.183 
(<0.01) 
-.065 
(.103) 
-.047 
(.248) 
.002 
(.957) 
-.125 
(<0.01) 
-.254 
(<0.01) 
-.214 
(<0.01) 
-.191 
(<0.01) 
-.208 
(<0.01) 
-.214 
(<0.01) 
BONUS  -.029 
(<0.01) 
-.048 
(<0.01) 
-.043 
(<0.01) 
-.070 
(<0.01) 
-.049 
(<0.01) 
-.017 
(<0.01) 
-.018 
(<0.01) 
-.021 
(<0.01) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
-.029 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .012 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(.002) 
.003 
(.268) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
LEV .020 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.048 
(<0.01) 
.040 
(<0.01) 
.037 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.070 
(<0.01) 
.065 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.388 
(<0.01) 
-.294 
(<0.01) 
-.211 
(<0.01) 
-.324 
(<0.01) 
-.413 
(<0.01) 
-.430 
(<0.01) 
-.446 
(<0.01) 
-.461 
(<0.01) 
-.426 
(<0.01) 
-.465 
(<0.01) 
CAP .456 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.415 
(<0.01) 
.386 
(<0.01) 
.397 
(<0.01) 
.466 
(<0.01) 
.477 
(<0.01) 
.461 
(<0.01) 
.484 
(<0.01) 
.489 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.135 
(<0.01) 
-.160 
(<0.01) 
-.173 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.119 
(<0.01) 
-.119 
(<0.01) 
-.129 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.142 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.419 .412 .314 .385 .419 .468 .473 .444 .451 .462 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993).  For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. BONUS = performance based compensation (WEF 2008). SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm 
i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales 
in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / total assets in year t. LOSS = 
indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.10 Test results of research question ten: Audit quality 
Table 5-1, panel B, appendix A, shows that only 54% of the firm-year observations 
are associated with a Big 4 auditor. Table 5-13(i) reports the regression results for 
BIG4 with discretionary accruals. The coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant in the pooled model as well as the year wise specification, except for the 
year 2004. The results suggest that BIG4 auditor play a vital role in shaping managers 
income increasing practices choices. The positive coefficient on LEV implies that 
firms with high leverage engage in income-increasing discretionary earnings 
management practices to avoid the costly breaches of debt contracts. The coefficient 
of GWTH is positive and statistically significant at 1% level in both pooled and year-
wise specification. Since firms with growth potentials have larger accruals 
(McNichols 2000), it is important to control for GWTH as determinants of DACCR. 
The coefficient of SIZE is statistically significant at conventional level in either the 
pooled or year-wise specifications. CAP is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level in both pooled and year-wise specification. LOSS is also significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5-13(i) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with audit quality 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1BIG4 + β2 SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.326 
(<0.01) 
-.332 
(<0.01) 
-.294 
(<0.01) 
-.385 
(<0.01) 
-.389 
(<0.01) 
-.337 
(<0.01) 
-.296 
(<0.01) 
-.291 
(<0.01) 
-.320 
(<0.01) 
-.360 
(<0.01) 
BIG4 -.013 
(<0.01) 
-.017 
(.001) 
-.017 
(.002) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
-.015 
(<0.01) 
-.006 
(.028) 
-.003 
(.188) 
-.008 
(.001) 
-.014 
(<0.01) 
-.016 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .013 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(.021) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.008 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
LEV .018 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .055 
(<0.01) 
.051 
(<0.01) 
.043 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.043 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.073 
(<0.01) 
.066 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.416 
(<0.01) 
-.306 
(<0.01) 
-.218 
(<0.01) 
-.339 
(<0.01) 
-.421 
(<0.01) 
-.442 
(<0.01) 
-.452 
(<0.01) 
-.468 
(<0.01) 
-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.482 
(<0.01) 
CAP .466 
(<0.01) 
.473 
(<0.01) 
.426 
(<0.01) 
.407 
(<0.01) 
.413 
(<0.01) 
.469 
(<0.01) 
.479 
(<0.01) 
.462 
(<0.01) 
.486 
(<0.01) 
.494 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.135 
(<0.01)` 
-.162 
(<0.01) 
-.176 
(<0.01) 
-.137 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.125 
(<0.01) 
-.131 
(<0.01) 
-.138 
(<0.01) 
-.147 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.451 .350 .312 .379 .415 .468 .467 .438 .447 .455 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. BIG4 = indicator variable with the value of 1 if the firm audited by one of the BIG 4 and otherwise 0. SIZE = natural 
logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in 
year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets 
in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise.
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 In order to examine earnings quality as a joint function of macro governance 
and audit quality by using exploratory PCA was used to reduce the 10 macro 
governance variables to a single composite variable. 
Table 5-13(ii) reports on the joint effect of BIG4 choice and the macro 
governance. The adjusted R2 is 43 percent; the significance levels of individual 
coefficients are reported as two-tail p-values. 
The macro governance variable by itself represents the effect on accruals as 
macro governance become stronger. The macro governance variable is significant and 
negatively related to DACCR at p<.01. BIG4 is insignificantly negatively related to 
DACCR at p>.10. 
The interaction of macro governance with the BIG4 variable measures the 
effect of Big4 on earnings quality relative to non-big4 as macro governance become 
stronger. A negative sign indicate discretionary accruals of Big 4 firms are 
consistently smaller relative to the accruals of non-Big 4 clients as a country’s macro 
governance regime becomes stronger. The control variables are in general consistent 
with earlier results. 
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Table 5-13(ii) 
 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with audit quality and macro governance 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1 MACRO + β2 BIG4 + β3MACRO*BIG4 + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GWTHit + 
β7CFOit + β8CAPit + β9LOSSit+ fixed effects 
 
 
Independent  
variables 
Pooled 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.309 
(<0.01) 
MACRO -.005 
(<0.01) 
BIG4 -.000 
(.403) 
MACRO*BIG4 -.006 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .052 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.420 
(<0.01) 
CAP .453 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.132 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included 
Adj. R2 
 
.430 
N 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been 
reported.  
MACRO = macro governance are computed using PCA for 10 macro variables. BIG4 = Indicator variable with the value of 1 if the 
firm audited by one of the BIG 4 and otherwise 0. DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in 
$ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales 
in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. 
CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports 
negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.11 Test results of research question eleven: Board size 
Table 5-1, panel B, appendix A, provides the summary statistics of board size by 
country. The overall mean board size is 8.54. The table shows that, Philippines, 
Thailand and Canada have high board size whereas Paraguay, Ecuador and Colombia 
have lowest mean board size.  
The results in Table 5-14(i) show that there is a significant negative relationship 
between DACCR and board size in all models, both pooled and year wise specifications 
and the adjusted R2 ranges from 10 percent to 57 percent. The result suggests that the 
larger the board, the more effective it is in its monitoring function. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Larcker et 
al. (2007) who argue that large boards are more effective in their oversight duties 
relative to smaller boards and are susceptible to the CEO’s domination over board 
matters. In contrast, Yermack’s (1996) study found that smaller boards are associated 
with better firm performance. This is particularly true of large US (mean BOD 5.47) 
industrial corporations, where market values for firms with smaller boards are high. The 
control variables are in general consistent with earlier results. 
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Table 5-14(i) 
 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with board size 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1 BOD+ β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.320 
(<0.01) 
-.478 
(<0.01) 
-3.448 
(<0.01) 
-.280 
(<0.01) 
-.087 
(<0.01) 
-.161 
(<0.01) 
.176 
(<0.01) 
.149 
(<0.01) 
-.434 
(<0.01) 
.021 
(.008) 
BOD -.000 
(<0.01) 
-.001 
(.022) 
-.003 
(.055) 
-.000 
(.086) 
-.003 
(<0.01) 
-.000 
(.167) 
-.003 
(<0.01) 
-.003 
(<0.01) 
-.001 
(<0.01) 
-.002 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .012 
(<0.01) 
-.006 
(.098) 
.096 
(<0.01) 
.038 
(<0.01) 
.027 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.036 
(<0.01) 
.022 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
.019 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
.123 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(.085) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.005 
(.003) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.0005 
(.403) 
GWTH .055 
(<0.01) 
.003 
(.227) 
-.008 
(.380) 
.009 
(<0.01) 
.001 
(.766) 
.022 
(<0.01) 
.015 
(.002) 
.029 
(<0.01) 
.046 
(<0.01) 
.000 
(.148) 
CFO -.411 
(<0.01) 
-.098 
(<0.01) 
-.321 
(<0.01) 
-.284 
(<0.01) 
-.214 
(<0.01) 
-.301 
(<0.01) 
-.340 
(<0.01) 
-.313 
(<0.01) 
-.238 
(<0.01) 
-.274 
(<0.01) 
CAP .461 
(<0.01) 
.510 
(<0.01) 
2.526 
(<0.01) 
-.057 
(<0.01) 
-.286 
(<0.01) 
.743 
(<0.01) 
.154 
(<0.01) 
-.046 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.140 
(<0.01) 
-.130 
(<0.01) 
-.313 
(<0.01) 
-.151 
(<0.01) 
-.031 
(<0.01) 
-.111 
(<0.01) 
-.020 
(.001) 
-.071 
(<0.01) 
-.123 
(<0.01) 
-.153 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.416 .528 .427 .246 .341 .570 .101 .118 .406 .195 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. BOD = no of directors on the board of a firm. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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 In order to examines earnings quality as a joint function of macro governance 
and board size by using exploratory PCA was used to reduce the 10 macro 
governance variables to a single composite variable. 
Table 5-14(ii) reports on the joint effect of board size and the macro 
governance. The adjusted R2 is 43 percent; the significance levels of individual 
coefficients are reported as two-tail p-values. 
The macro governance variable by itself represents the effect on accruals as 
macro governance become stronger. The macro governance variable is significant and 
negatively related to DACCR at p<.01. However, board size is not significantly 
related to DACCR at p>.10.  
The interaction of macro governance with the board size variable measures 
the effect of larger board on earnings quality relative to smaller board as macro 
governance becomes stronger. A negative sign indicate discretionary accruals of 
larger board firms are consistently smaller relative to the accruals of smaller board 
firms as a country’s macro governance regime becomes stronger. The control 
variables are in general consistent with earlier results. 
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Table 5-14(ii) 
 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with board size and macro governance 
 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1 MACRO + β2BOD + β3MACRO*BOD + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GWTHit + 
β7CFOit + β8CAPit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent  
variables 
Pooled 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.310 
(<0.01) 
BOD .001 
(.287) 
MACRO -.006 
(<0.01) 
MACRO*BOD -.007 
(.129) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
LEV .019 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .052 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.421 
(<0.01) 
CAP .453 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.132 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included 
R .646 
Adj. R2 
 
.430 
N 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993).  For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been 
reported.  
 
MACRO = macro governance are computed using PCA for 10 macro variables. BOD = no of directors on the board of a firm. 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-
term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in 
year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total 
assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 
otherwise. 
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5.4.12 Test results of research question twelve: Board effectiveness 
 
Table 5-1, panel C, appendix A, provides the summary statistics of board 
effectiveness data by country. The table shows that, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Australia and South Africa have highest board effectiveness, whereas Pakistan, China, 
Poland and Venezuela have the lowest board effectiveness respectively. Table 5-1, 
panel D, appendix A, reports a negative relation between country-level board 
effectiveness and discretionary accruals (DACCR), significant at p<.01.   
Table 5-15(i) reports regression results for analysis of the relationship 
between earnings management and board effectiveness. The board effectiveness 
variable is negative and significant in all models both pooled and year wise 
specifications. Adjusted R2 ranges from 31 percent to 47percent.  This suggests that 
board effectiveness plays a vital role in constraining managers’ earnings 
management. However, this result should be interpreted with caution because country 
level board effectiveness scores are considered instead of firm level data, and these 
comparison with the results of studies such as (2002); Xie et al. (2003); Peasnell et al. 
(2005); Lee et al. (2007); and Larcker et al. (2007), must be made with caution. The 
control variables are in general consistent with earlier results. 
 
 165
Table 5-15(i) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with board effectiveness 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1 BIND + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.202 
(<0.01) 
-.219 
(<0.01) 
-.205 
(<0.01) 
-.077 
(<.032) 
-.188 
(<0.01) 
-.225 
(<0.01) 
-.248 
(<0.01) 
-.214 
(<0.01) 
-.207 
(<0.01) 
-.227 
(<0.01) 
BIND -.024 
(<0.01) 
-.019 
(.009) 
-.014 
(.061) 
-.055 
(<0.01) 
-.036 
(<0.01) 
-.022 
(<0.01) 
-.011 
(<0.01) 
-.015 
(<0.01) 
-.022 
(<0.01) 
-.024 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .012 
(<0.01) 
.009 
(.002) 
.003 
(.311) 
.021 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.006 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(<0.01) 
.010 
(<0.01) 
.017 
(<0.01) 
LEV .020 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.026 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.018 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .053 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.049 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.037 
(<0.01) 
.053 
(<0.01) 
.056 
(<0.01) 
.070 
(<0.01) 
.065 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.390 
(<0.01) 
-.295 
(<0.01) 
-.212 
(<0.01) 
-.331 
(<0.01) 
-.418 
(<0.01) 
-.430 
(<0.01) 
-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.463 
(<0.01) 
-.428 
(<0.01) 
-.465 
(<0.01) 
CAP .459 
(<0.01) 
.472 
(<0.01) 
.424 
(<0.01) 
.396 
(<0.01) 
.406 
(<0.01) 
.467 
(<0.01) 
.480 
(<0.01) 
.463 
(<0.01) 
.486 
(<0.01) 
.492 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.138 
(<0.01) 
-.160 
(<0.01) 
-.175 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.133 
(<0.01) 
-.119 
(<0.01) 
-.122 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.136 
(<0.01) 
-.144 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.417 .347 .311 .379 .415 .469 .471 .443 .450 .460 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR =signed discretionary accruals. BIND = board effectiveness (WEF 2008).  SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO 
= operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable 
with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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 In order to examine earnings quality as a joint function of macro governance 
and board effectiveness, exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) was used to 
reduce the 10 macro governance variables to a single composite variable. 
Table 5-15(ii) reports on the joint effect of board effectiveness and the macro 
governance. The adjusted R2 is 43.40 percent; the significance levels of individual 
coefficients are reported as two-tail p-values. 
The macro governance variable by itself represents the effect on accruals as 
macro governance become stronger. The macro governance variable is significant and 
negatively related to DACCR at p<.01. Board effectiveness is also significantly 
negatively related to DACCR at p<.01.  
The interaction of macro governance with the board effectiveness variable 
measures the effect of board effectiveness on earnings quality relative to ineffective 
board as macro governance becomes stronger. A negative sign indicate discretionary 
accruals of effective board are consistently smaller relative to the accruals of 
ineffective board as a country’s macro governance regime becomes stronger. The 
control variables are in general consistent with earlier results. 
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Table 5-15 (ii) 
 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with board effectiveness and macro governance 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1MACRO + β2BIND + β3MACRO*BIND + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GWTHit + 
β7CFOit + β8CAPit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent  
variables 
Pooled  
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.317 
(<0.01) 
MACRO -.015 
(<0.01) 
BIND -.017 
(<0.01) 
MACRO*BIND -.002 
(.098) 
SIZE .018 
(<0.01) 
LEV .017 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .051 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.424 
(<0.01) 
CAP .453 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.131 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included 
Adj. R2 
 
.434 
N 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993).For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been 
reported.  
  
MACRO = macro governance are computed using PCA for 10 macro variables. BIND = board effectiveness (WEF 2008).   DACCR 
= signed discretionary accruals. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term 
debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. 
CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets 
in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.4.13 Test results of research question thirteen: Ownership concentration 
 
Table 5-16(i) shows that the coefficient on OWN in both the pooled and year wise 
specifications is statistically significant at (p<.01). This result is consistent with La 
Porta et al. (1998) who find a high degree of ownership concentration in firms from 
countries with relatively poor country-level governance and argues that the conflict 
between large shareholders/sponsor owners and minority shareholders is the primary 
firm-level governance problems in such countries. In companies with concentrated 
ownership, controlling shareholders can expropriate wealth from minority 
shareholders in many ways. For example, they can extract cash by selling assets, 
goods or services to the company through self-dealing transactions, they can obtain 
loan on preferential terms, they can transfer assets from the company in focus to other 
companies under their control, or they can dilute the interest of minority shareholders 
by acquiring shares at a preferential price (Johnson et al. 2000). Morck et al. (1998) 
also find a positive relationship between ownership concentration and earnings 
management in the 5% to 25% range. The control variables are in general consistent 
with earlier results. 
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Table 5-16(i) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with ownership concentration 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1 OWN + β2SIZEit + β3LEVit + β4GWTHit + β5CFOit + β6CAPit + β7LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.369 
(<0.01) 
-.341 
(<0.01) 
-.297 
(<0.01) 
-.404 
(<0.01) 
-.405 
(<0.01) 
-.384 
(<0.01) 
-.354 
(<0.01) 
-.342 
(<0.01) 
-.359 
(<0.01) 
-.409 
(<0.01) 
OWN .131 
(<0.01) 
.162 
(<0.01) 
.144 
(<0.01) 
.195 
(<0.01) 
.120 
(<0.01) 
.114 
(<0.01) 
.119 
(<0.01) 
.113 
(<0.01) 
.110 
(<0.01) 
.136 
(<0.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<0.01) 
.007 
(.010) 
.002 
(.569) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.011 
(<0.01) 
.012 
(<0.01) 
.020 
(<0.01) 
LEV .018 
(<0.01) 
.024 
(<0.01) 
.028 
(<0.01) 
.025 
(<0.01) 
.023 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.013 
(<0.01) 
.016 
(<0.01) 
.014 
(<0.01) 
GWTH .052 
(<0.01) 
.050 
(<0.01) 
.042 
(<0.01) 
.047 
(<0.01) 
.041 
(<0.01) 
.038 
(<0.01) 
.052 
(<0.01) 
.057 
(<0.01) 
.068 
(<0.01) 
.061 
(<0.01) 
CFO -.383 
(<0.01) 
-.292 
(<0.01) 
-.212 
(<0.01) 
-.311 
(<0.01) 
-.416 
(<0.01) 
-.425 
(<0.01) 
.-.449 
(<0.01) 
-.458 
(<0.01) 
-.421 
(<0.01) 
-.443 
(<0.01) 
CAP .451 
(<0.01) 
.457 
(<0.01) 
.413 
(<0.01) 
.383 
(<0.01) 
.397 
(<0.01) 
.458 
(<0.01) 
.466 
(<0.01) 
.455 
(<0.01) 
.477 
(<0.01) 
.488 
(<0.01) 
LOSS -.133 
(<0.01) 
-.158 
(<0.01) 
-.172 
(<0.01) 
-.130 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
-.118 
(<0.01) 
-.121 
(<0.01) 
-.124 
(<0.01) 
-.130 
(<0.01) 
-.132 
(<0.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.424 .353 .317 .389 .417 .475 .480 .451 .452 .468 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in Rogers 
(1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. OWN = ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 2006).  SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i 
in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/ equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in 
year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = 
indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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In conducting empirical tests such as above, it is assumed that the relationship 
between ownership level and earnings management behaviour is linear. However, an 
argument can be made that at different ranges of ownerships either a convergence-of-
interest or entrenchment effect could dominate. Morck et al. (1988) find a positive 
relation between ownership and firm value (proxied by Tobin’s Q) in the 0% to 5% 
board ownership range, a negative and less pronounced relation in the 5% to 25% 
range, and a further positive relation beyond 25%. 
 They interpret the findings as 
…. consistent with both the convergence-of-interests and entrenchment effect. 
The initial rise in Q as ownership rise might reflect manager’s greater incentives 
to maximize value as their stakes rise. Beyond the 5% ownership level, however, 
increase in managerial ownership may be associates with conditions conducive 
to the entrenchment of incumbent management…….throughout this range, the 
incentive effect can still be operative; it is just dominated by the entrenchment 
effect. As board ownership reaches the neighbourhood of 25%, managers with 
even higher board ownership might not be significantly entrenched than those 
with 25% ownership…. the increase in Q for the very highest ownership levels 
then might reflect a pure convergence-of-interests effect. 
  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) replicate Morck et al. (1998) and also find a 
curvilinear relation between Q and the fraction of common stock owned by corporate 
insiders. However, they find the convergence-of-interests effect to be operative up to 
50% ownership stake and then the entrenchment effect comes in. 
 In respect of audit, Lennox (2005) investigates how divergence-of-interests 
and entrenchment problem affect the choice of auditor behaviour. Using a sample of 
1331 listed and 538 unlisted UK companies, he finds that the relationship between 
management ownership and audit firm size is significantly negative when ownership 
is low for 0-5% but high for 25-100% which is consistent with the divergence-of-
interest effect. Consistent with the entrenchment effect, Lennox finds that the 
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relationship between management ownership and audit firm size is significantly more 
positive when ownership is at intermediate levels. 
 To investigate whether the behaviour of ownership structure and earnings 
management takes on the functional form identified by Morck et al. (1988) a 
piecewise linear regression is estimated Morck’s partition of ownership: 
         OWN (0-25)       = actual ownership if   0% < OWN <25% 
           OWN (25-50)     = actual ownership if 25% <OWN <50% 
          OWN (50-100)  = actual ownership if 50% <OWN <100% 
 
 Table 5-16(ii) presents the impact of ownership structure on earnings 
management for the pooled sample. The coefficients are statistically significant and 
negative for OWN<25% but positive at OWN>25%. The results suggest that with 
higher levels of ownership, when ownership is medium range or the largest 
shareholders have dominance in the affairs of the companies, and management of the 
companies engage in income increasing earnings management strategies to maximise 
the personal wealth of the larger shareholders. 
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Table 5-16(ii) 
 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with ownership concentration 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = β0 + β1OWN (0-25%) + β2OWN (0-25%) + β3OWN (0-25%) + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + 
β6GWTHit + β7CFOit + β8CAPit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent variables 
Pooled 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.295 
(<.01) 
(0-25)% -.030 
(<.01) 
(25-50)% .016 
(<.01) 
(50-100)% .024 
(<.01) 
SIZE .014 
(<.01) 
LEV .018 
(<.01) 
GWTH .052 
(<.01) 
CFO -.383 
(<.01) 
CAP .451 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.130 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included 
Adj. R2 
 
.425 
N 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects 
using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. OWN = ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 2006).  SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets 
in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in 
year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = 
non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net 
income in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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In order to examines earnings quality as a joint function of macro 
governance and ownership concentration, exploratory PCA was used to reduce the 
10 macro governance variables to a single composite variable. 
Table 5-16(iii) reports on the joint effect of ownership concentration and 
the macro governance. The adjusted R2 is 43.20 percent; the significance levels of 
individual coefficients are reported as two-tail p-values. 
The macro governance variable by itself represents the effect on accruals 
as macro governance become stronger. The macro governance variable is 
significant and negatively related to DACCR at p<.01. Ownership concentration is 
also but positively related to DACCR at p<.01.  
The interaction of macro governance with the ownership concentration 
variable measures the effect of high ownership concentration on earnings quality 
relative to low ownership concentration as macro governance becomes stronger. 
The results show that the higher ownership concentration mediates the impact of 
strong macro setting. The control variables are in general consistent with earlier 
results. 
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Table 5-16(iii) 
 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with ownership concentration and macro 
governance 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
 DACCRit = β0 + β1MACRO + β2OWN + β3MACRO*OWN + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit + β6GWTHit + 
β7CFOit + β8CAPit + β9LOSSit + fixed effects 
 
 
Independent variables 
Pooled 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.325 
(<.01) 
MACRO -.021 
(<.01) 
OWN .025 
(<.01) 
MACRO*OWN .020 
(<.01) 
SIZE .018 
(<.01) 
LEV .016 
(<.01) 
GWTH .050 
(<.01) 
CFO -.412 
(<.01) 
CAP .449 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.131 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included 
Adj. R2 
 
.432 
N 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering 
effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year and country dummies have not been 
reported.  
 
MACRO = macro governance are computed using PCA for 10 macro variables. OWN = ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 
2006).  DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. 
LEV= total long-term debt/equity for firm i in year t. GWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 
and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP = non-current 
(fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS = indicator variable with the value of 1 if firm i reports negative net income 
in the previous year and 0 otherwise. 
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5.5 Robustness tests 
A number of additional tests are performed to examine the sensitivity of the 
results to issues such as alternative model specifications, and deletion of small 
countries. 
 
5.5.1 Using cross-sectional Jones (1991) model 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994); Subramanyam (1996) and Krishnan (2003a) finds 
that parameter estimates in the cross-sectional Jones model are more precise than 
their time-series counterparts. Furthermore, Bartov et al. (2000) evaluate the 
ability of seven accruals estimation models in detecting earnings management by 
examining the association between discretionary accruals and audit qualifications 
and conclude that the cross-sectional Jones model and the cross sectional 
modified Jones model both perform better than their time-series counterparts in 
detecting earnings management. The important difference between the Jones 
model and the modified Jones model is that the modified Jones model takes into 
account the change in receivables in computing the change in revenues. The mean 
(median) values of discretionary accruals under Jones model are 0.0001 (0.0115). 
The difference in mean and median values are statistically significant at the 
(p<.01) level. Results of the re-estimation of  all the models for macro and micro 
governance with discretionary accruals obtained from the Jones model are 
consistent with the pooled results reported in Table 5-4 to 5-16. The re-estimation 
results are reported in Table 5-17 to 5-18 (Appendix D). 
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5.5.2 Deleting smaller countries 
In order to assure that smaller countries with fewer observations do not drive the 
results, the models reported in Tables 5-4 to 5-16 were re-estimated for the sample 
with only the largest countries and having 200 or more firm-year observations. 
These additional results for the pooled specification are reported in tables 5-19 to 
5-20 (Appendix D) and are unchanged from the full sample results in terms of 
both the sign and statistical significance on the test variables of interest. It thus 
appears that smaller countries do not derive the results. 
 The following checks were made on heteroskedasticity: 
(i) The Studentized deleted residuals were plotted against ‘standardized 
predicted values’ for each regression model to check that the values for the 
‘Studentized deleted residuals’ are evenly distributed around ‘zero’ for all levels 
of the predicted values. The scatter plots for all models showed no sign for 
heteroskedasticity. 
(ii) The ‘unstandardized residuals’ of all regression models were plotted in 
‘histograms’ and in all cases showed reasonably normal distributions. 
(iii) The observed unstandardized residuals were plotted against expected 
normal P-P plot and the results for all models were normal. 
To assess the ‘goodness of fit’ or ‘normality test’ of each model, 
‘unstandardized predicted values’ and ‘unstandardized residuals’ were recorded in 
the data window and a scatter plot constructed by putting ‘unstandardized 
residuals’ in the Y-axis and ‘unstandardized predicted values’ in the X-axis. The 
scatter plots for all models confirmed the fit of the models and their normality. 
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5.6. Summary 
This chapter has reported the results of the tests of the thirteen research questions 
set out in Chapter 4. An overall summary of the results of the tests is presented in 
chapter 6, the final chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
6.2 Summary of the research findings 
 
6.3 Implications of the study 
 
6.4 Limitations of the study 
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6.1 Introduction 
This final chapter of the study proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 provides an 
overall summary of the results and Section 6.3 discusses the implications of the 
study for practitioners, and regulators. The chapter concludes with Section 6.4 
which describes the limitations of the study.  
 
6.2 Summary of the research findings 
This thesis conducts a cross country study to investigate the role of macro and 
micro governance in mitigating opportunistic earnings management behaviour. 
Thirteen research questions were discussed and the results of the tests were as 
follows: 
Research question 1: Enforcement 
The results from testing research question one show that the macro governance 
variable enforcement is negatively associated with discretionary accruals. This is 
consistent with the findings of Hope et al. (2008); Francis and Wang (2008); 
Daske et al. (2008); La Porta et al. (1998; 2002; and 2006); and Luez et al. (2003). 
Research question 2: Institutional setting 
The results indicate that a strong institutional setting at the country level reduces 
discretionary accruals.  
Research question 3: Political system 
The results suggest that political stability at the country level decreases 
discretionary accruals.  
Research question 4: Corruption  
The results suggest that discretionary accruals lower in the absence of corruption 
decreases. 
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Research question 5: Culture 
 The results support the expectation that strong culture and ethical values at 
country level help reduce discretionary accruals.  
Research question 6: Adoption of IFRS 
The results suggest that adoption of IFRS leads to increased discretionary 
accruals. However, the macro governance setting can mitigate the impact of IFRS 
adoption. 
Research question 7: IPOs 
The results suggest that IPOs are positively related to discretionary accruals. This 
is consistent with managers making income-increasing discretionary accruals 
adjustments to portray a rosy picture in the year of offering to maximize the offer 
proceeds.  
Research question 8: Debt contracts 
The results suggest that high levels of debt are associated with higher 
discretionary accruals. 
Research question 9: Performance based compensation 
The results indicate that performance based compensation does not lead to higher 
discretionary accruals. However, this finding is subject to the limitations of the 
proxy used for performance based compensation. 
Research question 10: Audit quality 
The results are consistent with choice of a Big 4 auditor leading to decreased 
discretionary accruals. However, the interaction effect with macro governance 
indicates discretionary accruals of Big 4 firms are consistently smaller relative to 
the accruals of non-Big 4 clients as a country’s macro governance regime 
becomes stronger. 
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Research question 11: Board size 
The results suggest that a larger board leads to lower discretionary accruals. 
However, interaction effects with macro governance result shows that 
discretionary accruals of larger board firms are consistently smaller relative to the 
accruals of smaller board firms as a country’s macro governance regime becomes 
stronger.  
Research question 12: Board effectiveness 
The results indicate that an effective board is associated with lower discretionary 
accruals. However, interaction effects with macro governance result shows that 
discretionary accruals of effective board are consistently smaller relative to the 
accruals of ineffective board as a country’s macro governance regime becomes 
stronger.  
Research question 13: Ownership concentration 
The initial results indicate that concentrated ownership increases discretionary 
accruals. However, further analysis indicates that this is likely to apply only at 
high levels of concentration. 
 
6.3 Implications of the study  
Evidence from the earnings management literature makes it clear that earnings 
management is pervasive activity. This study does not attempt to gauge the extent 
of earnings management. Rather it looks at the impact of the macro setting on 
earnings management and the micro level steps that might be taken to mitigate 
management tendency for earnings management. The important implication of the 
results of the study is that the success of any action taken to limit earnings 
management at the level of the company will depend on the macro setting. An 
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important example is provided by IFRS. The general expectation among 
accounting standard setters is that adoption of IFRS will improve earnings quality. 
The results show the opposite. However, this is likely due to the macro setting in 
which IFRS is being adopted. Indeed the results of the study show that positive 
macro factors can mitigate the impact of adoption of IFRS. 
 
6.4 Limitation of the study 
The limitations of this study derive from three principal sources. Firstly, the study 
relies on a financial statement data base for company financial data. However, that 
is a common weakness for all large scale capital markets studies. The serious 
limitation in this study is the use of proxies for key variables. Firstly, 
discretionary accruals for earnings management and hence earnings quality. 
However, this is also a common limitation. The special limitation in this study is 
the proxies employed for the macro variables. The proxies are largely untested in 
this application and thus there is a serious risk that the results obtained may reflect 
choice of these proxies rather than the underlying economic reality. 
 
 183 
List of References 
 
Aboody, D., Hughes, J. and Liu, J. 2005. Earnings quality, insider trading, and 
cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(5): 651-673. 
 
ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2003. Report on Bangladesh ‘Capacity 
Building of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Selected Capital Market 
Institutions’. Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
 
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. 1997. National Champions and Corruption: Some 
Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic. The Economic Journal, 107:1023-1042. 
 
Adiel, R. 1996. Reinsurance and the management of regulatory ratios and taxes in 
the property-Casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
22(1-3): 207-240. 
 
Agrawal, A., and Knoeber, C. 1996. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to 
Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(3): 377-397. 
 
Alam, M. 1995. A theory of limits on corruption and some applications. Kyklos, 
48: 419-435. 
 
Albrecht, W. D., and Richardson, F. M. 1990. Income Smoothing by economy 
sector. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 17: 713-730. 
 
Ali, A., and Hwang, L. 2000. Country-specific factors related to financial 
reporting and the value relevance of accounting data. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 38 (1): 1-21. 
 
Ali, A., Hwang, L. 1995. Accrual management and the incremental information 
content of earnings and cash flow from operations. Working paper, Stern School 
of Business, New York University. 
 
Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., Przeworski, A. 1996. Classifying 
political regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development, 31 (2): 3-
36. 
 
Anderson, R., and Rebb, D. 2004. Board composition: Balancing family influence 
in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49: 209-237. 
 
Anderson, R., and Rebb, D. 2003a. Founding Family ownership and firm 
performance. Journal of Finance, 58:1301-1328. 
 
Anderson, R., and Rebb, D. 2003b. Family ownership, corporate diversification, 
and firm leverage. Journal of Law and Economics, 46: 653-684. 
 
Anderson, R., Mansi, S. and Rebb, D. 2003. Founding Family ownership and the 
agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68: 263-286. 
 184 
Aoki, M. 1988. Information, Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy. 
Cambridge University Press, New York, Cambridge. 
 
Armstrong, C. S., M. E. Barth, E. J. Riedl. 2010. Market Reaction to the Adoption 
of IFRS in Europe. The Accounting Review, 85 (1):31-61. 
 
Ashari, N., Hain, C. H., Soh, L. T., and Wei, H. W. 1994. Factors affecting 
income smoothing among listed companies in Singapore. Accounting and 
Business Research, 24(96): 291-301. 
 
Asthana, S. C., and Zhang, Y. 2006. The effects of R&D investments on 
persistence of abnormal earnings. Review of Accounting & Finance, 5(2):124-139. 
 
Ashton, D., Dunmore, P. And Tippett, M. 2004. Double Entry Bookkeeping and 
the Distributional Properties of Financial Ratios. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 31 (5&6): 15-37. 
 
Ataullah, A., A. Higson and Tippett, M. 2007. The distributional Properties of the 
Debt to Equity Ratio: Some Implications for Empirical Research. Abacus, 
43(2):111-135. 
 
Averitt, R.T. 1968. The Dual Economy: The Dynamics of American Industry 
Structure, Norton & Company Inc. USA. 
 
Ayres, F. 1994. Perceptions of Earnings Quality: What Managers Need to Know, 
Management Accounting, March: 27-29. 
 
Bacon, J., and Brown, J.K. 1975. Corporate Directorship Practices: Role, 
Selection and Legal Status of the Board. The Conference Board, Inc., New York. 
 
Bae, K., Tan, H. and Welker, M. 2008. International GAAP Differences: The 
Impact of Foreign Analysts. The Accounting Review, 83(3): 593-628. 
 
Ball, R. J., and Brown, P. 1968. An empirical evaluation of accounting income 
numbers. Journal of Accounting Research, 6: 159-178. 
 
Ball, R. 2001. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of 
public financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on 
Financial Services: 127-182. 
 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. and Robin, A. 2000. The Effect of International Institutional 
Factors on Properties of Accounting Earnings. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 29: 1-51. 
 
Ball, R., Robin, A. and Wu, J. S. 2003. Incentives versus standards: properties of 
accounting income in four East Asian countries, and implications for acceptance 
of IAS. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3): 235–270. 
 
Barth, M., Landsman, W. and Lang, M. 2008. International Accounting Standards 
and Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3): 467-498. 
 185 
 
Barth, M., Beaver, W., and Landsman, W. 2001a. The Relevance of the Value 
Relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting: Another View. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 31(31): 77-104. 
 
Barth, M., Cram, D., and Nelson, K. 2001b. Accruals and the prediction of future 
cash flows. Accounting Review, 76(1): 27-59. 
 
Barth, M. E., Elliott, J. A. and Finn. M. W. 1999. Market rewards associated with 
patterns of increasing earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 37 (autumn): 
387-413. 
 
Bartov, E., Gul, F. A. and Tsui, J. S. L. 2001. Discretionary-accruals models and 
audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3): 421- 453. 
 
Bartov, E., Givoly, D. and Hayn, C. 2002. The rewards to meeting or beating 
earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33: 173-204. 
 
Barua, A., Legoria, J., and Moffitt, J. S. 2006. Accruals Management to Achieve 
Earnings Benchmarks: A Comparison of Pre-Managed Profit and Loss Firms. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(5-6): 653-670. 
 
Bathke, A. W., and Lorek, J., and K. S. 1989. Firm-size and the predictive ability 
of quarterly earnings data. The Accounting Review, 64: 49-68. 
 
Beasley, M. 1996. An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of 
Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, 
71(4): 443-465. 
 
Beatty, A., Chamberlain, S., and Magliolo, J. 1995. Managing financial reports of 
commercial banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital, and earnings. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 33: 231-261. 
 
Beaver, W. H. 1968.The information content of annual earnings announcements. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 6: 67-92. 
 
Beaver, W. H., and Engel, E. E. 1996. Discretionary behaviour with respect to 
allowances for loan losses and the behaviour of security prices. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 22(1-3): 73-95. 
 
Beaver, W., and McNichols, M. 1998. The Characteristics and Valuation of Loss 
Reserves of Property Casualty Insurers. Review of Accounting Studies, 3(1-2): 73-
95. 
 
Beck, T., and Levine, R. 2005. Legal Institutions and Financial Development. 
World Bank Policy Research working Paper Series No. 3136. The World Bank. 
 
Beck, E. M., Horan, P. M. and Tolbert, C. M. 1978. Satisfaction in a Dual 
economy: A sectoral model of earnings determination. American Sociological 
Review, 43: 704-720. 
 186 
 
Becker, C. L., DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J. and Subramanyam, K. R. 1998. The 
effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 15(1): 1-24. 
 
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S.M., Courteau, L.  2004.  The effect of audit committee 
expertise, independence and activity on aggressive earnings management. 
Auditing: A journal of Practice and Theory, 23(2): 13-35. 
 
Belkaoui, A. and Picur, R. D. 1984. The smoothing of income numbers: some 
empirical evidence on systematic differences between Core and Periphery 
industrial sectors. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 11: 527-545. 
 
Belkaoui, R., and AlNajjar. 2006. Earnings opacity internationally and elements 
of social, economic and accounting order. Review of Accounting and Finance, 
5(3): 189-203. 
 
Beneish, M. 1997. Detecting GAAP violation: Implications for assessing earnings 
management among firms with extreme financial performance. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 16: 271-309. 
 
Beneish, M. 2001. Earnings management: A perspective. Managerial Finance, 
27(12): 3-1. 
 
Beneish, M. D. 1999. The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analysts 
Journal, 55: 24-36. 
 
Beneish, M. D. and M. E. Vargus. 2002. Insider trading, earnings quality, and 
accrual mispricing. The Accounting Review, 77(4): 755-791. 
 
Beny, L. N. 2005. Do insider trading laws matter? Some preliminary comparative 
evidence. American Law and Economics Review, 7(1): 144-183. 
 
Berle, A. A., and Means, G. C. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. Commerce Clearing House, New York. 
 
Bernard, V., Skinner, D. 1996. What motivates managers’ choice of discretionary 
accruals? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22: 313-325. 
 
Bhagat, S., and Jefferris, R. 2002. The Econometrics of Corporate Governance 
Studies. MIT Press, Boston, MA. 
 
Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H. and Welker, M. 2003. The World Price of Earnings 
Opacity. The Accounting Review, 78 (3): 641-678. 
 
Bloomfield, D., and Shackman, J. 2008. Non audit service fees, auditor 
characteristics and earnings restatements. Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(2): 
125-141. 
 
 187 
Bluestone, B., Murphy, M. W., and Stevenson, M. 1973. Low wages and the 
working poor. The Institute of Labour and Industrial Relations. The University of 
Michigan-Wayne State University. 
 
Bowen, R., Burghstahler, D., and Daley, L. 1987. The Incremental Information 
Content of Accrual versus Cash Flows. The Accounting Review, 3: 723-747. 
 
Bowen, R., Rajgopal, S., and Venkatachalam, M. 2008. Accounting Discretion, 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 25 (2):351-405.  
 
Bowen, J., Lacey, R., and Noreen, E. 1981.  Determinants of corporate decision to 
capitalize interest. Journal of Accounting and Economics, (August): 151–179. 
 
Bowman, R. G., and Navissi, f. 2003. Earnings management and abnormal 
returns: Evidence from the 1970-1972 price control regulations. Accounting and 
Finance, 43(1): 1-19. 
 
Brown, L. D. 2001. A temporal analysis of earnings surprises: Profits vs. losses. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 39(2): 221-241. 
Brennan, M. J. and E. S. Schwartz. 1985. Evaluating Natural Resource 
Investments. Journal of Business, Bowen 58(2): 135-157 
 
Brown, L. D., and Higgins, H. N. 2001. Managing earnings surprises in the US 
versus 12 other countries. Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 20: 371-398. 
 
Burgstahler, D., Hail, L., and Leuz, C. 2007. The importance of reporting 
incentives: earnings management in European private and public firms. The 
Accounting Review, 81(5): 983-1016. 
 
Burgstahler, D., and Eames, M. 2006. Management of earnings and analysts 
forecasts. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 33(5-6): 633-652. 
 
Burgstahler, D., and Dichev, I. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1): 99-126. 
 
Burilovich, L., and Kattelus, S. 1997. Auditors’ Influence on Earnings 
Management: Evidence from the Alternative Minimum Tax. Journal of Applied 
Business Research, 13(spring): 9-22. 
 
Bushman, R.M., Piptroski, J. D., and Smith, A. J. 2004. What Determine 
Corporate Transparency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42 (2): 207-252. 
 
Bushman, R.M., and Smith, A.J. 2003. Transparency, financial accounting 
information, and corporate governance. Economic Policy Review, 9(1): 65-87. 
 
Bushman, R.M., and Piotroski, J.2006. Financial Reporting Incentives for 
conservative accounting: The influence of legal and political institutions. Journal 
of Accounting & Economics, 42(1-2): 107-148. 
 
 188 
Bushee, B. 1998. The influence of institutional Investors on myopic R & D 
investment behaviour. The Accounting Review, 73: 305-333. 
 
Cai, L., Rahman, A. and Courtenay, S.  2008. The effect of IFRS and its 
Enforcement on Earnings Management: An International Comparison. Working 
Paper, Massey University, New Zealand. 
 
Caramanis, C., and Lennox, C. 2008. Audit effort and earnings management. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 45: 116-138. 
 
Cahan, S. 1992. The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals: A 
refined test of the political cost hypothesis. The Accounting Review, 67: 77-95. 
 
Chambers, D. J. 1999. Earnings management and capital market misallocation. 
Working paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 
Chen, K. Y., Lin, K. and Zhou, J. 2005. Audit quality and earnings management 
for Taiwan IPO firms. Managerial auditing Journal, 20(1): 86-104. 
 
Cheng, C., Liu, C., and Schaefer, T. 1996. Earnings Permanence and the 
Incremental Information Content of Cash Flows from Operations. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 34 (spring): 175-181. 
 
Cheng, C., Liu, C., and Schaefer, T. 1997. Accounting Accruals and the 
Incremental Information Content of Earnings and Cash Flows from Operations, 
Advances in Accounting Research, 15: 101-123. 
 
Chtourou, S., Bedard, J., and Courteau, L. 2001. Corporate governance and 
earnings Management. Retrieve at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=275053. 
 
Chung, R., Firth, M. and Kim, J. 2002. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic 
earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8: 29-48. 
 
Chia, Y. M., Irvine, L. and Hing-wah, L. 2007. Choice of auditors and earnings 
management during the Asian financial crises. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
22(2): 177-196. 
 
Christie, A., and Zimmerman, J. 1994.  Efficient versus Opportunistic Choices of 
Accounting Procedures: Corporate Control Contests. The Accounting Review, 69: 
539-566. 
 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., and Lang, L. H. P. 2000a. The separation 
of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58(1-2): 81-112. 
 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., and Lang, L. H. P. 2000b. Expropriation 
of minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asian corporations. Working paper, 
The World Bank, Washington, DC 
 
 189 
Claessens, S., and Fan, J. P. H. 2003. Corporate Governance in Asia: A survey. 
International Review of Finance, 3(2): 71-104. 
 
Collins, J. H., Shackelford, D.A. and Wahlen, J.M. 1995. Bank differences in the 
coordination of regulatory capital, earnings and taxes. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 33(2): 263-291. 
 
Collins, D., and Hribar, P. 2002. Errors in estimating accruals: implications for 
empirical research.  Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1): 105-135. 
 
Collingwood, H. 2001. The earnings game: Everybody plays, nobody wins. 
Harvard business Review, 79 (6): 65-74. 
 
Collins, D., S. Kothari. 1989. An analysis of inter temporal and cross-sectional 
determinants of earnings response coefficients. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 11: 143-182. 
 
Core, J., and W. Guay. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity 
incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28(2): 151-184. 
 
Core, J. E., Guay, W.R. and Larcker, D. F.  2003. Executive equity compensation 
and incentives: A survey. Economic Policy Review, 9 (1): 27-50. 
 
Davidson, S., Stickney, C., and Weil, R. 1987. Accounting: The Language of 
Business, Seventh edition, Thomas Horton and Daughter, Arizona. 
 
Daniels, R. 1995. The role of debt in interactive corporate governance. California 
Law Review, 83:1073-1113. 
 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., and Verdi, R. 2009. Mandatory IFRS adoption 
around the world: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 46(5): 1085- 1142. 
 
DeAngelo, L., 1986. Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study 
of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Review, 41: 400-
420. 
 
DeAngelo, L.1988. Managerial competition, information costs and corporate 
governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contest. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, (January): 3-36. 
 
DeAngelo, L. 1981. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 3: 183-199. 
 
DeAngelo, H., and Gilson, S. 1994. The Collapse of First Executive Corporation: 
Junk Bonds, Adverse Publicity, and the ‘Run on the Bank’ Phenomenon. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 36: 287–336. 
 
 190 
DeAngelo, H., Linda, E.D. and Skinner, D.J.1996. Reversal of fortune: Dividend 
signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growth. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 4(3): 341-373 
 
Dechow, P.M., S.A. Richardson and I. Tuna 2003. Why are earnings Kinky? An 
examination of the earnings management explanation. Review of Accounting 
Studies, 8: 355-384. 
 
Dechow, P. 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm 
performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 18: 3-42. 
 
Dedman, E. 2000. An investigation into the determinants of UK board structure 
before and after Cadbury.  Corporate Governance, 8:133-153. 
 
DeFond, M. L., and Jiambalvo, J. 1994. Debt covenant effects and the 
manipulation of accruals.  Journal of accounting and Economics, 17: 145-176. 
 
DeFond, M., and Jiambalvo, J. 1993. Factors related to auditor-client 
disagreements over income increasing accounting methods. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 9: 411-431. 
 
DeFond, M., and Jiambalvo, J. 1991. Incidence and Circumstances of Accounting 
Errors. The Accounting Review, (July): 643-655. 
 
DeFond, M., Subramanyam, K. 1998. Auditor Changes and Discretionary 
Accruals.  Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25: 35-68. 
 
De Fond, M., and Hung, M. Y. 2004. Investor Protection and Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from Worldwide CEO Turnover. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 42: 269-312. 
 
Defond, M. L., and Hung, M. 2003. An empirical analysis of analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 35(1): 73-100. 
 
Dechow, P. M., and D. J. Skinner.  2000.  Earnings management: Reconciling the 
views of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting Horizon, 
14(2): 235-250. 
 
Dechow, P. M., and Dichev, I. 2002. The quality of accruals and earnings: The 
role of accruals estimation errors. The Accounting Review, 77(supplement): 35-59. 
 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. 1995. Detecting earnings 
management. The Accounting Review, 70(2): 193-225. 
 
Dechow, P., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, A. P. 1996. Causes and Consequences of 
Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by 
the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13:1-36. 
 
 191 
Dechow, P., and Sloan, R. 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem: 
An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14: 51-89. 
 
DeGeorge, F., J. Patel and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed 
thresholds. Journal of Business, 72(1): 1-33. 
 
Deloitte’s IAS Plus Website. 2009. Use of IFRSs by Jurisdiction. Retrieved June1, 
2009, from http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm 
 
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes 
and consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93(6): 155-1177. 
 
DeMarzo, P. M., Fishman, M. J., and Hagerty, K. M. 1998. The optimal 
enforcement of insider trading regulations. Journal of Political Economy, 106(3): 
602-633. 
 
Denis, D. J., and Denis, D. K. 1994. Majority Owner-managers and 
Organizational Efficiency.  Journal of Corporate Finance, 1: 91-118. 
 
Dhaliwal, D. S. 1988. The Effect of the Firms’ Business Risk on the Choice of 
Accounting Methods. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 15(2): 289-
302. 
 
Dichev, I., and Tang, W. 2005. Matching and Volatility of Earnings. Working 
Paper, University of Michigan. 
 
Dickson, P. 1998. Standard-setter bans ‘big-bath’ accounting. The Accountant, 
November 1. 
 
Ding, Y., Hope, O. K., Jeanjean, T., and Stolowy, H.  2007. Differences between 
domestic accounting standards and IAS: measurement, determinants and 
implications. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26(1): 1-38. 
 
DiRienzo, C., Das, J., Cord, K., and Burbridge, J. 2007. Corruption and the role of 
Information. Journal of International Business, 38(2): 320-332. 
 
Dixit, A., and Pindyck, R. S. 1994. Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton 
University Press, USA. 
 
Doupnik, T.S., and Taskumis, G.T. 2004. A critical review of test of Gray’s 
theory of culture relevance and suggestions for future research. Journal of 
Accounting Literature, 23: 1-48. 
 
DuCharme, L., Malatesta, P., and Sefcik, S. 2001. Earnings management: IPO 
valuation and subsequent performance. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance, 16(4): 369-397. 
 
Durtschi, C., and Easton, P. 2004. Earnings Management? Alternative 
explanations for observed discontinuities in the frequency. SSRN working paper. 
 
 192 
Dyck, A. I. J., and Zingales, L. 2002. The corporate governance role of the media. 
CRSP working paper, 543, SSRN.com/abstract=335602. 
 
Dyck, A., and Zingales, L. 2004. Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison. Journal of Finance, 59(2): 537-600. 
 
Ebrahim, A. 2007. Earnings management and board activity: an additional 
evidence. Review of Accounting & Finance 6(1): 42-58. 
 
Easton, P., and Harris, T. 1991. Earnings as an explanatory variable for returns. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 19-36. 
 
Easton, P., and Zmijewski, M. 1989. Cross-sectional variation in the stock market 
response to accounting earnings announcements, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 11: 117-141. 
 
Easterly, W., and Levine, R. 2002. Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments 
Influence Economic Development. NBER working Papers 9106, National Bureau 
of Economic Research. Retrieved at: http://www.ideas.repec.org/e/pea1.htm. 
 
Eccles, R. G., Herz, R.H., Keegan, E.M., Phillips, D.M.H.  2001. The Value 
Reporting Revolution: Moving beyond the Earnings Game. Jhon Wiley, New 
York. 
 
Elias, R. Z. 2004. The impact of corporate ethical values on perception of 
earnings management, Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(1): 84-98. 
 
Erickson, M., and Wang, S. 1999. Earnings management by acquiring firms in 
stock for stock Mergers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27: 149-176. 
 
Erickson, M., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E. L.  2006. Is there a link between 
executive compensation and accounting fraud? Journal of Accounting Research, 
44(1): 113-144. 
 
Ewert, R., and Wagenhofer, A. 2005. Economic effects of tightening accounting 
standards to restrict earnings management. The Accounting Review, 80: 430-465. 
 
Fama, E.F. 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 88(2): 288-307. 
 
Fama, E.F. and M. Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 25: 301-325. 
 
Fan, J. P., and Wong T. J. 2005. Do external auditors perform a corporate 
governance Role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 43 (1): 35-71. 
 
Farooque, O. A., van Zijl, T., Dunstan, K., and Karim, W. 2007. Ownership 
Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14(2):127-150. 
 193 
 
Farber, D. B., 2005. Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance 
matter? The Accounting Review, 80(2): 539-561. 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 1985. Elements of financial 
statements. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 6. Norwalk, CT: 
FASB. 
 
Financial Times (June 19, 2004). Retrieved at http://www.ft.com/home/USA. 
 
FEE. 2001. Enforcement Mechanism in Europe: A preliminary investigation of 
oversight systems. Retrieved at www.fee.be/20Europe153200520952.pdf. 
 
Firth, M., Fung, P., and Rui, O. 2002. Simultaneous Relationships among 
Ownership, Corporate Governance, and Financial Performance. Retrieved at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=235225. 
 
Fisman. R, and Gatti, R. 1999. Decentralization and corruption: Cross-country 
and cross state evidence. Unpublished Manuscript, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
 
Foreign, B. 1999. The Economist, July 24: 54. 
 
Frankel, R., McNichols, M., and Nelson, K. 2002. The relation between auditors' 
fees for non-audit services and earnings management. The Accounting Review, 
77(Supplement): 71-105. 
 
Francis, J., Philbrick, D., and Schipper, K. 1994. Shareholder Litigation and 
Corporate Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 32 (2): 137-164. 
 
Francis, J., Maydew, E., Sparks, H. 1999. The role of Big Six auditors in the 
credible reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 18 (2): 
17–34. 
 
Francis, J. and Wang. D. 2008. The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 
Audits on Earnings Quality around the World. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 25 (1):1-39. 
 
Fong, A. 2006. Earnings management in corporate accounting: An overview. 
Cross-section, 2: 81-95. 
 
Frost, C.A.  1999. Characteristics and information value of corporate disclosure of 
forward looking information in global equity markets. Working paper, Dartmouth 
College, USA. 
 
Fudenberg, K., and J. Tirole. 1995. A theory of income and dividend smoothing 
based on incumbency rents. Journal of Political Economy, 103: 75-93. 
 
Gilson, R. J., and Roe, M. J. 1993. Understanding the Japanese Kerietsu: Overlaps 
between corporate governance and industrial organization. Yale Law Journal, 
102(4): 871-906. 
 194 
 
Gaver, J., Gaver, K., and Austin, J. 1995. Additional evidence on bonus plans and 
income management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19: 3-28. 
 
Gray, S. 1988. Towards a theory of culture influence on the development of 
accounting systems internationally. Abacus, 24(1): 1-15. 
 
Graff, M. 2006. Myths and Truths: The “Law and Finance” Theory Revisited. 
Review of Economics, 57(1): 51–76. 
 
Goel, R.K., and Nelson, M.A.  1998.  Corruption and Government Size: A 
Disaggregated Analysis. Public Choice, 11(2): 107-20. 
 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. 2003. Corporate governance and equity 
prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118: 107-155. 
 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., and Boeker, W. 1994. The effect of board size and 
diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 241-50. 
 
Grossman, S., and Hart, O. 1980. Takeover Bids, the free-rider Problem, and the 
Theory of the Corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 11: 42-64. 
 
Grossman, S., and Hart, O. 1982. Corporate financial structure and managerial 
incentives, in The Economics of Information and Uncertainty (edited by J. J. 
MaCall) Chicago: The University of Chicago: 107-137. 
 
Greenwald, B. B., and Stiglitz, J.E.  1990. Asymmetric Information and the new 
theory of the firm: Financial Constraints and risk behaviour. American Economic 
Review, 80(2):160-165. 
 
Guay, W., Kothari, S., and Watts, R.1996. A Market-Based Evaluation of 
Discretionary Accrual Models.  Journal of Accounting Research, 34(Supplement): 
83-105. 
 
Gul, F., and Tsui, J. 2001. Free Cash Flow, Debt Monitoring and Audit Pricing: 
Further Evidence on the Role of Director Equity Ownership”, Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice &Theory, 20(2): 71-84. 
 
Guan, L., Pourjalali, H., Sengupta, P., and Teruya, J. 2005. Effect of cultural 
environment on earnings manipulation: A five Asia-Pacific country analysis. The 
Multinational Business Review, 13 (2): 23-41. 
 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L. 2006. Does culture affect economic 
outcomes? Working paper, University of Rome, Northwestern University, and 
Harvard University. 
 
Habib, A. 2005. Firms specific determinants of income smoothing in Bangladesh: 
An empirical evaluation. Advances in International Accounting, 18: 53-71. 
 
 195 
Habib, A. 2008. The role of accruals and cash flows in explaining security returns: 
Evidence from New Zealand. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation, 17: 51-66. 
 
Habib, A. and Islam, A. 2007. Determinants and consequences of non-audit 
service fees Preliminary evidence from Bangladesh. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 22 (5): 446-469. 
 
Hall, T., and Yago. G. 2000. Estimating the cost of opacity using sovereign bond 
spreads. Policy Brief, 13, Milken Institute, California. 
 
Hall, R. E., and Jones, C. I. 1999.  Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much 
More Output Per Worker Than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
114(1):83-116. 
 
Hall, B., and Liebman, J. 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113: 653- 691. 
 
Hall, B. J. 1999. The design of multi-year stock potions plans. Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, 12(2): 97-102. 
 
Hall, S., and Stammerjohan, W. 1997. Damages Awards and Earnings 
Management in the Oil Industry. The Accounting Review, 72: 47-65. 
 
Han, J., and Wang, S. 1998. Political costs and earnings management of oil 
companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis. The Accounting Review, 73, 
1998:103-117. 
 
Hagerman, R., and Zmijewski, M. 1979. Some economic determinants of 
accounting policy choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, August: 141–
161 
 
Han, J.C.Y., and Wong, S.  1998. Political costs and earnings management of oil 
companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf crises. The Accounting Review, 73: 103-
117 
 
Hanlon, M., RajGopal, S., Shevlin, T. 2003. Are executive stock options 
associated with future earnings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1-3): 
3-43. 
 
Hart, O.  1983. The Market Mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of 
Economics, 14(2): 366-382. 
 
Hart, O.1995. Corporate Governance: Some theory and implications. The 
Economic Journal, 105(May): 678-689. 
 
Hayn, C. 1995.  The information content of losses, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 20:125-153. 
 
 196 
Healy, P.M., and Wahlen, J. M. 1999. A review of the earnings management 
literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4): 
365-383. 
 
Healy, P., and Palepu, K.1993.The Effect of Firms’ Financial Disclosure Policies 
on the Stock Prices. Accounting Horizons, 2:1-11. 
 
Healy, P. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of 
accounting and Economics, 7: 85-107. 
 
Harris, M., and Raviv, A. 1993. The theory of capital structure, Journal of 
Finance, 46: 297-356. 
 
Haque, F. C. Kirkpatrick and T. Arun. 2006. Political Economy of Corporate 
Governance in Bangladesh. Centre on regulation and Competition, Institute for 
Development Policy and Management. Working Paper No. 127, University of 
Manchester, UK. 
 
Hribar, P., Jenkins, N. T., and Johnson, B. 2006. Stock repurchases an earnings 
management device. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1-2): 3-27. 
 
Holthausen, R.W., and Larcker, D. 1996. The financial performance of reverse 
leveraged buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics, 42 (3): 293-332. 
 
Holthausen, R., Larcker, D., and Sloan, R. 1995. Annual Bonus Schemes and the 
Manipulation of Earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 19: 29-74. 
 
Hofstede, G.H. 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work 
Related Values. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA. 
 
Hofstede, G. H. (2001), Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviours, 
Institutions, and Organizations across Nations, Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks, CA. 
 
Holland, 2004. Earnings Management: A Methodological Review of the 
Distribution of Reported Earnings Approach. Retrieved at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=432531. 
 
Holland, K. E., and Jackson, R. G. H. 2004. Earnings management and deferred 
tax.  Accounting and Business Research, 34 (2):101-123. 
 
Holmstrom, B. R.  1979. Moral Hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 10(1): 74-91. 
 
Holthausen, R.W. 2003. Testing the relative power of accounting standards versus 
incentives and other institutional features to influence the outcome of financial 
reporting in an international setting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36: 
235-272. 
 
 197 
Holthausen, R., Larcker, D.  and Sloan, R. 1995. Annual bonus schemes and the 
manipulation of earnings. Journal of accounting and Economics, 19: 29-74. 
 
Hope, O-K. 2003a. Disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards, and 
analysts forecasts accuracy: an international study. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 41: 235-272. 
 
Hope, O-K. 2003b. Firm-level disclosures and the relative roles of cultures and 
legal origin. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 
14(3): 218-248. 
 
Hope, O –K., Kang, T., Thomas, W., Yoo, Y. K. 2008. Culture and auditor choice: 
A test of the secrecy hypothesis, Journal of Accounting & Public Policy, 27: 357-
373. 
 
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., Gupta, V. 2004. Culture, 
Leadership and Organizations: The Global Study of 62 Societies. Sage 
Publications, Inc 
 
Houqe, M. N., vanZijl, T., Dunstan, K., and Karim, W. 2008. A Review of 
Contemporary Earnings Management. Working Paper (APC Conference 
presentation, Paris 2008), Victoria University of Wellington. 
 
Houqe, M. N., vanZijl, T., Dunstan, K., and Karim, W. 2008. Does Corporate 
Governance affect Earnings Quality: Preliminary Evidence from Bangladesh? 
Working paper (APC Conference presentation, Las Vegas 2009), Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
 
Hoopes, J., Malagueno, R., Albrecht, C., and Albrecht, W.S. 2006. Accounting 
and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis. Retrieved at  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=536672. 
 
Hsu, G., and Koh, P. S. 2005. Does the presence of Institutional investors 
influence accruals accounting? Evidence from Australia. Corporate Governance, 
13 (6): 809-823. 
 
Hu, A. (2000). China: Corruption and Anti-Corruption strategies. Working paper, 
Tsinhua University, Beijing. 
 
Hughes, J.W., and Snyder, E.A. 1995. Litigations and settlement under the 
English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 38(1): 225-250. 
 
Hung, M. 2001. Accounting standards and value relevance of financial statement: 
an international analysis. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 30(3): 401-420. 
 
Husted, B. 1999. Wealth, Culture, and Corruption. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 30(2): 339-359. 
 
 198 
Hayn, C.1995. The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 20: 125-153. 
 
IMF.1997. 1997 Annual Meetings. Boards of Governors World Bank Group 
International Monetary Fund, Hong Kong, China. 
 
Islam, M.S., Uddin, M. M., and Ahmed, S. 2002. The operating performance of 
firms conducting seasoned equity offerings in Bangladesh. Dhaka University 
Journal of Business Studies, 23(2): 205-217. 
 
Iqbal, M. 1997. Recent Developments in Corporate Governance and their Impact 
on Management Practices.  Public Finance and Developments, 1 (2): 215-234. 
 
Jacobson, R., and Aaker, D.1993. Myopic management behaviour with efficient, 
but imperfect financial markets: A comparison of information asymmetries in the 
U.S. and Japan. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 16(4): 383-405. 
 
Jaggi, B., Low, P.Y. 2000. Impact of culture, market forces, and legal systems on 
financial disclosures. International Journal of Accounting 35 (4), 495–519. 
 
Jain, A. (2001). Corruption: A Review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1): 15-
35. 
 
Jenkins, N. 2002. Auditor independence, audit committee effectiveness, and 
earnings management. Working paper, Washington University, USA. 
 
Jensen, M.  1988. Takeovers: Their causes and consequences. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 2(1): 21-48. 
 
Jensen, M.1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76: 323-329. 
 
Jensen, M.C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of 
internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48: 831-80. 
 
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of firm: Managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-
360. 
 
Jeter, D.C., and Shivakumar, L. 1999. Cross-sectional estimation of abnormal 
accruals using quarterly and annual data. Effectiveness in detecting event-specific 
earnings management. Accounting and Business Research, 29(4): 299-319. 
 
Johnson, M., Kasznik, R., and Nelson, K. 2000. Shareholder Wealth effects of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Review of Financial Studies, 
5(3): 217-233. 
 
Jiraporn, P., and Daldalt, P. J. 2007. Does founding family control affect earnings 
management? An empirical note. Retrieved at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=632621. 
 
 199 
Johl, S., Jubb, C. A., Houghton, K. A. 2007. Earnings management and the audit 
opinion: Evidence from Malaysia. Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(7): 688-715. 
 
Jones, J.J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigation. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 29(2): 193-228. 
 
Jones, S., and Sharma, R. 2001. The impact of free cash flow, financial leverage 
and accounting regulation on earnings management in Australian ‘Old’ and ‘New’ 
economics. Managerial Finance, 27: 18-38. 
 
Judge, G., Hill, R. Griffiths, W., Lutkepohl, H., Lee, T.1988. Introduction to the 
theory and practice of econometrics. 2nd ed. New York. 
 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky A. 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decisions 
under risk. Econometrica, 47: 263-291. 
 
Kalay, A. 1982. Stockholder-bondholder conflict and dividend constraints. 
Journal of Financial Economics: 211-233. 
 
Karim, A. K. M. W. 1995. Provision of Corporate Financial Information in 
Bangladesh, PhD dissertation, School of Business and Economic Studies, 
University of  Leeds, UK. 
 
Karim, A. K. M. W., and van Zijl, T. 2008. Role of corporate governance in 
influencing auditor choice in emerging audit services market. Working paper, 
Victoria University of Wellington. 
 
Kabir, M H., Islam, A., Sharma, D., and Salat, A. 2008. Association between 
Auditor quality and earnings quality – Do local big four auditors provide quality-
differentiated audits in Bangladesh, Conference paper, Asia-pacific conference on 
international accounting issues November 9-12, Paris France. 
 
Kantor, M.  1996. Remarks at Detroit Economic Club. Available at 
http://www.usembassy-isreal.org.il/publish/press/commerce/archieve/july/dc1_7 
30.htm.accessed 11/23/2009. 
 
Kang, S-H. 2005. A conceptual and empirical evaluation of accrual prediction 
models. http://ssrn.com/abstract=147259. 
 
Kaplan, S. N.  1994. Top executives, turnover, and firm performance in Germany. 
Journal of Law Economics, and Organization, 10(1):142-159. 
 
Kaplan, S. N., and Minton, B. A. 1994. Appointments of outsiders to Japanese 
boards-determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 36(2): 225-258. 
 
Kasznik, R. 1999. On the association between voluntary disclosures and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1): 57-82. 
 
 200 
Kasznik, R., and M. McNichols. 2002. Does Meeting Expectations Matter? 
Evidence from Analyst Forecast Revisions and Share Prices. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 40: 727–759. 
 
Kedia, S., and Philippon, T. 2005. The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting. AFA 
2006 Boston Meeting Paper. Retrieved at http://ssrn.com/abstract=328661. 
 
Kelly, S. 2004.The Market Premium for the Option to Close: Evidence from 
Australian Gold Mining Firms. Retrieved at http://ssrn.com/abstract=348781. 
 
Kellogg, R. L. 1984. Accounting activities, securities prices, and class action 
lawsuits. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 6(3):185-204. 
 
Keasey, K., Wright, M. 1997. Corporate Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and 
Remuneration. Hohn Wiley & Sons. 
 
Kerstein, J., and Rai, A. 2007. Intra-Year Shifts in the Earnings Distribution and 
their Implications for Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 44: 399-419. 
 
Klein, A. 2002a. Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence. 
Accounting Review, 77(2): 435-453. 
 
Klein, A. 2002b. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3): 375-400. 
 
Key, K.G. 1997. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable 
television industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23 (3): 309-337. 
 
Kinnunen, J., Kasnaen, E., and Niskanen, J.1995. Earnings management and the 
economic sector hypothesis: empirical evidence on a converse relation in the 
finish case. Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, 22: 497-520. 
 
Knack, S., and Keefer, P. 1995. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and Politics, 
7(3): 207-227. 
 
Koch, T.W., and Wall, L. D. 2000. The use of accruals to manage reported 
earnings: theory and evidence.  Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
USA. 
 
Krishnan, G. 2003a. Audit quality and the pricing of discretionary accruals. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 22: 109-126. 
 
Krishnan, G. 2003b. Does big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings 
management? Accounting Horizons, 17: 1-16. 
 
Kole, S. R, and Mulherin, J.H. 1997.  The Government as a shareholder: A case 
from the United States. Journal of Law and Economics, 40: 1-22. 
 
 201 
Kormendi, R., and Lipe, R. 1987. Earnings innovation, earnings persistence and 
stock returns. Journal of Business, 60: 323-345. 
 
Kothari, S., Leone, A., and Wasley, C. 2005. Performance Matched Discretionary 
Accrual Measures.  Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(1):163-197. 
 
Kothari, S.P. 2001.Capital Market Research in Accounting. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 31(1-3):105-231. 
 
Kothari, S.P. 2000. The role of financial reporting in reducing financial risks in 
the market. Available at: http://bosfed.org/home 
 
Kaufmann, D., and Wei, S. 2000. Does ‘grease money’ speed up the wheels of 
commerce? Working Paper. WP/00/64. Washington DC: International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
Kufamnn, D., Kraay, A., and Zoido- Lobatón, P .1999. Governance Matters.  
Policy Research Working Paper. The World Bank, Development Research Group. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. 1997a.  Legal 
Determinants of External Finance" Journal of Finance, 52(3):1131-1150. 
 
La Porta, R., Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W. 1997.Good news for 
value stocks: Further evidence on market efficiency. Journal of Finance, 
52(2):859-874. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. 1998. Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6): 1113-1154. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.  1999. Corporate Ownership 
around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2):471-571. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W. 2000. Investor 
protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 
58(October-November): 3-27. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 2006. What works in securities 
laws? Journal of Finance, 61(February): 1-32. 
 
Larcker, D. 2003. Discussion of: Are executive stock option associated with 
future earnings. Journal of Financial Economics, 36: 91-103. 
 
Larker, D., and Richardson, S. 2004. Fees paid to audit firms, accrual choices and 
corporate governance. Journal of Accounting Research, 42: 625-658. 
 
Larcker, D.F., Richardson, S.A., and Tuna, I. 2007. Corporate Governance, 
Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance. The Accounting Review, 
82(4): 963-1008. 
 
 202 
Lawrence, J., Stapledon, G.1999. Is Board Composition Important? A Study of 
Listed Australian Companies. Working paper, University of Melbourne. 
 
Lee, K.W., Lev, B., and Yeo, G. 2007. Organizational structure and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 22(2): 293-331. 
 
Leiken, R. 1997. Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic. Foreign Policy, 
105: 55-73. 
 
Lennox, C.S.2005. Audit Quality and executive officers’ affiliations with CPA 
firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(2): 201-231. 
 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., and Wysocki, P.D. 2003. Investor protection and earnings 
management: An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69: 
506-527. 
 
Levit, A. 1998. Remarks by Chairperson of the SEC. The Number Game. New 
York University Centre for Law and Business (September). 
 
Lev, B.1989. On the Usefulness of Earnings and Earnings Research: Lessons and 
Directions from Two Decades of Empirical Research. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 27(3):153-193. 
 
Lev, B. 2000. New Accounting for New Economy. ASX Monthly Roundup, 
Australia (See Huntley’s2001). 
 
Lev, B., and Aboody, D. 2000. Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains. 
The Journal of Finance, 55(6): 2747-2766. 
 
Lichtenberg, F.R., and Pushner, G.M. 1994. Ownership structure and corporate 
performance in Japan. Japan and the World Economy, 6(3): 239-261. 
 
Lipton, M., Lorsch, J.W. 1992. A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
Governance. Business Lawyer, 48(1): 59-78. 
 
Liu, Q., and Lu, Z. 2002. Earnings management to tunnel: Evidence from China’s 
listed companies. Working paper, McKinsey & Company and University of Hong 
Kong. 
 
Lin, J. W., Li, J. F. and Yang, J. S. 2006. The effect of audit committee 
performance on earnings quality. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(9): 921-933. 
 
Lin. H., and Paananen, M. 2007. The Development of Accounting Quality of IAS 
and IFRS over Time: The Case of Germany. http://ssrn.com/abstract=632681. 
 
Lopez, T. J., and Ress, L. L. 2001. The effect of meeting analysts’ forecasts and 
systematic positive forecast errors on the information content of unexpected 
earnings. http://ssrn.com/abstract=138681. 
 
 203 
Loughran, T., and Ritter, J. R. 1995. The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance 
50: 23-51. 
 
Loughran, T., and Ritter, J. 1997. The operating performance of firms conducting 
seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Finance, 52: 1823-1850. 
 
Lys, T., and Watts, R. 1994. Lawsuits against auditors. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 32(supplement): 65-93. 
 
Malinvaud, E. 1980. Statistical Methods of Econometrics. North-Holland 
Publishing Company, Amsterdam. 
 
Maher, M., Andersson, T. 2000. Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm 
Performance and Economic Growth. OECD working paper. 
 
Manne, H. G. 1965. Insider Trading and the Stock Market. New York, Free Press. 
 
Martin, K. J., and McConnell, J. J. 1991 Corporate performance, corporate 
takeovers and management turnover. Journal of Finance, 46: 671 – 688. 
 
Mauro, P.1995. Corruption and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
110(August): 681-712. 
 
Mauro, P. 1997. The effects of corruption on growth, investment and government 
expenditure: A cross-country analysis. Corruption in the global economy, Edited 
by Kimberly Ann Elliott (Washington: Institute for International Economics). 
 
McChesney, F. 2001. Rent Seeking and Rent Extraction in The Elgar Companion 
to Public Choice. Edward Elgar. 
 
McNichols, M. F. 2000. Research design issues in earnings management studies. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19: 313-345. 
 
McNichols, M. F., and Stubben, S. R.  2005. Does earnings management effect 
firms investment decisions? Working paper, Stanford University, USA. 
 
McNichols, M.F., and G.P. Wilson. 1988. Evidence of earnings management from 
the provision for bad debts. Journal of Accounting Research, 26 (supplement): 1-
31. 
 
Macrae, J. 1982. Underdevelopment and the economics of corruption: A game 
theory approach. World Development, 10(8): 677-687. 
 
McConnell, J., Servaes, H. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and 
corporate Value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 595-613. 
 
Meck, G. K., Rao, R. P., and Skousen, C. J. 2007. Evidence on factors affecting 
the relationship between CEO stock option compensation and Earnings 
management. Review of Accounting & Finance, 6(3): 304-323. 
 
 204 
McVay, S. 2006. Earnings management using classification shifting: An 
examination of core earnings and special items. The Accounting Review, 81(3): 
501-530. 
 
Mikhail, M. B., Walther, B. R., and Willis, R. H. 2004. Earning surprises and the 
cost of equity capital. http://ssrn.com/abstract=504662. 
 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., Yu, W. 2000. The information content of stock markets: 
Why do emerging markets have synchronous price movements? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 58(1-2): 215-260. 
 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W.1988. Management ownership and 
market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 
293-315. 
 
Moyer, S. 1990. Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in 
commercial Banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12: 123-154. 
 
Mueller, G. G. (1968). Accounting Principles Generally Accepted in the United 
States Versus Those Generally Accepted Elsewhere. International Journal of 
Accounting Education and Research, (spring): 91-103. 
 
Mulford, C.W., and Comiskey, E.E. 2002. The financial number game: Detecting 
creative accounting practices. Jhon Wiley & Sons Inc. 
 
Myers, L., and Skinner, D. 1999. Earnings momentum and earnings management.  
Working paper, University of Michigan. 
 
Nabar, S., and K. K. Boonlert-U-Tahi. 2007. Earnings Management, Investor 
Protection, and Natural Culture. Journal of International Accounting Research, 
6(2): 35-54. 
 
Nenova T. 2000. The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross – 
Country Analysis. Retrieved at http://ssrn.com/abstract=237809 
 
Nobes C. W. 1988.The Causes of Financial Reporting Differences.  An Issues in 
Multinational Accounting, edited by C. W. Nobes and R. H. Parker, Oxford, 
Philip Allan. 
 
Nobes C. W. 1992. International Classification of Financial Reporting, Second 
Edition, Routledge, London and New York. 
 
North, D. C., and Weingast, B. 1989. Constitution and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century 
England. The Journal of Economic History, 49(4): 803-832. 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 1995. 
Financial Markets and Corporate Governance. Financial Market Trends, 62 (Nov). 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 1999. 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
 
 205 
Offerman, L. R., and Hellman, P. S. 1997. Culture’s consequences for leadership 
behavior: National values in Action. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 28: 
342-351. 
 
Paananen. M. 2008. The IFRS Adoption’s Effect on Accounting Quality in 
Sweden. Working paper, University of Hertfordshire, UK. 
 
Paek, W., and Press, E. 1997. Discretionary accruals, managers` incentives and 
stock prices. Working paper, Sung Kyun Kwan University. 
 
Palmorse, Z. 1987. Litigation and independent auditor: The role of business 
failures and management fraud. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 6 
(spring): 90-103. 
 
Palmrose, Z.1988. An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. 
Accounting Review, 63: 55-73. 
 
Park, M. S., and Park, T. 2004. Insider Sales and Earnings Management. Journal 
of Accounting & Public Policy, 23(5): 381-411. 
 
Payne, J., Robb, S. 2000. Earnings Management: The Effect of Ex Ante Earnings 
Expectations. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 15(4): 371-392. 
 
PCAOB (The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board). 2009. Retrieved at 
www.pcaobus.org/home 
 
Peasnell, P., Pope, P., Young, S. 1998. Outside Directors, Board Effectiveness, 
and Earnings Management. Working paper, Lancaster University. 
 
Peasnell, P., Pope, P., Young, S.2000. Detecting earnings management using 
cross-sectional abnormal accruals models. Accounting and Business Research, 30: 
313-326. 
 
Peasnell, P.2006. Do outside directors limit earnings management: Corporate 
Finance Review, 10(5): 5-10. 
 
Peasnell, P., Pope. P, Young. S.2005. Board monitoring and earnings 
management: Do outside director’s influence abnormal accruals?  Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 32(7-8): 1311-1346. 
 
Pedhazur, E.1997. Multiple regressions in behavioural research: explanation and 
prediction. 3rd ed., Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers. 
 
Pelapu, K.  1986. Predicting takeover targets: A methodological and empirical 
analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8(1): 3-35. 
 
Peng, L., and Roell, A.A. 2006. Executive pay, earnings manipulation and 
shareholder litigation. AFA 2005 Meeting Paper. SSRN.com/Abstract= 488148. 
 
Pergola, T. 2006. Management Entrenchment, Corporate Governance and 
Earnings Quality. Working paper, Nova Southern University. 
 
 206 
Perry, S., Williams, T.1994. Earnings management preceding management buyout 
offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18: 157-180. 
 
Petroni, K.1992. Optimistic reporting in the property-casualty insurance industry. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15: 485-508. 
 
Petrovits, C. 2006. Corporate-Sponsored Foundations and Earnings Management. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(3): 335-362. 
 
Peter, D. W. 2004. Earnings Management, Tax Compliance, and Institutional 
Factors: A Discussion of Haw et al. (2004). Working paper, Sloan School of 
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Pierre, M.G., and Sekkat, K. 2005. Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of 
growth? Public Choice, 122(1-2). 
 
Platikanova, P., and Nobes, C.  2006. Was the Introduction of IFRS in Europe 
Value- Relevant? Working Paper, University Pompeu Fabra and University of 
Reading. 
Pourjalali, H., Meek, G. 1995. Accounting and culture: the case of Iran. Research 
in Accounting in Emerging Economies, 3: 3-17. 
Rahman, R. A., and Ali, F. H. M. 2006. Board, Audit Committee and Earnings 
Management: Malaysian Evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 21(7): 783-804. 
 
Rajgopal, S., and Shivakumar, L. 2007. A Catering Theory of Earnings 
Management. Working paper, University of Washington Business School and 
London Business School. 
 
Rath. S., and Sun, L. 2007. Do Australian Firms Engage in Earnings 
Management? Working Paper, Curtin University of Technology, Australia. 
 
Rangan, S. 1998. Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity 
offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50: 101-122. 
 
Richardson, S.A., Tuna, I. A., and Wu, M. 2002. Predicting earnings 
management: The case of restatements. Retrieved at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=338681 
 
Robinson, T., Grant, J.1997. The impact of earnings management on bond risk 
premia. Advances in Accounting, 15:169-192. 
 
Rock, M. T., and Bonnett, H. 2004. The Comparative Politics of Corruption: 
Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, 
Growth and Investment. World Development, 32(6):999-1017. 
 
Roe, M. 1994. Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American 
Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 
 
 207 
Rogers, W. H. 1993. sg17: Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples. 
Stata Technical Bulletin, 13:19-23. 
 
Romano, R. 1993. The genius of American Corporate Law. American Enterprise 
Institute Press, Washington, D.C. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, S. 1978. Corruption: A study in Political Economy. New York: 
Academy Press. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, S. 2002. “Grand” Corruption and the Ethics of Global Business. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 26:1889-1919. 
 
Rubin, P. 1990. Managing business transactions: Controlling the cost of 
coordinating, communicating, and decision making. Maxwell Macmillan 
International. 
 
Salter, S., and Niswander, F. 1995. Culture influence on the development of 
accounting systems internationally: A test of Gray’s (1988) theory. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 29(1): 159-177. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, part of the SEC’s Regulation SOX, Federal law. 
 
Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 
3(4): 91- 102. 
 
Schipper, K. 2005. The introduction of International Accounting Standards in 
Europe: implications for international convergence. European Accounting Review, 
14(1):101-26. 
 
Scholes, M., Wilson, G.P., and Wolfson, M. 1990. Tax Planning, Regulatory 
capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks. Review of 
Financial Studies, 3: 625-650. 
 
Schuler, R., and Rogovsky, N. 1998. Understanding compensation practice 
variations across firms: The impact of national culture. Journal of International 
Business studies, 29(1): 159-177. 
 
Seligson, M. 2002. The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A 
Comparative Study of Four Latin Countries. The Journal of Politics, 64(2): 408-
433. 
 
Share and Share, U. 1999. The Economist. August 7:18-19. 
 
Shen, C., and Chih, H. 2005. Investor protection, prospect theory, and earnings 
management: An international comparison of the banking industry. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 29: 2675-2697. 
 
Shivakumar, L.2000. Do Firms Mislead Investors by Overstating Earnings before 
Seasoned Equity Offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(3): 339-
371. 
 208 
 
Shleifer, A., and Wolfenzon, D. 2000. Investor Protection and Equity Markets. 
Working Paper. Harvard University and New York University 
 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W. 1993. Greenmail, white knights, and shareholders' 
interest. RAND Journal of Economics, 17(3): 293-310. 
 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal 
of Finance, 52(2): 737-783. 
 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W.1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. 
Journal of Political Economy, 94: 461-488. 
 
Shivakumar, L. 2002. Do Firms Mislead Investors by Overstating Earnings before 
Seasoned Equity Offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(3): 339-
371. 
 
Skinner, D. J., and Sloan, R.G. 2002. Earnings surprises, growth expectations and 
stock returns or don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of 
Accounting Studies, 7(2-3): 289-312. 
 
Spamann, H. 2006. On the significance and/or endogeneity of La Porta et al’s 
‘Anti Directors Rights Index’ under consistent coding. Discussion Paper No. 7. 
Harvard Law School. 
 
Stice, E. 1991. The market reaction to 10-K and 10-Q filing and to subsequent 
The Wall Street Journal earnings announcements. The Accounting Review, 
66(January): 42-55. 
 
Stulz, R. M., and Williamson, R. 2003. Culture Openness and Finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 70(3): 313-349. 
 
Soderstrom, N. S., and Sun, K. J. 2008. IFRS Adoption and Accounting Quality: 
A Review. European Accounting Review, 16(4): 675-702. 
 
Spiess, D. K. and Affleck-Graves, J. 1995. The Long –run performance of stock 
returns following debt offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 54: 45-74. 
 
Subramanyam, K. R. 1996. The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 22: 249-281. 
 
Sunder, S. 1997. Theory of Accounting and control. Cincinnati, OH: South-
Western Publishing. 
 
Stapleton, G.P. 1998. Australian Share market ownership. Securities Regulation in 
Australia and New Zealand. Sydney: LBC Information Service. 
 
Sweeney, A. 1994. Debt-Covenant Violations and Managers’ Accounting 
Responses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 281-308. 
 
 209 
Tanzi, V., and Davoodi, H.1997. Corruption, Public Investment and Growth. IMF 
Working Paper 97/139. Retrieved at http://www1.worldbank.org/home 
 
Tanzi, V. 1998. Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope, and 
cures. IMF Staff Papers, 45(5): 559-594. 
 
Teoh, S.H., and Wong, T.J. 1993. Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings 
Response Coefficients. The Accounting Review, 68: 346-367. 
 
Teoh, S.H., Welch, I., and Wong, T.J. 1998. Are Accruals during Initial Public 
Offerings Opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies, 3:175-208. 
 
Teoh, S.H., Welch, I., and Wong, T.J. 1998a. Earnings management and the long-
term market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance, 53 
(December): 1935-1974. 
 
Teoh, S., Welch, I., Wong, T.1998b. Earnings Management and the 
Underperformance of Seasoned Equity Offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 50: 63-99. 
 
Terisman, D.2000. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of 
Public Economics, 76: 399-457. 
 
The World Economic Forum. 2008. The Financial Development Report. USA. 
Retrieved at http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm 
 
The World Factbook. 2009. Central Intelligence Agency, USA. Retrieved at 
http://www.cia.com/home/usa 
 
The World Bank. (1998-2007). The World Bank Development Research Group. 
Retrieved at http://www.worldbank.org 
 
Thomas, J., and Zhang, X.  2000. Identifying unexpected accruals: A comparison 
of current approaches. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19: 346-376. 
 
Transparency International. 2008. Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, 2008.  Retrieved at http://www.transparency.org/home 
 
Uddin, S.N. and Hopper, T.M. 2003. Accounting for privatization in Bangladesh: 
Testing World Bank Claims. Critical Perspective on Accounting, 14: 739-774. 
 
van. T, B., and Vanstraelen, A. 2005. Earnings management under German GAAP 
versus IFRS. European Accounting Review, 14(1): 155-80. 
 
United Nations. 2008. Annual Report. Retrieved at http://www.un.org/home 
 
Viscusi, W. K.,  J. E. Harrington., and Vernon, J. M. 2005. Economics of 
Regulation and Antitrust. 4th Edition, MIT press. 
 
 210 
Vogl, F. 1998. The supply side of global Bribery. Finance and Development, 
35(2): 30-33. 
 
Warfield, T., and Wild, J. 1995. Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and 
informativeness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20: 61-91. 
 
Wang, Z., Swift, K., Lobo, G.1994. Earnings management and the 
informativeness of accruals adjustments. Working paper, Motana State University. 
 
Wang, T.Y.2004. Investment, shareholder monitoring, and economics of 
corporate securities fraud. Working Paper, University of Maryland. 
 
Watts, R., and Zimmerman, J. 1978. Towards a Positive Accounting Theory of the 
determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 53 (January): 
112-134. 
 
Watts, R., and Zimmerman, J. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Watts, R., and Zimmerman, J. 1990. Positive Accounting Theory: A ten Year 
Perspective.  The Accounting Review, 65: 131-156. 
 
WBES. 2000. (World Business Environment Survey), Annual Report. Retrieved 
at http://www.wbes.org/home 
 
Weber, M. 2006. Sensitivity of executive wealth to stock price, corporate 
governance and earnings management. Review of Accounting & Finance, 5(4): 
321-354. 
 
Wei, S. J. (1999), Corruption and Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, 
Minor Annoyance or Major Obstacle? The World Bank, Washington, DC, Policy 
Research Paper No. 2048, Public Economics, Development Research Group. 
 
Wei, S. J. 2000. How taxing is corruption on International Investors. The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 82(1): 1-11. 
 
Weisbach, M. 1988. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 20(1-2): 413-460. 
 
White, H. 1980. A Heteroscedasticity-consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and 
a Direct Test for Heteroscedasticity. Econometrica, 48: 817-838. 
 
Wild, J. 1996. The audit committee and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance, 11: 247-276. 
 
Wilson, P. 1996. Discussion: write-offs: manipulation or impairment? Journal of 
Accounting Research, 34:171-177. 
 
WHO. 2008. (World Health Organization). Annual Report. Retrieved at 
http://www.who.org/home 
 211 
 
Willamson, O. E. 1979. Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Transactional Relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22: 233-261. 
 
Wright, C. J., Shaw, J. R., and Guan, L. 2006. Corporate Governance and Investor 
Protection: Earnings Management in the UK and the US. Journal of International 
Accounting Research, 5 (1): 25-40. 
 
Wu, X. 2005. Firm Accounting Practices, Accounting Reform and Corruption in 
Asia. Policy and Society, 24(3): 53-78. 
 
Wu, X. 2005a. Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross- country Analysis. 
Governance: A International Journal of Policy, Administrative and Institutions, 
18(2):151-170. 
 
Wu, X. 2005b. Political Institutions and Corporate Governance Reform in 
Southeast Asia. In Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia: 
Economics, Politics and Regulation, ed. K. L. Ho, ISEAS, Singapore. 
 
Xie, B., Davidson, N.W. and DaDalt, P. 2003. Earnings management and 
corporate governance: the roles of the board and the audit committee. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 9 (3): 295-316. 
 
Xu, X., and Wang, Y. 1999. Ownership structure and corporate governance in 
Chinese stock companies. China Economic Review, 10: 75-89. 
 
Yaari, H., DaDalt, P., Ronen, J., and Yaari, V. 2007.An accruals conundrum in 
earnings management research. Work in Process. New York University and 
Morgan State University. 
 
Ye, J. 2006. Accounting Accruals and tests of earnings management. Working 
paper, Baruch College, NY. 
 
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of a company with a small board of 
directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40: 185-211. 
 
Yoon, S.S., and Miller, G.A. 2002. Cash from operations and earnings 
management in Korea. The International Journal of accounting, 37: 395-412. 
 
Young, M. 2000. Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud: Corporate 
Governance Guide, Harcourt, Inc. 
 
Yu, M. 2005. International Earnings Management and Accounting Standards. 
SSRN working paper. Retrieved at http://ssrn.com/abstract=825146 
 
Zahra, S., and Pearce, J. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15: 291-
334.
 212
Appendix – A  
 
Statistical Output 
 
Table 5-1 
 
Panel A:  Sample distribution by country and year 
 
Country 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Total 
 
Australia 81 69 52 49 170 923 977 1012 1060 4393 
Argentina 20 39 49 56 65 104 132 147 132 744 
Austria 24 19 13 29 24 33 45 69 81 337 
Bangladesh 47 43 60 03 04 03 02 08 06 176 
Belgium 34 39 25 22 57 111 122 111 106 627 
Bermuda 19 22 26 76 442 518 564 562 546 2775 
Brazil 141 181 316 325 301 346 369 356 376 2711 
Canada 230 204 163 132 826 1102 1118 1185 1194 6154 
Cay. Island 05 06 9 24 258 375 464 477 471 2089 
Chile 95 172 132 146 280 327 188 408 414 2160 
China 0 0 65 131 1136 1285 1464 1424 1634 7141 
Columbia 05 05 11 06 9 59 27 36 49 207 
Czech Rep 86 88 56 35 42 23 21 14 12 377 
Denmark 39 30 21 28 94 114 125 125 126 702 
Egypt 23 29 52 67 339 581 509 424 301 2324 
Ecuador 0 0 19 0 0 23 29 55 40 147 
Finland 14 16 111 21 67 127 130 123 117 634 
France 131 149 110 284 492 609 622 588 530 3513 
Germany 160 145 25 224 218 286 430 551 634 2758 
Greece 20 24 05 04 32 65 204 232 257 863 
Hong Kong 08 03 19 20 157 175 184 185 180 912 
Indonesia 0 0 0 1 251 255 262 276 278 1323 
Ireland 20 20 19 14 12 36 45 51 54 270 
Israel 06 9 9 23 118 137 169 203 530 1205 
Italy 56 76 97 163 161 30 198 230 233 1244 
Jordan 01 04 76 90 104 114 119 121 140 769 
Kuwait 01 02 7 16 31 57 50 49 29 241 
Latvia 03 02 01 02 04 04 12 33 29 90 
Luxemburg 02 03 01 04 14 29 30 25 27 135 
Malaysia 63 66 62 93 573 842 621 945 919 4184 
Mexico 70 117 127 137 135 128 137 131 117 1099 
Netherlands 63 42 32 28 107 162 148 134 115 831 
New Zealand 15 11 7 07 62 115 124 121 112 574 
Nigeria 0 01 1 03 12 22 30 22 06 97 
Norway 34 22 13 15 140 147 167 162 162 862 
Oman 0 01 46 61 81 88 87 95 105 564 
Pakistan 148 155 84 71 115 125 127 160 196 1181 
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 01 34 35 41 42 153 
Peru 34 26 20 19 15 98 127 127 111 577 
Philippines 0 01 02 11 155 165 166 177 165 842 
Portugal 12 12 07 07 07 54 25 32 48 204 
Qatar 0 0 02 04 09 15 18 22 26 96 
UAE 0 06 10 11 17 28 36 44 48 200 
Russia 03 07 07 16 25 50 77 153 125 463 
Venezuela 07 08 09 05 15 19 16 21 22 121 
Viet Nam 0 0 0 0 07 07 28 120 263 425 
S. Arabia 0 15 38 43 61 68 76 75 81 457 
Singapore 40 26 22 11 349 497 578 578 564 2666 
S. Africa 74 45 52 47 135 191 182 213 230 1169 
Spain 33 40 53 98 111 24 143 136 129 767 
Srilanka 02 03 32 13 24 32 46 51 47 250 
Sweden 72 42 27 24 223 287 333 383 392 1784 
Switzerland 28 24 22 58 56 88 129 163 177 745 
Taiwan 05 07 08 18 188 392 1200 1549 1592 4959 
Thailand 23 01 11 10 350 402 404 407 458 2066 
UK 530 469 405 433 356 724 901 1297 1460 6575 
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Japan 83 81 95 104 2330 2561 3044 2622 2015 12736 
USA 5132 4044 5865 4419 5237 5157 5093 4995 4681 45223 
India 22 43 80 351 813 1150 1900 2091 828 7278 
South Korea 725 800 870 835 1052 1230 1303 1348 1413 9576 
Morocco 0 02 27 30 33 37 30 20 20 199 
Poland 12 13 19 17 30 40 43 17 17 208 
Turkey 01 01 02 01 04 40 59 123 123 354 
Total 25285 26795 25712 21554 17863 10194 9539 10250 9714 156906 
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Table 5-1 
 
Panel B: Measures of macro governance variables for the 63 countries in the study 
 
Country Enforcement 
 
 
 
INS 
 
 
POL 
 
 
COR 
 
 
CUL 
 
 
IFRS JUD SEC MIN ENF RLAW PRESS 
 
Australia 6.4 6.22 5.86 6.24 1.81 1.45 1.67 .85 1.99 6.08 1 
Argentina 2.17 4.41 3.58 4.01 -.58 .27 -.74 -.03 -.47 3.46 0 
Austria 6.06 5.80 5.86 6.23 1.87 1.55 1.53 1.04 1.99 6.09 1 
Bangladesh n.a n.a n.a n.a -.86 -.52 -.87 -1.60 -1.29 n.a 0 
Belgium 5.37 5.84 5.61 6.01 1.45 1.46 1.32 .74 1.40 5.40 1 
Bermuda n.a n.a n.a n.a .88 1.08 1.33 .81 1.27 n.a 0 
Brazil 3.14 5.14 4.80 4.79 -.48 .37 .00 -.09 -.33 3.77 0 
Canada 6.01 5.64 5.63 6.07 1.85 1.46 1.53 .94 1.90 5.86 0 
Cayman Island n.a n.a n.a n.a 1.15 .84 1.33 1.17 1.27 n.a 0 
Chile 4.25 5.98 5.27 5.53 1.15 1.15 1.41 .85 1.31 5.46 0 
China 3.43 3.42 3.61 3.84 -.40 -1.66 -.19 -.37 -.53 3.71 0 
Colombia 3.81 4.94 4.49 4.50 -.64 -.25 .10 -1.62 -.22 4.43 0 
Czech Rep 4.10 4.90 4.13 4.93 .73 .96 .95 .75 .36 3.95 1 
Denmark n.a n.a n.a n.a 2.03 1.72 1.81 .82 2.39 n.a 1 
Egypt 4.86 3.93 4.51 4.62 .00 -1.08 -.44 -.87 -.41 4.34 1 
Ecuador n.a n.a n.a n.a -.96 -.35 -1.06 -.90 -.75 n.a 0 
Finland 6.43 5.82 5.88 6.22 1.95 1.63 1.70 1.47 2.57 6.63 1 
Germany 6.53 5.95 6.14 6.34 1.77 1.48 1.39 .83 1.78 6.15 1 
Greece n.a n.a n.a n.a .64 1.05 .79 .48 .39 n.a 1 
Hong Kong 5.94 6.19 5.61 6.20 1.45 .55 1.95 1.16 1.71 5.82 1 
India 5.30 5.52 5.31 5.64 .17 .35 -.15 -.84 -.21 4.19 0 
Indonesia 2.97 5.58 5.74 4.52 -.82 -.25 -.26 -1.17 -.77 3.77 0 
Ireland 6.01 5.95 5.77 6.21 1.62 1.42 1.75 1.16 1.60 5.53 1 
Israel 6.03 5.52 5.40 5.93 .69 .68 .91 -1.18 .83 4.88 1 
Italy 3.79 4.47 3.97 4.46 .37 1.14 .84 .28 .31 4.08 1 
Japan 5.51 5.24 4.98 5.23 1.40 .91 1.27 1.11 1.31 5.41 0 
Jordan n.a n.a n.a n.a .45 -.62 .41 -.53 .38 n.a 1 
Kuwait 5.23 4.42 4.40 5.32 .75 -.36 .51 .28 .67 4.72 1 
Latvia n.a n.a n.a n.a .52 .83 1.06 .81 .38 n.a 1 
Luxemburg n.a n.a n.a n.a 1.83 1.63 1.79 1.51 2.01 n.a 1 
Malaysia 5.24 5.48 5.53 5.73 .58 -.34 .67 .35 .38 5.26 0 
Mexico 3.58 5.10 4.44 4.63 -.49 .06 .43 -.40 -.35 4.35 0 
Morocco n.a n.a n.a n.a -.03 -.63 -.15 -.31 -.06 n.a 0 
Netherlands 6.41 5.70 5.58 6.02 1.75 1.67 1.65 .77 2.05 6.15 1 
New Zealand n.a n.a n.a n.a 1.93 1.62 1.68 1.27 2.38 n.a 1 
Nigeria 3.52 5.05 4.33 4.14 -1.27 -.78 -.89 -1.99 -1.29 3.79 0 
Norway 6.09 5.81 5.76 6.06 2.02 1.64 1.34 1.21 2.13 6.18 1 
Oman n.a n.a n.a n.a .71 -.77 .75 .66 .71 n.a 1 
Pakistan 3.51 3.96 4.97 4.92 -.82 -1.17 -.39 -1.92 -.93 4.35 0 
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Paraguay n.a n.a n.a n.a -.93 -.36 -.68 -.48 -1.02 n.a 0 
Peru 2.19 5.31 4.23 4.77 -.75 .05 .11 -.90 -.35 3.99 1 
Philippines 3.31 4.81 4.66 4.96 -.48 -.18 -.06 -1.26 -.69 3.51 0 
Poland 3.54 4.95 4.25 4.38 .25 .95 .64 .22 .14 4.17 1 
Portugal n.a n.a n.a n.a .97 1.27 1.00 .85 1.11 n.a 1 
Qatar n.a n.a n.a n.a .93 -.51 .45 .86 .83 n.a 1 
UAE 4.98 4.80 4.64 5.20 .67 -.78 .80 .68 1.16 5.30 1 
Russia 2.70 3.57 3.14 3.94 -.91 -.87 -.45 -.74 -.76 3.26 0 
Saudi Arabia 4.39 3.91 4.40 4.72 .17 -1.42 -.02 -.65 .18 4.43 0 
Singapore 5.60 5.99 5.55 6.10 1.82 -.07 1.85 1.30 2.30 6.30 1 
South Africa 5.45 6.02 5.64 6.22 .24 .60 .68 -.07 .56 4.68 1 
South Korea 5.13 5.92 5.12 5.42 .72 .71 .70 .42 .31 5.16 0 
Spain 3.76 4.93 4.61 5.25 1.10 1.05 1.06 .33 1.18 4.87 1 
Srilanka n.a n.a n.a n.a .01 -.35 -.11 -1.61 -.29 n.a 0 
Sweden 6.16 6.26 6.37 6.32 1.86 1.55 1.44 1.13 2.24 6.45 1 
Switzerland 6.30 5.85 5.34 6.13 1.96 1.72 1.45 1.40 2.19 6.17 0 
Taiwan n.a n.a n.a n.a .77 .79 .94 .51 .53 n.a 0 
Thailand 4.72 5.26 4.88 5.02 .03 -.50 .37 -.99 -.26 4.14 0 
Turkey 4.40 5.23 4.58 4.82 .08 -.19 .21 -.65 .06 4.64 0 
UK 6.04 5.79 5.94 6.29 1.73 1.42 1.76 .46 1.86 5.83 1 
USA 5.06 5.52 5.50 5.79 1.57 1.08 1.47 .31 1.30 5.10 0 
Venezuela 1.19 4.49 3.89 4.06 -1.39 -.58 -1.35 -1.24 -1.05 3.31 1 
Viet Nam 3.61 4.31 4.48 3.89 -.43 -1.45 -.49 .42 -.66 4.03 0 
Mean 5.09 5.41 5.26 5.56 1.07 .80 1.05 .46 1.08 5.09 .24 
S.D .84 .61 .57 .61 .74 .82 .69 .68 .87 .69 .42 
 
 Note: JUD = judicial independence (WEF 2008). SEC = enforcement of securities laws (WEF 2008). MIN = protection of minority shareholders interest (WEF 2008). ACC = 
enforcement of accounting and auditing standards (WEF 2008). RLAW = rule of laws (WB 1999-2007). PRESS = press freedom (WB 1999-2007). INS = regulatory quality (WB 
1999-2007). PLO = political stability (WB 1999-2007). COR = control of corruption (WB 1999-2007). CUL = ethical behaviour of firms (WEF 2008). IFRS = a dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 for a given year after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 5-1 
 
Panel C: Measures of micro governance variables for the 63 countries in the study 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
Micro governance variables 
 
BIG4 (%) BONUS IPO  BOD BIND OWN 
 
Australia 59 05 .77 8.35 5.81 .28 
Argentina 65 4.73 .39 3.91 4.67 .55 
Austria 62 5.01 .88 10.39 5.63 .51 
Bangladesh 39 n.a n.a 7.82 4.93 .50 
Belgium 53 4.94 .27 9.55 5.41 .62 
Bermuda 64 n.a n.a 10.47 n.a n.a 
Brazil 66 4.36 .71 3.51 4.63 .63 
Canada 75 5.37 .27 11.72 5.57 .24 
Cay. Island 60 n.a n.a 10.70 n.a n.a 
Chile 80 4.97 .15 5.01 5.53 .38 
China 10 4.60 1.91 5.82 4.01 n.a 
Colombia 33 3.86 n.a 2.85 4.85 .68 
Czech Rep 46 4.27 .20 5.48 5.03 n.a 
Denmark 84 n.a n.a 7.98 n.a .40 
Egypt 24 3.79 .21 3.31 4.39 .62 
Ecuador 05 n.a n.a 2.15 n.a n.a 
Finland 90 5.01 3.73 9.60 5.37 .24 
Germany 55 5.60 .34 8.43 5.69 .50 
Greece 25 n.a n.a 8.06 n.a .68 
Hong Kong 81 5.19 3.29 12.31 5.34 .54 
India 38 4.53 .52 8.80 5.03 .43 
Indonesia 26 5.19 .08 5.60 5.36 .62 
Ireland 90 4.92 .80 10.13 5.50 .36 
Israel 40 5.06 .12 10.87 5.23 .55 
Italy 86 4.95 .39 7.28 4.32 .60 
Japan 73 4.32 .43 5.92 5.15 .13 
Jordan 28 n.a n.a 10.25 n.a n.a 
Kuwait 53 4.71 n.a 7.89 4.60 n.a 
Latvia 33 n.a n.a 7.59 n.a n.a 
Luxemburg 87 n.a n.a 11.65 n.a n.a 
Malaysia 60 5.11 .16 9.47 5.39 .52 
Mexico 72 4.74 .22 4.51 4.61 .67 
Morocco 71 n.a n.a 9.04 n.a n.a 
Netherlands 86 5.29 .71 9.16 5.62 .31 
New Zeal 85 n.a n.a 8.19 n.a .51 
Nigeria 66 3.58 .37 10.33 4.97 .45 
Norway 94 4.72 .96 8.40 5.55 .31 
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Oman 61 n.a n.a 9.83 n.a n.a 
Pakistan 45 3.55 n.a 9.23 3.57 .41 
Paraguay 29 n.a n.a 1.50 n.a n.a 
Peru 55 3.94 n.a 4.93 4.68 .57 
Philippines 31 4.33 .58 13.94 4.72 .51 
Poland 47 4.15 .25 5.67 4.13 n.a 
Portugal 43 n.a n.a 3.95 n.a .59 
Qatar 72 n.a n.a 10.11 n.a n.a 
UAE 74 4.33 1.06 9.37 4.59 n.a 
Russia 56 4.57 1.74 3.78 4.96 n.a 
Saudi Arabia 55 4.33 .77 9.13 4.73 n.a 
Singapore 71 5.18 1.76 9.69 5.61 .53 
South Africa 70 5.67 .34 10.00 5.73 .52 
South Korea 36 5.41 .63 10.26 5.21 .20 
Spain 86 4.88 .31 4.86 5.00 .50 
Srilanka 87 n.a n.a 8.96 n.a .61 
Sweden 86 5.16 .41 8.36 6.09 .28 
Switzerland 90 5.61 .96 8.59 5.41 .48 
Taiwan 85 n.a 1.02 12.25 4.83 .48 
Thailand 72 4.37 1.02 12.25 4.83 .48 
Turkey 32 3.62 .21 7.26 4.34 .50 
UK 63 5.36 .78 9.37 5.92 .15 
USA 61 5.51 .34 10.00 5.47 .12 
Venezuela 88 4.47 n.a 4.14 4.29 .49 
Viet Nam 38 4.30 .19 6.62 4.46 n.a 
Mean 54 5.09 .64 8.54 5.27 .26 
S.D .498 .51 .69 5.51 .46 .17 
 
Note: BIG4 = equals 1 if the firm audited by one of the BIG 4 and otherwise 0. BONUS = extent of incentives based compensation (WEF 2008). IPO = initial public offerings (WEF 
2008). BOD = no of directors on the board of a firm. BIND = board effectiveness from the (WEF 2008). OWN = ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 2006).  
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Table 5-1 
 
Panel D: Pearson correlation on macro and micro governance variables with DACCR (N = 63) 
 
 
 
SEC MIN ACC RLAW PRESS POL COR CUL IPO LEV BONUS IFRS BIG4 BOD BIND OWN DACRR 
 
JUD .681 
(<.01) 
.754 
(<.01) 
.823 
(<.01) 
.758 
(<.01) 
.605 
(<.01) 
.542 
(<.01) 
.688 
(<.01) 
.863 
(<.01) 
-.125 
(<.01) 
.020 
(<.01) 
.337 
(<.01) 
.243 
(<.01) 
.176 
(<.01) 
.153 
(<.01) 
.741 
(<.01) 
-.298 
(<.01) 
-.076 
(<.01) 
SEC  .855 
(<.01) 
.870 
(<.01) 
.652 
(<.01) 
.755 
(<.01) 
.424 
(<.01) 
.619 
(<.01) 
.717 
(<.01) 
-.167 
(<.01) 
.038 
(<.01) 
.560 
(<.01) 
.169 
(<.01) 
.153 
(<.01) 
.190 
(<.01) 
.867 
(<.01) 
-.195 
(<.01) 
-.071 
(<.01) 
MIN   .929 
(<.01) 
.725 
(<.01) 
.733 
(<.01) 
.397 
(<.01) 
.713 
(<.01) 
.742 
(<.01) 
-.341 
(<.01) 
.037 
(<.01) 
.574 
(<.01) 
.177 
(<.01) 
.192 
(<.01) 
.198 
(<.01) 
.905 
(<.01) 
-.274 
(<.01) 
-.104 
(<.01) 
ACC 
   
.804 
(<.01) 
.771 
(<.01) 
.470 
(<.01) 
.785 
(<.01) 
.801 
(<.01) 
-.139 
(<.01) 
.038 
(<.01) 
.631 
(<.01) 
.229 
(<.01) 
.223 
(<.01) 
.224 
(<.01) 
.909 
(<.01) 
-.3016 
(<.01) 
-.112 
(<.01) 
RLAW 
   
 .822 
(<.01) 
.773 
(<.01) 
.965 
(<.01) 
.852 
(<.01) 
-.168 
(<.01) 
.003 
(.265) 
.611 
(<.01) 
.126 
(<.01) 
.304 
(<.01) 
.165 
(<.01) 
.820 
(<.01) 
-.623 
(<.01) 
-.166 
(<.01) 
PRESS 
   
  .583 
(<.01) 
.800 
(<.01) 
.646 
(<.01) 
-.310 
(<.01) 
.045 
(<.01) 
.574 
(<.01) 
.051 
(<.01) 
.272 
(<.01) 
.128 
(<.01) 
.803 
(<.01) 
-.610 
(<.01) 
-.132 
(<.01) 
POL 
     
 .768 
(<.01) 
.742 
(<.01) 
-.042 
(<.01) 
-.035 
(<.01) 
.364 
(<.01) 
.065 
(<.01) 
.324 
(<.01) 
.001 
(.844) 
.552 
(<.01) 
-.443 
(<.01) 
-.098 
(<.01) 
COR 
       
.841 
(<.01) 
-.132 
(<.01) 
-.001 
(.713) 
.604 
(<.01) 
.154 
(<.01) 
.344 
(<.01) 
.139 
(<.01) 
.812 
(<.01) 
-.528 
(<.01) 
-.157 
(<.01) 
CUL 
        
-.068 
(<.01) 
-.012 
(<.01) 
.425 
(<.01) 
.264 
(<.01) 
.284 
(<.01) 
.115 
(<.01) 
.793 
(<.01) 
-.325 
(<.01) 
-.084 
(<.01) 
IPO 
         
-.026 
(<.01) 
.003 
(.260) 
.174 
(<.01) 
-.069 
(<.01) 
-.017 
(<.01) 
-.260 
(<.01) 
.100 
(<.01) 
.024 
(<.01) 
LEV 
          
-.005 
(.054) 
.017 
(<.01) 
.062 
(<.01) 
.073 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.048 
(<.01) 
.149 
(<.01) 
BONUS 
           
.036 
(<.01) 
.091 
(<.01) 
.248 
(<.01) 
.671 
(<.01) 
-.420 
(<.01) 
-.165 
(<.01) 
IFRS 
            
.033 
(<.01) 
.009 
(<.01) 
.184 
(<.01) 
.230 
(<.01) 
-.010 
(<.01) 
BIG4 
             
.164 
(<.01) 
.254 
(<.01) 
-.101 
(<.01) 
.033 
(<.01) 
BOD 
              
.174 
(<.01) 
-.074 
(<.01) 
.031 
(<.01) 
BIND 
              
 -.437 
(<.01) 
-.126 
(<.01) 
OWN 
              
  .169 
(<.01) 
 
Note: p-values are in parenthesis.  
 
 
JUD = judicial independence (WEF 2008). SEC = enforcement of securities laws (WEF 2008). MIN = protection of minority shareholders interest (WEF 2008). ACC = enforcement of 
accounting and auditing standards (WEF 2008). RLAW = rule of laws (WB 1999-2007). PRESS = press freedom (WB 1999-2007). REG = regulatory quality (WB 1999-2007). PLO 
= political stability (WB 1999-2007). COR = control of corruption (WB 1999-2007). CUL = ethical behaviour (WEF 2008). BIG4 = indicator variable with the value of 1 if the firm 
audited by one of the BIG 4 and otherwise 0.  BONUS = extent of incentive based compensation (WEF 2008).  IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given year after 
mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. IPO = initial public offerings (WEF 2008). BOD = no of directors on the board of a firm. BIND = board effectiveness (WEF 2008).  OWN 
= ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 2006). DACCR is the signed discretionary accruals. 
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Table 5-2 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
DACCR -.1678               .24275 -.2775 -.1674 -.0471 
SIZE 5.1092 .88551 4.4922 5.0923 5.7102 
LEV  .4732 .98672   .0102  .1805    .6071 
GWTH -.0025 .59483 -.0148  .0725    .1577 
CFO .0342 .19394 -.0131  .0561    .1240 
CAP .3367 .24780 .1295  .2848    .4975 
LOSS     .31       .46        0         0        1 
 
Note: DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV is 
total liabilities / total equities for firm i in year t. GWTH is return on equity, defined as the net income in year t scaled by total equity in 
year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. CAP is the non-current (fixed) assets in year t / 
Total assets in year t. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i reports income before extraordinary items in the previous year negative and 0 
otherwise.  
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Appendix - B: Definitions of financial number games 
 
Label Definition 
 
Aggressive accounting 
 
A forceful and intentional choice and application of accounting 
principles done in an effort to achieve desired result. Typically 
higher current earnings, whether the practices followed are in 
accordance with GAAP or not. 
 
 
Earnings management 
 
The active manipulation of earnings toward a pre-determined 
target, which may be set by management, a forecast made by 
analyst, or an amount that is consistent with a smoother, more 
sustainable earnings stream. 
 
 
Income smoothing 
 
A form of earnings management designed to remove peaks and valleys 
from a normal earnings series, including steps to reduce and “store” 
profits during good years for use during slower years. 
 
 
Fraudulent financial reporting 
 
Intentional misstatements or omission of amounts or disclosures in 
financial statements, done to deceive financial statement users, which 
are determined to be fraudulent by an administrative, civil, or 
criminal proceeding. 
 
 
Creative accounting practices 
 
Any and all steps used to play the financial number game, including 
the aggressive choice and application of accounting principles, 
fraudulent financial reporting, and any steps taken towards earnings 
management or income smoothing. 
 
 
Source: Mulford and Comiskey (2002: 3) 
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Appendix - C 
Brief sketch of empirical studies on earnings management 
(Source: Own works based on S.P. Kothari (2001) and other empirical studies) 
 
SL 
# 
Author (s) 
 
Motivation Sample Results 
 
 
01 
 
Copeland and Wojdak 
(1969) 
 
Accounting for merger to 
maximize future income. 
 
Gagnon’s 55-58 data, plus 118 recent 
NYSE mergers. 
 
Strong support for the hypothesis of income maximization through a massive use of the pooling 
method. 
 
 
02 
 
Anderson and 
Louderback (1975) 
 
Purchase – pooling decision. 
 
114 mergers of the NYSE  
 
No significant decline of the maximizing behavior after APB 16 
 
03 
 
Bermser (1975) 
 
Use of accounting changes for EM 
 
250 largest U.S. firms from Fortune 
sample. 
 
 
Changing firms have a poorer pattern of profit 
 
04 
 
Healy (1985) 
 
Effect on bonus plans on 
accounting choice. 
 
94 firms for 239 firms’ year. 
 
If the profit is too low, managers will take a bath otherwise they will pick income – increasing or 
decreasing procedures 
 
 
05 
 
DeAngelo (1986) 
 
Proxy contest and management 
buyout. 
 
 
64 NYSE and American SEC proposing a 
management buyout (1973 - 1982) 
 
The empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis 
 
06 
 
McNichols and Wilson 
(1988) 
 
Decrease the variance of earnings 
when the profit is too low, 
managers will choose to take a 
bath. 
 
 
138 firms from the printing and 
publishing industry giving a total of 2038 
firm – years. 
 
Results are consistent with the income decreasing hypothesis although not with the smoothing 
hypothesis. 
 
07 
 
Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) 
 
CEO situation and R &D 
expenditure. 
 
 
Compustat firms in specific SIC codes – 
405 firms. 
 
 
Positive evidence of income increasing accounting choices by CEO. 
 
 
08 
 
Jones (1991) 
 
EM during an enquiry of the 
International Trade. 
 
 
23 firms in 5 industrial sectors 
 
Managers make income decreasing accounting choices during investigation. 
 
09 
 
Aharony et al. (1993) 
 
EM in an IPO context  
 
229 industrial firms (1985 -87) on a 
population of 1162 U.S. firms 
 
No evidence of manipulation through the accruals. 
 
10 
 
Bartov (1993) 
 
Income recognition from 
disposals. 
 
653 firm – year observations from 
Compustat, classified by industrial sector. 
 
Highly geared and low income firms have significantly higher revenues from asset sales. 
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11 Dempsey et al. (1993) ownership structure and EM  Compustat firms with at least one 
extraordinary item between 1960 and 
1966. Total 248 firms. 
 
When management and ownership are separated, high level of EM through extraordinary items 
 
12 
 
Pourciau (1993) 
 
The effect of non-routine top 
executive changes on accounting  
 
 
73 firms from disclosure having 
experience a non-routine CEO change. 
 
As expected new CEO decrease income in their first year (big bath), unexpectedly leaving CEO do 
the same in their last year. 
 
13 
 
DeAngelo et al. (1994) 
 
Potential problems to comply with 
debt covenant dealt through 
dividend cuts. 
 
 
76 firms from the NYSE with three years 
of losses within 1980 – 85. 
 
No real significant income increasing procedures. 
 
14 
 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) 
 
Possibility of a default of the debt 
covenant. 
 
94 firms from the NAARS database 
disclosing a violation between 1985and 
1988. 
 
 
EM occurs the year before the default becomes publicly knows. 
 
15 
 
Friedlan (1994) 
 
EM in a IPO context  
 
277 IPO firms from 1981 to 1984 
 
 
 
Income increasing procedures just before the IPO 
 
16 
 
Sweeney (1994) 
 
Debt covenant default possibilities  
 
130 firms first times violators (1980 - 
1989) with data on Compustat. 
 
 
Significant manipulation when in danger of defaulting. 
 
17 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) 
 
To test the validity of available 
models in detecting EM. 
 
4 samples: 2 random of 1000 each, 1 from 
firms having extreme performances, and 1 
of 36 firms prosecuted by the SEC. 
 
 
Jones modified is the best model although none is really complete. 
 
18 
 
Gaver et al.(1995) 
 
Effect on bonus plan on 
accounting choices  
 
 
102 firm between 1980 and 1990 
 
No big bath they increase the profit when too low and decrease it when too high 
 
19 
 
Holthausen et al. (1995) 
 
Effect on bonus plan on 
accounting choices  
 
567 firms between 1987 and 1993 
 
Income reducing procedure at the top 
 
20 
 
Kinnunen et al. (1995) 
 
EM and economy sectors 
 
37 listed firm, 17 core and 20 peripheral 
 
 
 
Opportunity for and use of EM is greater in the core sector, and the sector is making a difference. 
 
 
21 
 
Neill et al. (1995) 
 
EM in IPO context 
 
Population = 2609 IPOs (1975 – 1984).  
 
Relationship between the size of the proceeds and the liberality of accounting policies. 
 
 
22 
 
Beneish (1997) 
 
Distinguish GAAP violators from 
simply aggressive accruals. 
 
 
Experimental : 64 firms charged by the 
SEC 
Control group: Firms with high accruals 
2118 firms. 
 
 
The model can detect the possibility of opportunistic reporting among firms with large accruals. 
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23 Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) 
 
EM around profit = 0 or a negative 
value 
64446 observation-years (1977 - 94) Strong evidence of EM when earnings decrease or are negative. 
 
24 
 
Black et al. (1998) 
 
EM through asset disposals and 
accounting regulation in an 
international context. 
 
 
From data available in Global Vantage. 
750 firms from Australia, New Zealand 
and U.K, for a total of 1199 firm- years. 
 
 
Testing of asset revaluation. No evidence of EM in Australia and New Zealand but strong one in 
the U.K. 
 
25 
 
Cormier et al.(1998) 
 
Firms in financial distress and 
takeover attempts 
 
60 Swiss firms on five years on the total 
of 172 listed Swiss firms. 
 
 
Principles of the agency theory (or positive accounting theory) are applicable in Switzerland as 
well as in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
 
26 
 
Han and Wang (1998) 
 
EM to decrease political visibility 
 
 
76 firms in predetermined SIC codes 
 
Evidence that oil companies used income decreasing procedures during the Gulf war 
 
 
27 
 
Labelle and Thibault 
(1998) 
 
Environmental crises  
 
Sample of 10 firms having known as 
environmental crises reported on the front 
page of the New – York Times 
 
 
No evidence of earnings management after the issuing. 
 
28 
 
Teoh et al. (1998b) 
 
IPOs, increased asymmetry of 
information  
 
 
1649 IPO firms (1980 - 92) 
 
Positive evidence of Earnings management immediately after the issuing. 
 
29 
 
Beneish (1999a) 
 
 
Consequences of earnings 
overstatement. 
 
Experimental : 64 firms charged by the 
SEC 
Control group: Firms with high accruals 
2,118 firms. 
 
Managers are more likely to sell their holdings and exercise stock appreciation rights in periods 
when earnings are overstated. 
 
30 
 
Beneish (1999b) 
 
 
Detection of earnings manipulation 
 
74 companies and all Compustat 
companies matched by two – digit SIC 
numbers. Data available for 1982 – 92 
period 
 
 
Identification of half of the companies involved in earnings manipulation. 
 
31 
 
Degeorge et al.(1999) 
 
Manage investors impression 
 
Quarterly data on 5387 firms from 1974 to 
1996 
 
 
Firms are using EM to avoid reporting earnings below some threshold identified empirically in the 
study 
 
32 
 
Erickson and Wang 
(1999) 
 
Increasing stock value prior to a 
stock merger 
 
 
55 firms from 24 industries 
 
Income increasing procedures are found just before the merger 
 
33 
 
Jeter and Shivakumar 
(1999) 
 
Improve the methodology to detect 
event- specific EM 
 
 
1000 firms periods in each cash flow 
quartile 
 
The Jones model is not well specified or extreme cash flow 
 
 
34 
 
Kasznik (1999) 
 
Managers will try to present 
earnings to meet or beat the 
analysts’ forecasts. 
 
 
499 management earnings forecasts from 
Lexis news. 
 
Found evidence of EM to align the presented and the forecasted earnings 
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35 
 
Lim and Matolcsy 
(1999) 
 
EM facing price control in 
Australia 
 
3 groups : 1 – 32 investigated, 2 – 34 
subject to be inquired, 3 – not subject to 
be inquired 
 
 
Evidence of EM for the category 1 in year 0. 
 
36 
 
Magnan et al. (1999) 
 
EM by firms participating as 
plaintiffs in antidumping 
investigations. 
 
 
17 Canadian firms (1976 – 1992 period) 
 
Evidence of reduction of earnings to obtain favourable rulings 
 
37 
 
Navissi (1999) 
 
EM under price regulation 
 
62 firms from New Zealand  
 
 
Evidence of Earnings Management 
 
38 
 
Young (1999) 
 
To test the robustness of 5 models 
to measurement error 
 
 
158 firms distributed over 3 years 
 
Jones and Modified Jones models are the best model. 
 
39 
 
Bauman et al. (2001) 
 
To examine earnings management 
via change in the deferred tax 
asset. 
 
 
Fortune 5000 firms 
 
Existence of EM in a contextual approach. 
 
40 
 
Yoon and Miller (2002) 
 
EM in SEO context  
 
249 Korean listed firms that issued 
seasoned equity stocks from March 1995 
to December 1997 
 
 
Results support the earnings management hypothesis for the negative operating cash flow firms. 
 
41 
 
Elias (2004) 
 
 
Corporate ethical values and 
earnings management. 
 
 
4,200 AICPA. 
 
 
The results indicated that CPAs employed in organizations with high (low) ethical standards 
viewed earnings management activities as more unethical (ethical). 
 
 
42 
 
Abdelghany (2005) 
 
 
Measuring the quality of earnings  
 
90 companies for the period 1999-2003. 
 
 
The results suggest that the stakeholders before making any financing, investing decision or taking 
any corrective action have to use more than one approach to assess the quality of earnings. 
 
 
43 
 
Koumanakos et al. 
(2005) 
 
 
Accounting for merger to 
maximize future income. 
 
Sample of 42 acquiring firms with a total 
of 407 firm-year observations. 
 
 
 
Results provide weak evidence of biased accruals reported by managers in the year preceding the 
announcement and the completion of the deal. 
 
 
44 
 
Chen et al. (2005) 
 
 
Audit quality and earnings 
management for Taiwan IPO 
firms. 
 
 
367 new issues between 1999 and 2002. 
 
 
It is found that big five auditors are related to less earnings management in the IPO year in Taiwan. 
 
 
45 
 
Lin et al. (2006) 
 
 
Audit committees and earnings 
restatement  
 
 
 
Sample consists of 212 publicly-held 
corporations in the USA. 
 
 
Negative association between the size of audit committees and the occurrence of earnings 
restatement.  
 
46 
 
Rahman and Ali (2006) 
 
Monitoring function and earnings 
 
Sample consists of 97 firms listed on the 
 
Earnings management is positively related to the size of the board of directors.  
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management. 
 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia over the 
period 2002 – 2003. 
 
 
 
47 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) 
 
 
Real activities manipulation in 
large samples. 
 
 
Compustat database  between 1987 and 
2001 
 
 
This study suggesting price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report lower 
cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. 
 
 
48 
 
Lang et al. (2006) 
 
 
To compare US firms’ earnings 
with reconciled earnings for cross-
listed non-US firms. 
 
 
Sample comprises 698 non-US firm years 
1991 to 2002 
 
 
Relative to the US firms, cross-listed firms report reconciled earnings that are smoother compared 
to cash flows. 
 
49 
 
Petrovits (2006) 
 
 
Corporate philanthropy programs 
to achieve financial reporting 
objectives. 
 
Corporate foundation data from the 
foundations 990-PF, Compustat and 
I/B/E/S database. 
 
Firms reporting small earnings increases make income-increasing discretionary foundation funding 
choices. 
 
 
50 
 
Hribar et al. (2006) 
 
 
Stock repurchases to meet or beat 
analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) 
forecasts. 
 
 
32,536 firms year from 1988 to 2001  
 
A disproportionately large number of accretive stocks repurchases among firms that would have 
missed analysts’ forecasts without the repurchase.  
 
51 
 
Asthana and Zhang 
(2006) 
 
Firms’ and industry’s R&D 
intensity on persistence of 
abnormal earnings. 
 
 
2,524 firms year for the period 1982-2001 
 
 
Result suggests that firms’ and industries’ R&D intensities are both positively correlated with 
persistence of abnormal earnings.  
 
52 
 
Belkaoui and AlNajjar 
(2006) 
 
 
Determinants of earnings opacity 
internationally.  
 
A sample of 34 countries 
 
 
Earnings opacity internationally is negatively related to the levels of economic freedom and quality 
of life, and positively related to rule of law, economic growth and level of corruption.  
 
53 
 
Weber (2006) 
 
 
Executive wealth sensitivity to 
stock price fluctuations serves as 
an incentive for earnings 
management. 
 
 
A sample of 410 chief executive officers 
(CEOs) from 475 randomly selected 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms 
 
 
CEO wealth sensitivity is positively associated with abnormal accrual usage and the relation is 
consistent with income-smoothing.  
 
54 
 
Ebrahim (2007) 
 
 
Earnings management behaviour 
and board activity. 
 
 
SIC codes from 2,000 to 3,999 as listed in 
COMPUSTAT files in 2002 with fiscal 
year  
 
Earnings management is negatively related to both board and audit committee independence.  
 
55 
 
Meek et al. (2007) 
 
 
CEO stock option compensation 
and earnings management. 
 
 
4398 firms for the period 1993 - 2001 
 
 
Earnings management is more likely where stock options are a larger part of CEO compensation.  
 
56 
 
Reed et al. (2007) 
 
 
Successor auditor appointment and 
earnings management. 
 
 
Sample consists of all 119 publicly traded 
clients (1985 - 1994). 
 
 
Replacing Laventol and Horwath with a new auditor resulted in a statistically significant decrease 
in DAs.  
 
57 
 
Johl et al. (2007) 
 
 
Audit quality, earnings 
management, and financial crises. 
 
 
3256 firms covering financial periods 
between 1994 and 1999. 
 
 
Big 5 auditors in Malaysia appear to qualify more frequently than their non-Big 5 counterparts 
when high levels of abnormal accruals are present.  
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58 Chia et al. (2007) 
 
Auditor quality and earnings 
management during financial 
crises. 
 
Sample covers 383 firm-observations for 
the fiscal years of 1995-1998. 
 
The results show that service-oriented companies engage in income decreasing earnings 
management during the crisis period.  
 
 
59 
 
Daniel et al. (2007) 
 
 
Earnings management and 
avoidance of loss reporting. 
 
 
S&P 1500 firms over the period 1992–
2005 
 
 
Firms view expected dividend levels as important earnings thresholds 
 
 
60 
 
Caramanis and Lennox 
(2008) 
 
 
Audit effort and earnings 
management. 
 
 
Hours worked by auditors on 9,738 audits 
in Greece between 1994 and 2002 
 
 
Low audit effort increases the extent to which managers are able to report aggressively high 
earnings. 
 
 
61 
 
Kerstein and  Rai (2007) 
 
 
Earnings management and 
avoidance of loss reporting  
 
34,568 firm-year observations from the 
period 1976 to 2005. 
 
 
A high proportion of firms with small cumulative profits or losses at the beginning of the fourth-
quarter report small annual profits rather than small annual losses 
 
 
62 
 
John and Jorgensen 
(2007) 
 
Earnings management in fiscal 
year earnings relative to these 
alternative measures of firms’ 
annual earnings. 
 
 
18,539 firm-year observations for the 
period 1981 - 2001. 
 
 
Earnings management is not confined to the immediate vicinity of earnings threshold but is 
discernible over boarder sections of earnings and earnings change histograms. 
 
 
63 
 
Bloomfield and 
Shackman (2008) 
 
 
The relationship of NAS fees to 
the occurrence of financial 
statement restatements. 
 
 
The test population was formed by 
selecting 250 financial statement 
restatements announced by public 
companies for the period 2001 - 2002. 
 
 
 
The study did find stronger evidence that the level of total fees paid to the audit firm is significant 
in the predictability of a restatement.  
 
64 
 
Rock and Bonneti 
(2004). 
 
The relationship between 
corruption, investment and growth. 
 
4,689 firm-year observations for the 
period 1992-1996. 
 
 
Corruption is more damaging to investment and growth in small developing countries than in large 
ones. 
 
65 
 
Ades and Di Tella  
(1997). 
 
To examine the relationship 
between interventionist industrial 
policies and corruption. 
 
9,616 firm-year observations for the 
period 1989-1992. 
 
 
It is more expensive to achieve the desired objective using active industrial policies in economies 
where corruption is widespread than in corruption – free environments. 
 
66 
 
La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
Investor protection and ownership 
concentration. 
 
 
49 countries around the world. 
 
The study results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil- 
law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law 
countries located in the middle. They also finds that concentration of ownership of shares in the 
largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the 
hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to 
protect their rights. 
 
 
67 
 
Hoopes et al. (2006) 
 
Relationship between accounting 
and corruption 
 
Sample consists of 67 countries around 
the world. 
 
 
Better accounting and auditing quality can reduce corruption. 
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Robustness test 
Table 5-17 
(Using cross-sectional Jones (1991) model) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with macro governance 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
DACCRit = α0 + α1MACRO + α2SIZEit + α3LEVit + α4GWTHit + α5CFOit + α6CAPit + α7LOSSit + fixed effects…… (i) 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
JUD 
 
SEC 
 
MIN 
 
ACC 
 
RLAW 
 
PRESS 
 
INS 
 
POL 
 
COR 
 
CUL 
 
IFRS 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant .009 
(.023) 
-.011 
(.027) 
.041 
(<.01) 
.042 
(<.01) 
-.017 
(<.01) 
-.027 
(<.01) 
-.021 
(<.01) 
-.037 
(<.01) 
-.024 
(<.01) 
.033 
(<.01) 
-.034 
(<.01) 
MACRO -.009 
(<.01) 
-.005 
(<.01) 
-.015 
(<.01) 
-.014 
(<.01) 
-.029 
(<.01) 
-.017 
(<.01) 
-.029 
(<.01) 
-.022 
(<.01) 
-.022 
(<.01) 
-.015 
(<.01) 
.013 
(<.01) 
Size .007 
(<.01) 
.007 
(<.01) 
.006 
(<.01) 
.006 
(<.01) 
.010 
(<.01) 
.008 
(<.01) 
.010 
(<.01) 
.009 
(<.01) 
.010 
(<.01) 
.008 
(<.01) 
.006 
(<.01) 
LEV .018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.017 
(<.01) 
.017 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
GWTH .052 
(<.01) 
.053 
(<.01) 
.053 
(<.01) 
.053 
(<.01) 
.052 
(<.01) 
.054 
(<.01) 
.052 
(<.01) 
.053 
(<.01) 
.053 
(<.01) 
.052 
(<.01) 
.054 
(<.01) 
CFO -.370 
(<.01) 
-.370 
(<.01) 
-.369 
(<.01) 
-.369 
(<.01) 
-.381 
(<.01) 
-.383 
(<.01) 
-.382 
(<.01) 
-.385 
(<.01) 
-.382 
(<.01) 
-.370 
(<.01) 
-.383 
(<.01) 
CAP .183 
(<.01) 
.186 
(<.01) 
.183 
(<.01) 
.182 
(<.01) 
.171 
(<.01) 
.177 
(<.01) 
.172 
(<.01) 
.180 
(<.01) 
.173 
(<.01) 
.182 
(<.01) 
.187 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.146 
(<.01) 
-.145 
(<.01) 
-.144 
(<.01) 
-.144 
(<.01) 
-.138 
(<.01) 
-.140 
(<.01) 
-.138 
(<.01) 
-.143 
(<.01) 
-.138 
(<.01) 
-.145 
(<.01) 
-.145 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.280 .281 .283 .283 .298 .290 .297 .291 .296 .284 .284 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 N 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in 
Rogers (1993). Coefficient on Year dummies and country dummies are not reported for concision.  
JUD = judicial independence (WEF 2008). SEC = enforcement of securities laws (WEF 2008). MIN = protection of minority shareholders interest (WEF 
2008). ENF = enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). RLAW = rule of laws (WB 1999- 2007). PRESS = press freedom (WB 1999- 
2007). INS = regulatory quality (WB 1999-2007). POL = political stability (WB 1999-2007). COR = control of corruption (WB 1999-2007). CUL = ethical 
behaviour (WEF 2008). IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given year after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. DACCR = signed 
discretionary accruals. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV is total liabilities / total equities for firm i in year t. 
GWTH is return on equity, defined as the net income in year t scaled by total equity in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged total assets. CAP is the non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i reports income before 
extraordinary items in the previous year negative and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5-18 
(Using cross-sectional Jones (1991) model) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with micro governance 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = α0 + α1MICRO + α2SIZEit+ α3GWTHit α4CFOit + α5CAPit + α6LOSSit + fixed effects..........................(ii) 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
BIG4 
 
BOD 
 
BIND 
 
OWN 
 
IPO 
 
LEV 
 
BONUS 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.043 
(<.01) 
-.033 
(<.01) 
.093 
(<.01) 
-.083 
(<.01) 
-.030 
(<.01) 
.132 
(<.01) 
.114 
(<.01) 
MICRO -.013 
(<.01) 
-.001 
(<.01) 
-.025 
(<.01) 
.133 
(<.01) 
.003 
(<.01) 
.015 
(<.01) 
-.030 
(<.01) 
Size .009 
(<.01) 
.008 
(<.01) 
.007 
(<.01) 
.009 
(<.01) 
.010 
(<.01) 
-.001 
(.193) 
.007 
(<.01) 
LEV .018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.017 
(<.01) 
.017 
(<.01) 
-.488 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
GWTH .054 
(<.01) 
.054 
(<.01) 
.052 
(<.01) 
.051 
(<.01) 
.051 
(<.01) 
.044 
(<.01) 
.052 
(<.01) 
CFO -.381 
(<.01) 
-.390 
(<.01) 
-.369 
(<.01) 
-.362 
(<.01) 
-.362 
(<.01) 
-.351 
(<.01) 
-.367 
(<.01) 
CAP .184 
(<.01) 
.183 
(<.01) 
.181 
(<.01) 
.173 
(<.01) 
.172 
(<.01) 
.070 
(<.01) 
.178 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.145 
(<.01) 
-.145 
(<.01) 
-.142 
(<.01) 
-.138 
(<.01) 
-.139 
(<.01) 
-.105 
(<.01) 
-.139 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.285 .286 .285 .295 .291 .452 .288 
N 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 156,906 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method 
in Rogers (1993). Coefficient on Year dummies and country dummies are not reported for concision.  
BIG4 = indicator variable with the value of 1 if the firm audited by one of the BIG4 and otherwise 0.  BOD = no of directors on the board of a firm. 
BIND = board effectiveness (WEF 2008).  OWN = ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 2006). IPO = initial public offerings (WEF 2008). LEV 
= debt divided by equity of a firm. BONUS = performance based compensation (WEF 2008). DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV is total liabilities / total equities for firm i in year t. GWTH is return on 
equity, defined as the net income in year t scaled by total equity in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total 
assets. CAP is the non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i reports income before extraordinary 
items in the previous year negative and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5-19 
 
(Deleting smaller countries) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with macro governance 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = α0 + α1MACRO + α2SIZEit + α3LEVit + α4GWTHit + α5CFOit + α6CAPit + α7LOSSit + fixed effects…………(i) 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
JUD 
 
SEC 
 
MIN 
 
ACC 
 
RLAW 
 
PRESS 
 
INS 
 
POL 
 
COR 
 
CUL 
 
IFRS 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.324 
(<.01) 
-.371 
(<.01) 
-.357 
(<.01) 
-.349 
(<.01) 
-.358 
(<.01) 
-.363 
(<.01) 
-.363 
(<.01) 
-.359 
(<.01) 
-.362 
(<.01) 
-.304 
(<.01) 
-.364 
(<.01) 
MACRO -.008 
(<.01) 
.001 
(.171) 
-.002 
(.075) 
-.003 
(<.01) 
-.023 
(<.01) 
-.012 
(<.01) 
-.023 
(<.01) 
-.021 
(<.01) 
-.017 
(<.01) 
-.013 
(<.01) 
.009 
(<.01) 
Size .018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.020 
(<.01) 
.019 
(<.01) 
.020 
(<.01) 
.020 
(<.01) 
.020 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.017 
(<.01) 
LEV .102 
(<.01) 
.100 
(<.01) 
.100 
(<.01) 
.101 
(<.01) 
.101 
(<.01) 
.100 
(<.01) 
.100 
(<.01) 
.096 
(<.01) 
.099 
(<.01) 
.101 
(<.01) 
.097 
(<.01) 
GWTH -.033 
(<.01) 
-.033 
(<.01) 
-.033 
(<.01) 
-.033 
(<.01) 
-.030 
(<.01) 
-.031 
(<.01) 
-.030 
(<.01) 
-.031 
(<.01) 
-.030 
(<.01) 
-.033 
(<.01) 
-.031 
(<.01) 
CFO .374 
(<.01) 
-.375 
(<.01) 
-.375 
(<.01) 
-.375 
(<.01) 
-.386 
(<.01) 
-.386 
(<.01) 
-.387 
(<.01) 
-.388 
(<.01) 
-.386 
(<.01) 
-.375 
(<.01) 
.-.386 
(<.01) 
CAP .445 
(<.01) 
.448 
(<.01) 
.448 
(<.01) 
.447 
(<.01) 
.438 
(<.01) 
.443 
(<.01) 
.440 
(<.01) 
.442 
(<.01) 
.440 
(<.01) 
.444 
(<.01) 
.449 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.146 
(<.01) 
-.147 
(<.01) 
-.147 
(<.01) 
-.146 
(<.01) 
-.143 
(<.01) 
-.145 
(<.01) 
-.144 
(<.01) 
-.142 
(<.01) 
-.144 
(<.01) 
-.146 
(<.01) 
-.147 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.429 .428 .428 .428 .432 .429 .431 .431 .431 .429 .427 
N 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method in 
Rogers (1993). Coefficient on Year dummies and country dummies are not reported for concision.  
JUD = judicial independence (WEF 2008). SEC = enforcement of securities laws (WEF 2008). MIN = protection of minority shareholders interest (WEF 
2008). ENF = enforcement of accounting & auditing standards (WEF 2008). RLAW = rule of laws (WB 1999-2007). PRESS = press freedom (WB 1999-
2007). INS = regulatory quality (WB 1999-2007). POL = political stability (WB 1999-2007). COR = control of corruption (WB 1999-2007). CUL = ethical 
behaviour (WEF 2008). IFRS = A dummy variable takes the value of 1 for a given year after mandatory IFRS adoption and 0 otherwise. DACCR = signed 
discretionary accruals. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV is total liabilities / total equities for firm i in year t. 
GWTH is return on equity, defined as the net income in year t scaled by total equity in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged total assets. CAP is the non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i reports income before 
extraordinary items in the previous year negative and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5-20 
 
(Deleting smaller countries) 
Regression analysis of discretionary accruals with micro governance 
(Dependent variable is signed discretionary accruals: DACCR) 
 
DACCRit = α0 + α1MICRO + α2SIZEit+ β3GWTHit α4CFOit + α5CAPit + α6LOSSit + fixed effects.......................... (ii) 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
BIG4 
 
BOD 
 
BIND 
 
OWN 
 
IPO 
 
LEV 
 
BONUS 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Estimate 
(p-value) 
Constant -.375 
(<.01) 
-.367 
(<.01) 
.305 
(<.01) 
-.413 
(<.01) 
-.365 
(<.01) 
-.177 
(<.01) 
-.304 
(<.01) 
MICRO -.012 
(<.01) 
-.000 
(<.01) 
-.012 
(<.01) 
.119 
(<.01) 
-.002 
(<.01) 
.065 
(<.01) 
-.013 
(<.01) 
Size .020 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
.019 
(<.01) 
.021 
(<.01) 
.009 
(<.01) 
.018 
(<.01) 
LEV .098 
(<.01) 
.098 
(<.01) 
.102 
(<.01) 
.097 
(<.01) 
.100 
(<.01) 
-.552 
(<.01) 
.101 
(<.01) 
GWTH -.031 
(<.01) 
-.030 
(<.01) 
-.033 
(<.01) 
-.034 
(<.01) 
-.034 
(<.01) 
-.001 
(.077) 
-.033 
(<.01) 
CFO -.386 
(<.01) 
-.395 
(<.01) 
.375 
(<.01) 
-.370 
(<.01) 
-.369 
(<.01) 
-.341 
(<.01) 
-.374 
(<.01) 
CAP .448 
(<.01) 
.448 
(<.01) 
.446 
(<.01) 
.439 
(<.01) 
.438 
(<.01) 
.322 
(<.01) 
.445 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.147 
(<.01) 
-.147 
(<.01) 
-.146 
(<.01) 
-.144 
(<.01) 
-.144 
(<.01) 
-.101 
(<.01) 
-.145 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included included 
Adj. R2 
 
.427 .427 .428 .432 .430 .558 .428 
N 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 115,809 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and country clustering effects using the method 
in Rogers (1993). Coefficient on Year dummies and country dummies are not reported for concision.  
BIG4 = indicator variable with the value of 1 if the firm audited by one of the BIG4 and otherwise 0.  BOD = no of directors on the board of a firm. 
BIND = board effectiveness (WEF 2008).  OWN = ownership concentration (La Porta et al. 2006). IPO = initial public offerings (WEF 2008). LEV 
= debt divided by equity of a firm. BONUS = performance based compensation index (WEF 2008). DACCR = signed discretionary accruals. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV is total liabilities / total equities for firm i in year t. GWTH is return on 
equity, defined as the net income in year t scaled by total equity in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total 
assets. CAP is the non-current (fixed) assets in year t / Total assets in year t. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i reports income before extraordinary 
items in the previous year negative and 0 otherwise. 
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